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In modern times the over-riding policy of the international law of the
sea is commonly regarded as that of establishing and maintaining a public
order in the shared use of, and shared competence over, the oceans,
appropriately balancing the inclusive interests of all states and the
unique, exclusive interests of particular states in the greatest production
of values for all mankind.' The broad outlines of both the highest level
f See Contributors' Section, Masthead, p. 347, for biographical data.
1 See U.N. Secretariat, Memorandum on the Regime of the High Seas 10 (U.N. Doc. No.
A/CN.4/32) (1950); Lauterpacht, "Sovereignty over Submarine Areas," 27 Brit. Yb.
Int'l L. 376, 407 (1950); Smith, The Law and Custom of the Sea (3rd ed. 1959); Jessup,
The Law of Territorial Waters and Maritime Jurisdiction (1927); Dickinson, "Jurisdiction
at the Maritime Frontier," 40 Harv. L. Rev. 1 (1926).
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complementary principles and the more detailed specific prescriptions,
embodying such contraposed inclusive and exclusive interests, by which
the authoritative decision-makers of the general community seek to secure
such economic balance, are the common knowledge both of scholarly
observers and of participants in the processes of use, claim, and decision
by which the oceans are exploited and regulated.2 The necessity, in the
rational application of broad principles and detailed prescriptions, for a
comprehensive, informed, and contextual approach, considering every
specific problem in terms of all the factors in the context relevant to
rational choice between alternatives in decision, seems, however, to have
achieved somewhat less recognition.3 Thus, while officials and scholarly
observers frequently appear to concur upon the general inclusive and
exclusive interests at stake in particular problems, they also commonly
appear either to neglect entirely the specific factors uniquely revelant to
particular policy problems or to attempt to reach decision without ade-
quate investigation of the appropriate weight to be accorded the relevant
factors. Efforts to resolve the perennial problem of the permissible width
of the territorial sea, which has recently provoked a spate of the most
diverse and potentially harmful claims and has thus far proved refractory
to explicit multilateral agreement, seem notably to have been affected by a
disregard of certain special enviroimental factors particularly relevant to
a rational policy choice. Because of the great importance of this problem
to the whole public order of the oceans, it may not be inappropriate to
suggest both a brief examination of the general context which establishes
the importance of the problem and a more comprehensive, detailed
scrutiny of the special factors which ought to be taken into account by
decision makers.
From both historical and contemporary perspectives, the oceans, alone
of all the physical features of the planet earth, may be seen to be open,
under shared competence, to the widest common use by all who possess
the initiative, imagination and resources required for the sometimes
2 For a systematic exposition see McDougal and Burke, "Crisis in the Law of the Sea:
Community Perspectives versus National Egoism," 67 Yale L.J. 539, 550-67 (1958);
McDougal and Schlei, "The Hydrogen Bomb Tests in Perspective: Lawful Measures for
Security," 64 Yale L.J. 648, 655-74 (1955).
3 This, of course, is the consequence of a general orientation which regards international
law as predominantly a "body of rules" divorced from the fabric of human interaction.
For an illustration in the present context see the statement of the delegate of Belgium
at the 1958 Conference on the law of the sea rejecting, as a "basis for international law,"
an "argument" derived from "economic and technical considerations." U.N. Conference
on the Law of the Sea, Official Records, Vol. V, Third Committee (High Seas: Fishing:
Conservation of Living Resources) p. 13, para. 34 (U.N. Doc. A/Conf. 13/41) (1958).
(The official records of this Conference will hereinafter be cited as Official Records with
appropriate volume number.)
Feliciano, Book Review, 68 Yale L.J. 1039 (1959) offers a concise and effective intro-
duction to the need for a different approach.
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formidable tasks of such use. The most important and enduring of the
many productive uses of the vast ocean areas consist, of course, of the
movement and communication which have made possible the efficient
interchange of goods, services and information among peoples of all
parts of the globe.4 The oceans serve, in high degree, as avenues of
communication and transmission between territories and cultures and,
conversely, on occasion, as barriers for shielding and isolating certain
territorial communities from the effects of drastic redistributions of
power in other communities.' Scarcely less significant than this im-
portant service to communication and transportation, the oceans today
function as a huge renewable reservoir of food providing important
regions and populations with much of their subsistence, and promising
even greater yields in the future if the conditions of cooperative develop-
ment are permitted to come to fulfillment.6 Parts of the immense oceanic
floor have already been tapped for access to important reserves of fossil
fuel and geologists report rich possibilities in future exploitation for other
minerals.' Most recently, intensified efforts have been made in coopera-
tive activity to gain further enlightenment about fundamental natural
processes through research into the major portion of the globe which lies
concealed under the oceans.' Another ocean benefit, indirect but no less
important, consists of the continuing historical experience which confirms
that cooperative effort and coordinated restraint, may, and do, offer more
promise of greatest advantage for all participants than do rigidly con-
ceived, exclusive compartmentalization of sharable resourcesf
In protecting their numerous, and often conflicting, particular objec-
tives in the use of the oceans, states traditionally have made claims
against each other for authority-that is, for competence to prescribe and
apply policy-of many differing degrees of exclusiveness and inclusive-
4 The ocean-going vessel is still the primary method of carrying goods, and in its
relation to other forms of transportation is likely to remain the most economical instrument
for moving important bulk commodities. See McDowell and Gibbs, Ocean Transportation
2-3 (1954); Woytinsky and Woytinsky, World Comerce and Governments 429 (1955).
5 McDowell and Gibbs, op. cit. supra note 4 at 4-32; Fayle, A Short History of the
World's Shipping Industry 21-32 (1933).
6 For a comprehensive account of significant features of fishing activity from global
and regional perspectives, see Morgan, World Sea Fisheries (1956); Tressler and Lemon,
Marine Products of Commerce (2d Rev. ed. 1951).
7 Salient facts and references to recent literature are in Reiff, The United States and the
Treaty Law of the Sea 53-57 (1959).
8 Marshack, The World in Space (1958), reviews the scientific aspects of the Inter-
national Geophysical Year; Sullivan, The International Geophysical Year 259 (Int'l Conc.
Pamphlet, No. 521, Jan. 1959), reviews preparations for the IGY and emphasizes its
political aspects.
9 U.N. Dep't of Public Information, "A Chart for All the Oceans-International
Cooperation," 2 U.N. Rev. March, 1956, p. 28, April, 1956, p. 28; UNESCO Secretariat,
Scientific Considerations Relating to the Continental Shelf" (U.N. Doc. No. A/Conf. 13/2)
(1957) in 1 Official Records 39, 45, para. 51 (1958); McDougal and Burke, note 2, supra at
588-89.
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ness. The most comprehensive exclusive claims, the claims which limit
most the participation in decision by other states, are, of course, the
claims to protect the more intense concentrations of coastal interests in
the immediately adjacent waters described as "internal" and "terri-
torial." The most inclusive claims, the claims which, in reciprocity,
promise a concurrent or comparable competence to other interested
states, are the claims relating to events beyond these areas upon the
high seas.10 In recognition of their common interest in shared use and
shared competence over the oceans, states have traditionally claimed,
irrespective of changes over the centuries in particular objectives, only
a relatively narrow strip of immediately adjacent water as territorial sea
over which comprehensive exclusive authority is exercised and honored.
In practically all instances, the width, historically, has been limited to
three or four miles, with a very few isolated claims to six and twelve
miles.
In response to these claims and counterclaims advanced by particular
states for gaining control of the particular events which comprise the
process of shared use of the oceans, the general community of states,
through its established processes of authoritative decision, seeks both to
protect the inclusive interests of all states and the exclusive interests of
particular states and to establish the most appropriate balance between
these two types of accepted interests.1 From the most comprehensive
perspective, over a considerable period of time, it is evident that the
general community has sought to establish this reasonable protection and
balance in respect of the territorial sea by honoring the claims of states
to only a relatively narrow strip of water immediately adjoining the land
mass. This has meant, in practice, that the coastal state is authorized
upon unilateral demand to exercise almost complete authority over
vessels and persons within a narrow body of water adjacent to the shore,
including competence to deny all passage, authority to exclude passage
under certain conditions, authority over events occurring aboard the
vessel, authority over the vessel itself, authority to regulate navigation,
and most significantly, authority to exclude foreigners from fishery
exploitation. Beyond this narrow strip of territorial sea, in the waters
of what are called contiguous areas, the general community permits the
10 General categorization of these claims, explicitly noting the relationship between
the varying concentrations of interests and the degree of comprehensiveness in exclusiveness,
is in McDougal and Burke, note 2, supra at 550-555. A more comprehensive listing of
claims is in McDougal, Burke, and Vlasic, The Maintenance of Public Order at Sea and
the Nationality of ships. 54 Am. J. Int'l Law 25 (1960).
11 McDougal and Burke, note 2, supra 567-89. For a more general statement and
discussion of this policy problem in relation to world social processes see McDougal,
"The Impact of International Law upon National Law: A Policy-Oriented Perspective,"
4 S.D.L. Rev. 25 (1959).
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coastal state a diminishing, much less comprehensive, competence for
special, limited purposes to protect local value processes from external
threat and deprivation. In terms of inclusive interests, the concession of
comprehensive authority only within narrow geographical confines means
that in practical effects in the vast areas beyond immediately adjacent
waters the ships of all states are largely subjected only to the authority
of the state of the national character of a vessel, that the ocean is open
to unhindered use by all for transportation, communication, research, and
other purposes, and that the immense food reserves of the oceans are
available to all who seek to exploit them, subject to community-sanctioned
limitations for preserving future yields at desirable levels or for otherwise
regulating effort.'
The success of this traditional accommodation of inclusive and ex-
clusive interests, readily apparent in the concrete accomplishments of
the past, includes an immense production and wide sharing of all values
-most especially, power, wealth, enlightenment and skill-and scarcely
needs new documentation here. More immediate manifestation of the
viability of the historic balance, favoring inclusive claims to the widest
possible productive access to the oceans, is in the fact that not until very
recently have states attempted seriously to make claims to enlarge the
territorial sea. Today, however, a few states have begun to make claims
which threaten to reverse the traditional presumption and priority in
favor of inclusive use and to endanger that cooperative exploitation which
is indispensable if the community is to gain the full measure of potential
benefits from a very rich concentration of resources. The most exag-
gerated of these claims to widen the territorial sea have emanated from
some few South American states, claiming the right to sell what has
previously been regarded as common patrimony. Yet a number of other
states, perhaps not always with the same objectives, have also sought
radical extensions of the area subject to exclusive coastal access and com-
12 This is a rather capsule version of the way in which the community has established
a protection and balance of inclusive and exclusive interests. See McDougal and Burke, note
2, supra at 558-67. The 1958 Conference on the law of the sea may have both undesirable
and preferred effects upon this general accommodation. See, among a growing body of
literature on the results of that conference, Sorensen, The Law of the Sea (Intl Conc.
Pamphlet No. 520, 1958); Jessup, "The United Nations Conference on the Law of the
Sea," 59 Colum. L. Rev. 234 (1959); Dean, "The Geneva Conference on the Law of the
Sea: What Was Accomplished," 52 Am. J. Int'l L. 607 (1958); Tunkin, The Geneva
Conference on the Law of the Sea, International Affairs (Moscow) 47 (1958); Garcia-
Amador, The Exploitation and Conservation of the Resources of the Sea (2d ed. 1959),
Jessup, "The Geneva Conference on the Law of the Sea: A Study in International
Law-Making," 52 Am. J. Int'l L. 730 (1958); Whiteman, "Conference of the Law of the
Sea: Convention on the Continental Shelf," 52 Am. J. Int'l L. 629 (1958); Petren,
"Reflections on the Conference at Geneva on the Law of the Sea," in Egyptian Society
of International Law, Lectures on Topics of International Law and Economic Develop-
ments 51 (1959); Nikolic, "U.N. Conference on the Law of the Sea," 5 Jugoslovenska
Revija Za Medunarodno Provo 72 (1958).
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petence. So strong suddenly has this demand become for satisfaction of
short-term exclusive interests at the expense of wider community and
long-term exclusive interests that it both blocked efforts, at the 1958
Geneva Conference on the law of the sea, to achieve explicit agreement
on the issue and succeeded in securing, in proposed compromise formula-
tions, very substantial, and perhaps uneconomic, concessions to exclusive
demand. As is well known, the two strongest adherents to a three mile
territorial sea, the United States and the United Kingdom, conditionally
abandoned their traditional views at the 1958 Conference, and, as
compromise moves, supported a six-mile territorial sea coupled with a
further six-mile zone to which the coastal state would have exclusive
access to fishing resources subject to certain prior rights of other
states. This proposal commanded wide support but did not attract suf-
ficient backing to be included in the Convention on the Territorial Sea."3
Thus, although the outcome of the Geneva Conference manifested an
apparent accord on a number of issues of substantial potential im-
portance for the productive and rational use of the oceans and their many
resources, 14 agreement on the most important issue of all, that of the
width of the territorial sea, proved to be impossible. The failure to
resolve this issue is widely considered to be especially unfortunate both
because of its vital relationship to the scope of shared competence and
use, which of course becomes more restricted as the territorial sea is
widened, and because of the harmful friction and tension an unresolved
issue of such importance is capable of creating, and does create, even
between otherwise friendly states. The great desirability of reaching
explicit agreement, expressing a rational community policy on this issue,
and of achieving a consensus which would remove a potent source of
controversy between states is so widely acknowledged that new proposals
to these ends are to be discussed at an international conference to be
convened by the United Nations early in 1960.15
If a greater measure of success, rather than new frustration, in the
clarification of a rational policy in the general community interest, is
to be achieved at the approaching new conference, it would seem im-
portant that any decisions taken should be based upon that background
of available information which alone will permit full awareness of the
costs and gains of various alternative prescriptions for the breadth of
the territorial sea. More specifically, attention might profitably be
13 The evolution in state claims on this issue and community response are reviewed
infra at pp. 236-45.
14 See sources cited note 12 supra for early appraisals both by participants in the
Conference and by qualified observers.
'5 U.N. Doc. No. A/RES/1307 (XIII) (1958), U.N. Gen. Ass. Off. Rec. 13th Sess.
Supp. No. 18, at 54-55 (A/4090) (1958).
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focused by planners for the Conference and by commentators upon
factors relevant to the two major demands most often asserted by states
in justification of their proposals for establishing a territorial sea wider
than states have traditionally claimed: the needs of security in the light
of modern military technology, which allegedly require extension of all
components of exclusive authority, and the needs in allocation and
preservation of fishery resources in the light of improved fishing gear
and technique and expanding populations, which allegedly necessitate
greater exclusive access than claimed in the past.' The effects of over-
expanded comprehensive exclusive authority over the oceans upon con-
tinued efficient use of the oceans for transportation and communication
must also be assayed by criteria which embrace both inclusive and long-
term exclusive interests. It will be abundantly clear, we suggest, that
the width of the territorial sea is wholly irrelevant for major security
purposes, that enlarging exclusive access of coastal states to fishery
resources by this method, or by any other, is far more likely to impede
development and conservation than to assist in achieving greater present
production or maintaining future yields, and that the undesirable effects
upon efficient transportation and communication, whatever their magni-
tude and however measured, are not compensated by gain in inclusive or
exclusive interests and are, therefore, wholly undesirable from either
community or more particular perspectives. For purposes of documenting
these appraisals we now turn, first, to a systematic examination of the
factual background revelant to the issue of the width of the territorial
sea; then, to the clarification of a desirable community policy with
respect to the different claims to establish a width for the territorial sea;
next, to an examination of trends in past decisions and to future proba-
bilities; and finally, to an appraisal of trends and the recommendation
of alternatives.
I. BACKGROUND RELEVANT TO COMMUNITY POLICY
Events of the past three decades have made it manifest to all that it
is a concern for access to fisheries and for control over access of war-
ships which have engendered the considerable, often bitter and violent,
controversy over claims, and opposition to claims, to extend the breadth
of the territorial sea.
16 These demands form a consistent theme both in the extended deliberations of the
International Law Commission and in the discussions in the Committee on the Territorial
Sea at the Geneva Conference. See pp. 233-45 infra. The assumed relevance of the
territorial sea for fishing purposes is ancient. See Riesenfeld, The Protection of Coastal
Fisheries Under International Law 3 (1942).
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A. Fisheries and the Territorial Sea
In demanding either exclusive rights of exploitation or exclusive com-
petence to prescribe conservation measures, both of which are permis-
sible components of coastal authority within the territorial sea,17 states
frequently allege that adjacent fisheries are not adequate to support both
local and foreign exploitation either because of biological limits operating
upon the fish population in its environment, or because of cost and
income factors, or for both reasons.'8 It is urged, accordingly, that the
territorial sea must be widened in order that local fishermen may have
exclusive access to a larger ocean area or so that the coastal state may
be permitted exclusively to prescribe measures for preserving the future
yield, including, presumably, the authority to determine the allocation
of shares in the catch if any foreign fishing is to be allowed at all.
In this context the essential facts for background are those which
states consider to be important in support of their claims to widen the
territorial sea. These include, in general terms, the amount of available
resources, the general world effort to exploit such resources, and, of most
vital importance, the relationship between the intensity of fishing effort
and the future availability of fish. Accordingly, after initial reference to
factors affecting the desirability of increasing fish production, we focus
attention, with respect to the aggregate of fishery resources, upon the
location of commercial fisheries, information concerning the size and
productivity of the resources, and the difficulty and complexity of se-
curing such intelligence. Reference is then made, in relation to the fishing
effort, to the intensity of fishing around the globe and to the factors
affecting the extent of effort by particular states. Finally, in assessing
the impact of fishing intensity upon future resources, we examine briefly
the realism in the frequently mentioned possibility of complete extinction
or destruction of a fishery resource, diverse conceptions of overfishing a
particular resource, the level and kind of information necessary to a
determination that a resource will not support the presently exerted
fishing effort or future increase in that effort, and, finally, some domestic
and international economic features of fishery exploitation.
Insofar as population growth and the need for food are concerned it is
not proposed here to engage in theoretical estimates of the so-called car-
17 Jessup, op. cit. note 1, supra at xxxiii-xmdv, 115-208 (1927); Riesenfeld, op.
cit. note 16, supra at 277-82.
18 This allegation is quite common. It should be noted, however, that some demands
put forward for "conservation" of fishing resources are, in fact, demands for assuring a
more satisfactory rate of profit to local fishermen. Thus, the Icelandic claim for wider
fishing limits, which is commonly made in terms of the necessity of maintaining the fish
stocks around the island, seems to be primarily an effort to improve the profitableness of
fishing operations. See Iceland Ministry for Foreign Affairs, The Icelandic Fishery Limits
(April 1959).
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rying capacity of the earth, 9 but to emphasize that whatever this capacity
may be it is not even now efficiently employed to satisfy the needs of the
present population. In 1946 it was estimated that, for a period before
World War II, the food supplies in areas occupied by one-half of the
world's population were not adequate to furnish the minimum caloric
requirements of the average individual-it is to be emphasized that the
reference is to "food supplies" and not to actual caloric intake20 The
latter is very probably much lower than the value of the supplies. Six
years later, the FAO concluded that in comparison to the pre-war pe-
riod ". . .not only has there been an appreciable fall in the average
caloric supply for the world as a whole but also the large gaps between
the better and worse fed nations have widened."'" More importantly, for
present purposes, about four-fifths of the population receive inadequate
amounts of "protective foods," those which furnish minerals, vitamins
and proteins 2 In respect to proteins, meat is one of its most important
sources and, for this purpose, fish is the equivalent of meat.23
Some commentators have asserted that population growth is the most
important condition affecting the problem of providing peaceful access
for all peoples to widely demanded values,2 4 e.g., power, wealth and well-
being. This priority derives substantially from the fact that food is
19 There are numerous, widely divergent estimates of future population totals and
carrying capacity. See U.N. Dep't of Economic and Social Affairs, The Determinants and
Consequences of Population Trends 185-86 (U.N. Doc. No. ST/SOA/SER. A/17) (1953)
for a number of estimates of the carrying capacity and a critical appraisal of them.
The subject has also been widely discussed in more popular form: Osborn, The Limits of
the Earth (1953); Osborn, Our Plundered Planet (1948); Vogt, The Road to Survival
(1948). There seems to be considerable question about the usefulness of these projections
of carrying capacity. See U.N. Dep't of Economic and Social Affairs, The Future Growth
of World Population 21-22 (U.N. Doc. No. ST/SOA/SER.A/28) (1958); Bennett, The
World's Food 50-53 (1954).
20 FAO, World Food Survey 6-7 (1946).
21 FAO, Second World Food Survey 11 (1952).
22 Id. at 11-15; Woytinsky and Woytinsky, World Population and Production 303-04
(1953). The nutritional quality of food is also most important for health; a recent FAO
study states that "[Rlequirements for protein have been extensively studied and it is
established that a protein intake below certain levels is incompatible with health or with
life itself." FAO, Calorie Requirements-Report of the Second Committee on Calorie
Requirements 2 (1957).
23 FAO, World Food Survey 12 (1946); U.N. Interim Comm'n on Food and Agricul-
ture, Five Technical Reports on Food and Agriculture 179 (1945).
For a criticism of the FAO and an argument that this agency ". . . has tended to paint
the picture of the world food situation in the most somber colors, whether or not in
precise reflection of the facts. . . .," see Bennett, op. cit. note 19, supra at 189 et seq.
Professor Bennett contends that the data from the two World Food Surveys "afford no
credible evidence of persisting calorie shortage anywhere during the period 1934-38." Id. at
200.
24 The rate of growth for the world as a whole "appears to be more rapid now than
it has been at any earlier time." U.N. Dep't of Economic and Social Affairs, Determinants
and Consequences of Population Trends, op. cit. note 19, supra at 3. This U.N. study pre-
sumably was projected because information regarding the factors affecting population
trends and economic and social effects of population increases was considered especially
important at a time when the rate of population increase was so high.
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chronically unavailable to the greater part of mankind in sufficient quan-
tity or quality to avert hunger and to maintain adequate nutrition. The
facts of population growth are more significantly viewed, however, in
terms of the areas experiencing, or about to experience, the greatest
relative growth. Although estimates on this subject are notoriously in-
accurate, and usually err by being too conservative,25 it does seem to be
agreed that the rate of population increase tends to be highest in areas
already lacking in food supplies or the capital necessary to produce goods
which can be exchanged either for food or for the means to produce food
for more people.26 Even in areas where the rate of increase is not high
the absolute increase may be such as to place a great strain on available
supplies because of an inability to accelerate production sufficiently to
offset the increase. In either of these instances the problem of securing
enough food to meet local requirements is tied to the more general prob-
lem of economic development, and when fishing resources are available,
these may figure prominently in general development schemes.2 7
Since agricultural exploitation, and the distribution of the products
thereof, has failed to meet world food needs, some have urged greater
effort at exploiting what appear to be huge and available quantities of
ocean resources. 28 It is quite common to read that, after all, the ocean
occupies about 70% of the earth's surface and receives much the greater
part of the sunlight which is the basic source of energy from which man
derives all his food. Cofisequently, it is beyond question that the ocean
contains incredible amounts of matter, organic and inorganic, which is
converted into the flesh of equally incredible numbers of fish. It is
25 Dramatic evidence of the margin of error on a world scale is furnished by a 1957
U.N. population projection which notes sharp upward revisions of estimates of 1980
population from estimates made only a few years before. See U.N. Dep't of Economic
and Social Affairs, The Future Growth of World Population, note 19, supra at vii-viii.
It is noted that estimates for individual states have a "low order of reliability," id. at 1,
but the usefulness of population models is defended. Id. at 39.
26 FAO, Second World Food Survey 26-27 (1952); U.N. Economic and Social Council,
Population Commission Report, p. 3, Off. Rec. 27th Sess., Supp. No. 3 (E/3207/Rev. 1)
(E/CN. 9/156/Rev. 1) (1959).
Such areas would include much of Asia, Africa and Latin America, but the figures on
population for these areas are in many respects incomplete or lacking and estimates
are subject to substantial qualification. U.N. Dep't of Economic and Social Affairs, The
Determinants and Consequences of Population Trends, op. cit. note 19, supra at 10-20.
Areas categorized by one observer as in the demographic stage of "high growth potential"
include "Egypt, Central Africa, much of the Near East, virtually all of Asia outside the
Soviet Union and Japan, the islands of the Pacific and the Caribbean and much of
Central and South America." The categorization by Notestein, is referred to in Woytinsky
and Woytinsky, op. cit. note 22, supra at 257-58. See also U.N. Dep't of Economic and
Social Affairs, Population Growth and the Standard of Living in Underdeveloped
Countries (U.N. Doc. No. ST/SOA/SER. A/20) (1954).
27 FAO, Second World Survey 26 (1952).
28 FAO Fisheries Division, "Improving the Fisheries Contribution to World Food
Supplies," 6 FAO Fisheries Bull. 159 (1953); U.N. Interim Commission on Food and
Agriculture, op. cit. note 23, supra at 179; Smith and Chapin, The Sun, The Sea and
Tomorrow (1954).
[Vol. 45
TERRITORIAL SEA
estimated that the ocean contains 90%o of the "possible food material"
of the world and that each year the ocean produces one billion tons of
fish.29 But despite this theoretical abundance, and although total meat
production falls far short of meeting the world's protein requirements,
somewhat less than 30 million tons of fish are now caught each year30
and it is estimated that fish comprise only about 10% of the world supply
of animal protein.31 While this relative failure to exploit a very rich
source of food seems amazing, it may be remembered that exploitation of
land for agricultural purposes is also wholly inadequate in many parts of
the world, and is certainly an easier task than seeking to exploit fish in
the sea. Nevertheless, the facts are that the food may be found in the
ocean and that the major barrier to increasing the supply from that
source is not essentially biological but that of creating new human ar-
rangements, including research, for properly exploiting the oceans.3 2
Even if, for the world as a whole, an expanded agricultural production
could increase food supplies very substantially, there are parts of the
world in which the fish in the sea are very important for meeting future
protein needs.33
The most important factors accounting for the location of fisheries are
those relating to favorable environmental conditions. For the most part
the combination of light, temperature, nutrient elements and other factors
is most favorable in the relatively shallow waters adjacent to the great
continental land masses of the world and it is in these areas that the
great fisheries are chiefly located. 4 While it is important to note that fish
are most commonly found in commercial quantities in the relatively
restricted areas above the continental shelf, and therefore in some
29 Id. at 37, 56. Some idea of the astronomical figures involved is indicated by the
further estimate that "fish production is less than one-tenth of one per cent of the total
plant production in the sea." Id. at 35.
30 1958 United Nations Statistical Yearbook, 88 (1958) gives figures on total world catch
which include inland fisheries. Statistics on the catch from ocean fisheries for the years
1953-1956 are set out in FAO Memorandum, The Economic Importance of the Sea
Fisheries in Different Countries (U.N. Doc. No. A/Conf. 13/16) (1957) in 1 Official
Records 245.
31 FAO, Second World Food Survey 30 (1952). When the annual world catch was
established at 20 million tons it was estimated that only one million tons became available
as protein. World consumption of meat was then estimated at 50 million tons annually.
Smith and Chapin, op. cit. note 28, supra at 39-40. See also Woytinsky and Woytinsky,
op. cit. note 22, supra at 746.
32 FAO Fisheries Division, note 28, supra at 159. For reference to factors limiting
or deterring needed increases, see id. at 180.
33 One reason is that the problem of distributing the produce of agriculture exploitation
is very difficult and the areas lacking in protein are likely to be the last to benefit from
greater production. Increased fish production in adjacent sea areas is, on the other hand,
definitely possible and would be needed as a source of protein even as world supply from
other sources is increased.
34 Sverdrup, Johnson and Fleming, The Oceans-Their Physics, Chemistry 'and General
Biology 279 (1942); U.N. Interim Commission on Food and Agriculture, op. cit. note 23,
supra at 181; Von Bonde, "Latent Fishery Resources and Means for their Development,"
7 U.N. Scientific Conference on the Conservation and Utilization of Resources 35 (1951)
(hereinafter cited as UNSCCUR); Sea Fisheries 34 (Graham ed. 1956).
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proximity to a particular state, this does not establish a particularly
precise location of the place fish are caught in relation to the adjoining
land mass. The world's continental shelves vary greatly in width off the
different coasts around the globe.3 5 Furthermore, it is very doubtful that,
except in certain very limited instances, there is a reliable estimate on
the catch at varying distances from shore. Fishermen are not likely to
make such calculations while in the process of fishing, even if it were
possible to do so; in any event, they are primarily interested in searching
for, and finding, fish in sufficient density and quantity to repay the
effort to catch them.
5 a
One of the most important facts about fish, which alone would make
it virtually impossible to establish a conservation program, or to claim
meaningful exclusive access within a fixed zone of a specific width, is
that even the relatively sedentary type may range rather widely within
the confines of the continental shelves, and pelagic species move over
vast expanses of water.30 Fish move horizontally, that is roam from
one place to another, and vertically, at different depths, and no uniform
width for the territorial sea could encompass the range within which
fish move in all their life phases.3 7 Not only do fish move in and out
of territorial seas, even those of rather exaggerated width, such as
twelve miles, but they move laterally along coasts and where a coast
is divided into several sovereign states the fish may move through waters
35 For a relatively detailed description of shelf areas, including width, see Shepard,
Submarine Geology 107-44 (1948); UNESCO Secretariat, Scientific Considerations Relating
to the Continental Shelf (U.N. Doc. No. A/Conf. 13/2) (1957), 1 Official Records 39,
40-1 (1958) ; Morgan, op.cit. note 6, supra at 19-22 (1956).
35a We wish to be very explicit in noting that we exclude from this discussion, and
have no intent to refer to, anadromous species, i.e., those which live in the sea but
spawn in fresh water. Salmon are the most valuable of this species and, perhaps, of any
commercial fish. A population of this kind could probably be completely destroyed
since it would be possible to prevent their return to spawning grounds. The restraints
adopted by coastal states on the catch of salmon are designed to maintain future
yields; the relationship between these restraints and such yields are obvious. When,
therefore, non-coastal fishermen exploit such fish on the high seas the effect upon coastal
fishermen is evident and direct, and explains the problems which, too frequently, plague
relations between Japan and the United States and Japan and Russia with reference to
the salmon fishing of the North Pacific. See, for a comprehensive study of this industry
in the United States, Gregory and Barnes, North Pacific Fisheries (1939).
For an appraisal of the continuing difficulties between the states concerned, see N.Y. Times,
Aug. 16, 1959, p. 82. It should be noted that this newspaper story appears to have been
derived from the Japan Report, published by the Japanese Information Office in New
York.
36 Referring to the instance in which the movement of fish within the exploited area
is "strictly localized," it has been observed that "this situation is probably rare in major
fisheries, though an approximation to it might be found in fisheries based on species
restricting their distribution to a specific type of habitat which occurs only in isolated
localities." Beverton and Holt, On The Dynamics of Exploited Fish Populations 135-36
(1957). Apart from migrations of whole populations there ". . . are the more local move-
ments of individual fish which are responsible for the continual interchange of fish between
adjacent areas within the general habitat, whether the population as a whole is moving or is
static." Id. at 136. See also Morgan, op. cit., note 6, supra, passim.
37 Bottemanne, Principles of Fisheries Development 23-25 (1959).
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under the exclusive competence of several states.8" No unilaterally
conceived and implemented program of conservation or exploitation could
make sense under such circumstances.asa
Even where it is known that conditions are generally favorable for
concentrations of fish, it is most important to secure reliable estimates
of the abundance and productivity of the fish stock or stocks capable
of exploitation if resources are to be rationally allocated to this capability.
One comprehensive study observes that, while other techniques might
later be developed, the "best test" now available for determining fishery
possibilities consists of actually fishing an area on a commercial scale. 9
So little of this experimental work has been done, however, that this
same observer concludes that "[f]or many fishing grounds in the
Pacific, Indian Ocean, and South Atlantic there are insufficient data for
a satisfactory estimate to be made of the possible optimum production. 40
The relevance of information about the abundance and productivity of
fish stocks extends beyond appraisals of latent fishing grounds to well-
known fishing areas. Here, too, such information would appear to be
most vital for appraising the desirability of claims both to exclusive
exploitation and to conservation. 41 Fortunately, fishery scientists have
placed the greatest emphasis upon population studies. Thus, one expert's
recent observation indicates the importance and dimension of the prob-
lem: "It is, of course, of the utmost importance to determine the
magnitude of the population constituting the resource, in relation to
the amount being harvested, in order to determine whether or not
the current rate of fishing is too large or small, and thus to have a
basis for judging whether any conservation action is required."4' Another
expert has offered a slightly different estimate of the urgency of the
task, in the following terms:
38 Netherlands Economic Institute, The Development of Offshore Fisheries and the
Economics of Choice 25 (1958). Emphasis on this fact was used at the 1958 Geneva Con-
ference to oppose attempts to secure international recognition of the "special interest"
of coastal states in maintaining productivity of adjacent fishery resources. 5 Official Records
10-11, para. 6.
38a Notes 41-44, infra.
89 Morgan, op. cit. note 6, supra at 14-17.
40 Id. at 17.
41 Claims to exclusive exploitation appear to rest most frequently upon the premise
that the fish available are not sufficient to satisfy all current demands and maintenance
of future yields. Customarily, conservation is said to rest on the notion that some
type of regulation must be imposed if the future yield is to be maintained at the maximum
sustainable. Claims so presented, whether for exploitation or conservation, require certain
basic information concerning the size of the population and the effects of fishing. See
note 42, infra. And see Van Cleve, The Economic and Scientific Basis of the Principle of
Abstention (U.N. Doc. No. A/Conf. 13/3) (1957), 1 Official Records 47, 60 (1958).
42 Schaefer, "The Scientific Basis for a Conservation Programme," Papers Presented at
the International Technical Conference on the Conservation of the Living Resources of
the Sea 14, 23 (Rome, 18 April-10 May 1955) (U.N. Doc. A/Conf. 10/7) (1956)
(hereinafter cited as 1955 Rome Papers).
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The greatest and most comprehensive need towards that understanding
of the living resources of the sea which is indispensable to their rational
utilization and consequently to the formulation of scientifically sound
measures of conservation in respect of any given species, or group of
species, would seem to be systematic and, in particular regions, intensive
and detailed observation of those characteristics of the sea-its move-
ments, its conservative and non-conservative properties-which have
obvious and profound influences on fishes and other marine creatures on
which fishes depend. The great problem of discovering the causes of
natural fluctuations in the incidence, abundance, and quality of fish
stocks seems fundamentally to depend for its solution on such obser-
vation ...
Conjointly, and with the same problem in view, there is almost
equally great need on the biological side for accurate, quantitative assess-
ments of local and regional fish stocks, the age composition of each and
the annual recruitment thereto; of predator species; of the abundance
and composition of fish food as well as of inimically non-fish-food organ-
isms; of the exact nature of the Contribution of the former to the develop-
ment, growth, and maintenance of fishes under varying physical condi-
tions, and, on a uniform basis of intercomparability, of the intensities
and magnitudes of man's predatory activities towards economically
valuable food fish stocks.43
A comprehensive statement of the scientific information needed for con-
servation purposes (and for certain exploitative claims), as agreed upon
by experts in international conference, includes:
a. Extent of separation of the fishery resource into independent or semi-
independent populations; ...
b. Magnitude and geographical range of the populations constituting the
resource; ...
c. Pertinent facts respecting the life history (such as growth, mortality
rates, migration, recruitment, etc.) ecology, behaviour, and population
dynamics of the species constituting the resource ...
d. Effects of the amount, manner and kind of fishing on the resource and
on the quantity and quality of the sustainable average catch to be
obtained from it . . .and
e. Relationships of the same resource to other species which are members
of the same ecological community and are being expoited simultane-
ously by the same fishing equipment.
4
Gathering all this information is an immensely complicated, difficult
and time-consuming task, one which, not infrequently, takes years to
complete.45  It has been estimated, for instance, that statistics con-
cerning the "best-known and most studied fishery in the world" have
not been "entirely adequate" in view of the experience with international
43 Tait, "Outstanding Questions," 1955 Rome Papers 81, 81-2, note 42, supra.
44 Report of the International Technical Conference on the Conservation of the
Living Resources of the Sea 3 (U.N. Doc. A/Conf. 10/6) (1955).
45 Id. at para. 22.
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regulation which has relied on them.46 The same observer concludes that
"one of the most important essentials for any fishery is the compilation
from its origin of those statistics (catch, date, place, effort, and so on,
all to the required detail) which alone make assessment and then predic-
tion possible."'4 Some measure of the difficulties involved is indicated
by the appraisal, in one recent study, that in the United States "[1] ack
of adequate understanding of the occurrence, behavior and potential
harvest of fish and other marine organisms serves as a serious barrier to
extensive economic development and utilization of marine biological
resources.)48 Finally, it has been indicated that even where relatively
complete statistical details have become available there are formidable
difficulties in interpreting them.49
It may be added that the proposals for dividing the oceans into large
areas open only to the nationals of one state could greatly complicate
the task of acquiring greater information about fisheries. Restrictions
on the freedom of movement of fishermen and investigators might
severely handicap highly useful inquiry.50
Although the great fisheries of the world are mostly located within
relatively short distances from the coasts of continents and islands, and
thus within the range of economic exploitation, it appears that some of
them have not been exploited fully and effectively. For example, it is
estimated that 98% of the world's catch comes from fisheries located
in the northern hemisphere.51 The great fisheries in this half of the
globe have been fished for many years, and even centuries in some cases;
yet observers have nevertheless declared that certain fisheries are still
not being exploited to their full potential and that some fisheries in this
46 The full passage reads:
It is a matter of history that, for the best-known and most studied" fishery in the
world, it has taken approximately fifty years to introduce its first international regula-
tion, only to find that there are still many problems to solve. What is important,
however, is that it is now possible to foresee some of the dangers as well as to
predict with some certainty the prospective benefits. This is only because there are
now available long series of statistics, steadily improving in precision for conservation
purposes, albeit still not entirely adequate.
Lucas, "Regulation of North Sea Fisheries under the Convention of 1946." 1955 Rome
Papers, 167, 177, note 42, supra.
47 Ibid.
48 National Academy of Sciences-National Research Council, Oceanography 1960
to 1970 22 (1959) (First chapter of a report in progress by the Committee on Ocea-
nography.)
49 Burkenroad, "Fluctuation in Abundance of Pacific Halibut," 11 Bull. Bing. Ocean.
Coll. 81 (1948); Burkenroad, "Theory and Practice of Marine Fishery Management,"
18 J. du Conseil Permanent International pour L'Exploration de la Mer 300 (1953);
Beverton and Holt, op. cit. note 36, supra at 24-26.
50 FAO, Millions Still Go Hungry 64-5 (1957) (12th Report of the Director General).
51 LeGall, The Present World Problem of Sea Fisheries, 7 UNSCCUR 11, 12; Thompson,
Latent Fishery Resources and Means for Their Development, 7 UNSCCUR 28.
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hemisphere are not fished at all. 2 The southern hemisphere, which con-
tains the greater part of the world's waters and is 80% ocean, furnishes
only 21% of the world's catch and is apparently capable of greatly in-
creased production. While observers differ greatly in their estimates
of the possibilities of exploitation in the southern oceans, very general
assessments indicate that the latent resources are most extensive. 53
As indicated above, detailed surveys of fishery resources have not, for the
most part, been made.5" Progress is very slow when dependent solely upon
the initiative and skills of the individual states, chiefly because of the
lack of personnel capable of the necessary scientific work and the absence
of capital for investing in the equipment for exploitation. 55 However,
advances are now being made in cooperation with the Food and Agricul-
tural Organization and its various regional organizations for fisheries.56
There seems to be little ground for pessimism on the potentialities of these
waters, particularly in view of the results of research which indicate that
warmer waters are not so unfavorable to the development of marine
organisms as has customarily been thought,57 and as still asserted in
52 As is usual in this field, the estimates are contradictory. LeGall, note 51, supra at
12, declares that "[the possibilities of developing sea fishing in the northern hemisphere
are at present very limited." But Thompson offers evidence to the contrary. The herring
fisheries furnish about 15% of the total world production, an enormous quantity of fish,
yet "show no signs of depletion, and, indeed are capable of expansion." Thompson, note
51, supra at 29. Furthermore, there are a number of species not now marketed but
which might be caught in commercial quantities. Id. at 30. See also Graham, ed., op.
cit. supra note 34, at 49. 1
53 LeGall declares that in the southern hemisphere exploration "has shown vast
possibilities, certainly superior to the northern hemisphere. . . ." LeGall, note 51, supra
at 12. For a fairly detailed assessment of these possibilities see Thompson, note 51, supra
at 30-33; Von Bonde, note 34, supra at 36. Morgan, op. cit. supra note 6, assesses the
possibilities of expansion in a detailed regional survey.
54 See, generally, the papers on Developing Fishery Resources in 7 UNSCCUR 27
et. seq., containing numerous references to the need for surveys in the area; Morgan,
op. cit. note 6, supra at 14-18.
55 Some of the difficulties are indicated in the following description of the type of survey
work required:
. . . the work must be planned and sustained over a considerable period of years in
order to be carried to completion, discover the short and long-range fluctuations of
fish occurrences and the natural causes therefor, and to interest the necessary personnel
[which will consist of experienced marine biologists and skilled fishing and technical per-
sonnel], together with crews recruited, for climatic and economic reasons, from the
regions concerned. Owing to the peculiar difficulties associated with developing new
fisheries in warmer waters, private enterprise is unlikely to undertake the survey work,
which must be financed and prosecuted by Governments, up to the stage where
more promising prospects are revealed.
Thompson, note 51 supra at 34. Even the determination of when to conduct a survey
may be a most complex decision.
56 The Fisheries Bulletin formerly published by the FAO periodically carried details of
the work being done. Publications of the regional groups, such as the Indo-Pacific Fisheries
Council, furnish similar information. The FAO is now engaged in the evaluation of world
fishery resources, a task apparently not to be completed for some time. For a description
of the project, see 8 FAO Fisheries Bull. 197-202 (1955).
57 "The position has been quite widely held, that the warm seas are inherently less
fertile than the cold ones, because of a lower content of nutrient substance for plant-
growth. However, recent studies have suggested that this is a superficial distinction only
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some quarters for political reasons."
The capacity of states to exploit adjacent fisheries is another factor
of considerable importance and includes both the potential for investment
in fishing and processing equipment and the availability of markets.
The lack of capital for investment in fishery exploitation and the absence
of a market for consumption of an expanded fishery production often
constitute considerable barriers to the effective use of adjacent resources. 59
Unfortunately, these barriers appear to be most formidable in the very
states which could most benefit from the use of marine resources. The
states facing the most serious nutrition problems generally lack the
capital to permit the effective use of fish in the nearby ocean and, because
of their low economic level, the population may not provide an adequate
market for the fish which could be caught if the necessary capital were
made available.60 The market problem is considerably complicated also
because of the peculiar demands upon the transportation, preservative
and storage industries by a perishable commodity such as fish., Further-
more, while it is clear that the underdeveloped states face many serious
problems because of the lack of investment capital, this has particular
and that questions of the rate of turnover of the crop of plankton ... etc., are involved
which greatly complicate the theoretical calculations of basic productivity". Martin 0.
Burkenroad writing in the Far Eastern Quarterly, 1946, as quoted in DeVries and
Bottemanne, "Latent Fishery Resources and Means for Their Development," 7 UNSCCUR
39. Elsewhere, Bottemanne declares: "Nevertheless the general notion that tropical seas
are poor is, as a general statement, no longer considered true." Bottemanne, op. cit. supra
note 37, at 22.
58 The previous footnote suggests that there is considerable doubt about the accuracy
of the statement made by Mexico during the discussion in the Third Committee in
reference to tropical countries: "The waters off their coasts were tepid or warm and poor
in fishing resources, and the recuperative process in those seas was infinitely slower."
5 Official Records 31-32 (1958). Further doubt arises from the evidence concerning tropical
tuna, a most valuable fishery in the Pacific, which suggests to one expert observer that
"growth and turnover of population therefore appears to be very rapid." Schaefer,
"Scientific Investigation of the Tropical Tuna Resources of the Eastern Pacific," 1955 Rome
Papers 194, 207, note 42, supra.
59 Comparing the environment in which future increases in fishing production must occur
with that in which past increases have taken place the FAO observes:
In other parts of the Northern Hemisphere and in the Southern Hemisphere, not only
are the relations between land and water masses entirely different ...but the expan-
sions and technical changes must be of such novelty that often they will be beyond
the capacity of the present industries. Moreover, the potential demand, albeit
tremendous when measured by the need, is still latent, dormant or frustrated by
poverty; and production to the level of the theoretical total demand, and even to
intermediate levels, is quite beyond the capacity of the independent limited activities
of ill-equipped fishing populations.
FAO, Fisheries Division, "Improving the Fisheries Contribution to World Food Supplies,"
6 FAO Fisheries Bull. 159, 168 (1953). For an emphasis on market problems see FAO,
Millions Still Go Hungry 24-27, 50-53 (12th Rep. of the Director-General, 1957); U.N.
Technical Assistance Program, The Economic and Social Development of Libya 49-94
(U.N. Doc. No. ST/JAA/K/Libyal3) (1953); Government of India Planning Com-
mission, The New India 222-24 (1958); FAO Memorandum, "The Economic Importance
of the Sea Fisheries in Different Countries" (U.N. Doc. A/Conf. 13/16) (1957) 1 Official
Records 245, 249 (1958); Szczepanik, "Problems of Fish Marketing in the Indo-Pacific
Region," 9 FAQ Fisheries Bull. 85 (1956).
60 Sources cited in note 59, supra.
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importance for fishermen because the nature of the industry increases the
difficulty of obtaining credit."' Assuming private funds were at all
available, the problems of securing a loan are great because the fisherman
has no land to mortgage and, in a hazardous occupation, "their boats
are often uninsured because of very high insurance costs and thus cannot
be used as collateral.16 2 Moreover, with respect to government aid,
the fishing industry in most of the states is a highly individualistic one,
perhaps located in innumerable small communities along a coastline of
hundreds or thousands of miles, and the problem of administering aid
to an industry of this nature is most complicated indeed. As a result
of these various factors, marine resources in many areas would be com-
pletely wasted if their exploitation were left solely to an adjacent state.
Since the depletion of a fishery from "overfishing" and the alleged
"extinction" or "destruction" of certain species have been advanced as
bases for exclusive and comprehensive claims to authority, both to ex-
ploitation and conservation,63 more particular attention may be given to
the extent of the scientific knowledge of these matters. The charge of
"extinction" is most frequently made in political contexts, and, although
some writers also use this term, it appears to have no basis in informed
opinion."4 That this allegation has no substance rests, in part, on the
fact that a fish population is an open ended biological system which re-
plenishes itself from the effects of losses. One qualified observer declares
that:
Over a reasonably long period of time the losses from the population
must be balanced by accessions to the population, otherwise it would
become extinct. When, however, the percentage rate of loss is increased,
by whatever means, the percentage rate of accession to the population
changes also, so that the population again tends to come into balance.
... . It is the compensatory reaction of the fish population to the
mortality produced by fishing which makes a fishery possible, so that
the population comes into balance under the environmental conditions
which include this predation by man. It is theoretically possible to impose
so much fishing on a population as to drive it down below the magnitude
at which such compensatory reaction can bring it into balance again-
to drive it below its threshold magnitude for survival. I know, however,
of no instance where this has been accomplished in a purely marine
fishery. It appears that the threshold magnitude is almost always well
below the population size to which it is economically possible to fish.65
61 FAO Fisheries Division, note 59, supra at 184-185.
62 Woytinsky and Woytinsky, World Population and Production 724 (1955).
63 For an illustration, see 3 Official Records 52, 154, 167-68 (1958) (Canada); 5 Official
Records 6 (1958) (Peru), 11 (Monaco), 18 (Ecuador), 20 (Korea).
64 "It may be agreed that for nearly all populations of organisms in the sea there need
not be concern with protecting them against being driven to such low levels that they can
never recover." Schaefer, note 42, supra at 16.
65 Id. at 15.
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Another expert put it even more categorically: "It appears to be impos-
sible to exterminate a species or a fishery for profit, since the profit
disappears before the fish is exterminated."6 For practical purposes,
there seems to be no gain in speaking of the extinction of a species of
fish; the problem of overfishing arises long before extinction is a
possibility.
Apart from the fact that scientists agree that it is wholly impractical
to consider establishing a conservation program for an area of territorial
sea, which as we have seen does not coincide with the range of movement
of fish populations,67 it is also pertinent, in further appraisal of the
relevant facts, to inquire into the various conceptions of the goals of con-
servation and, accordingly, to consider what is known of the fluctuations
in fish species in response to fishing. It will be seen that there are very
substantial disagreements between marine biologists on this important
point, and that some even question whether it is meaningful to formulate
conservation objectives in terms of a biological limit upon the yield of a
fish species. Thus, some scientists, possibly a majority, adopt the notion
of "maximum sustainable yield" as the goal of conservation efforts and
put forward biological criteria for determining such a yield.6" Other
scientists, however, deny that maximum sustainable yield can be, in a
number of important instances, a realistic objective and assert, instead,
that the desirable yield is an optimum one which is determined primarily
by economic and social criteria. It is obvious that if scientists are still
in such substantial disagreement on the biological bases of conservation
66 Taylor, Survey of Marine Fisheries of North Carolina 319 (1951).
67 "It may be presumed that neither conservation regulations nor the principle of absten-
tion would be effective if applied to only parts of stocks of fish." van Cleve, note 41, supra
at 50.
68 The Convention on Fishing and Conservation of the Living Resources of the High
Seas, adopted by the 1958 Geneva Conference, provides in Article 2:
As employed in this convention, the expression "conservation of the living resources
of the high seas" means the aggregate of the measures rendering possible the optimum
sustainable yield from those resources so as to secure a maximum supply of food and
other marine products.
2 Official Records 139 (1958). Mr. Garcia-Amador, who participated in the 1955 Rome Con-
ference on conservation, in the International Law Commission discussions, and in the 1958
Conference, assumes that "optimum sustainable yield" was intended to mean the same as
"maximum sustainable yield." Garcia-Amador, The Exploitation and Conservation of the
Living Resources of the Sea 140-143, 195 (1959). It is probable that this was the intended
reference since the Report of the 1955 Rome Conference, from which the Convention
derived the definition of conservation, makes no reference to factors other than biological.
See Report of the International Technical Conference, note 44, supra. See also Opsahl,
"Towards the Rule of International Law in High Seas Fisheries", 27 Nordisk Tidsskrift for
International Ret 265, 286 (1957).
Possible alternatives did not go unrecognized in the preparatory papers for the Rome
Conference. Although putting greatest emphasis on "maximum sustainable yield," which
might sometimes require modification for economic considerations at least temporarily,
Schaefer notes that some observers "assert" or "imply" that "it may be more desirable to
maximize the net economic yield, rather than the sustainable total production." Schaefer,
note 42, supra at 16-17.
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there is little likelihood that non-scientists assembled in political conference
would succeed in clarifying policy in the general community interest.
In view of the importance of this point, not only because it casts further
doubt on the usefulness of the territorial sea for conservation purposes
but also because it raises questions about any fishery conservation
program formulated solely in terms of biological criteria, various con-
ceptions of overfishing may be reviewed in some detail.
A decline in catch per unit of effort has been advanced as one meaning
of overfishing. However, despite its importance to those actually engaged
in fishing, it is not usually adopted by scientists as an accurate index
for the reason that a decline begins even with the very initial stage of
exploitation and normally continues with any increase in intensity of
fishing whatever the absolute level of intensity. 9
Another, more frequently used, concept of overfishing relates to the
notion of a fish population in equilibrium with its environment, including
fishing mortality. In this sense the size of the catch in one year (C)
may be equal to, or more than, or less than, a quantity representing the
gain in the stock from recruitment (reproduction) (A) plus the growth
in the stock (G), less the natural mortality (M). If the catch exceeds
this quantity (C > A + G - M) then the stock available for the succeed-
ing year is decreased; if the catch is less than this quantity
(C < A + G - M) then the stock is increased; and if the catch is equal
(C = A + G - M) then there is no change in the stock. If
C = A + G - M, the catch "may be called the equilibrium catch, because
it is the size of the catch when the population is in equilibrium with
its environment, including predation by fishing."
It is clear that under the same environmental conditions, except for
the amount of fishing, equilibrium may be established at various levels
of stock. Indeed it may be established at any level of stock between
the maximum possible stock (when there is no fishing) and the thres-
hold level for survival. The problem, then, is reduced to estimating
A+ G - M, the rate of natural increase (which equals the equilibrium
catch) for various values of P [P signifies the weight of catchable stock]
(and corresponding values of fishing intensity). Since the several terms
are interconnected biologically, and some or all of them are determined
by the density-connected controlling elements of the environment,
there will, in general, be some maximum value for the equilibrium catch,
the establishment of which is the primary objective of fishery con-
servation.
Although the estimation of the fishing intensity which will produce
the maximum equilibrium catch is a central objective, a somewhat lesser
69 Beverton and Holt, op. cit. supra note 36, at 390; Graham, "Concepts of Conserva-
tion"W, 1955 Rome Papers 1, 8-12, note 42 supra; van Cleve, note 41, supra at 53.
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objective may be more easily attained and may be of great immediate
importance, that is, the determination of whether the intensity of fishing
is above or below the level corresponding to maximum equilibrium
catch. This does not necessitate estimating the equilibrium catch over
a wide range of fishing intensities, but only determining whether an
increase from the existing intensity will result in a decrease or an
increase in the equilibrium catch. In the latter case, the population is
being underfished (so far as maximum sustainable yield is concerned),
while in the former it is being overfished, and conservation action is
indicated. 7
Another conception of overfishing has emerged which appears to
differ fundamentally and radically from the preceding and to have
extremely significant policy consequences. In order to avoid a lengthy
explanation of an extremely complex topic, perhaps largely unfamiliar
to lawyers, a brief quotation from a recent comprehensive study by
Beverton and Holt will indicate both the major outlines of the new theory
and the consequences of it:
To summarize, we suggest that the concept of eumetric fishing provides
a rational basis for the mutual adjustment of the two biological char-
acteristics of fishing activity that can be varied by regulation, namely
the fishing mortality coefficient F and the age of fish tp' at which that
mortality first becomes effective. It leads to the eumetric yield curve
as the generalised yield-intensity curve of a fishery, in which the value
of tp' is not constant but is varied by changing the selectivity of the gear
in such a way that it is eumetric (well balanced) with any value in F. For
a single species, everything points to the conclusion that such yield
curves have no maximum-not, at least, within the working range of
F-but as F --> oo tend asymptotically towards a limit which is the
greatest possible yield obtainable from the population.
It is now possible to see the significance of the conclusion reached
above that a eumetric yield curve for a single species almost certainly
has no maximum at any finite value of F. It means that there is no
biological criterion that can be used as a guide to where it would be
best for a fishery to operate. Thus the maximum possible yield, i.e., the
asymptote of the eumetric yield curve, can be attained only with an
infinitely high fishing intensity and hence at a correspondingly high
cost; it is therefore a totally unreal objective for regulation-not for
any biological reason but on purely economic grounds. It seems that
some sacrifice of yield must be made in order to reduce the cost of fishing
to a level at which it is a reasonably profitable undertaking, and it is
partly in terms of factors such as these-factors that we refer to, broadly,
as economic and social-that the objectives of fishery regulation must
be framed. 71
It is thus observed that this theory of fishing differs fundamentally from
the preceding one because it denies that maximum sustainable yield
70 Schaefer, note 42, supra at 35-36. See also Graham, ed. op. cit. supra note 34, at 262;
van Cleve, note 41, supra.
71 Beverton and Holt, op. cit. note 36, supra at 376-77.
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is a realistic biological criterion for determining the regulation of fishing
effort.7 2 Under the eumetric fishing theory the criteria for limiting fishing
effort are economic, social and political, rather than biological.
It is not suggested that since no meaningful biological limit on yield
exists there need be no regulation of fishing intensity. Indeed the
recommendation is quite the opposite, because fishing, even on the
eumetric curve, may lead to economic consequences as undesirable as
those flowing from diseumetric fishing. Thus, while Beverton and Holt
conclude that a maximum catch is a "totally unreal objective for
regulation,"7 3
...there is, nevertheless, a greatest yield that is economically possible
to obtain, and it is instructive to consider for a moment what would
happen if it were taken as the objective of regulation. For this strictly
conservative purpose, regulation would be limited to ensuring that the
selective properties of the gear were always eumetric with whatever
fishing intensity was being exerted. The latter would not be regulated, and
economic incentive would cause it to increase until a point on the eumetric
yield curve was reached at which the profit margin was so low that the
incentive no longer existed. This steady state would differ from that
reached in the absence of regulation of any kind only in that the
yield would be rather larger because the mesh size would be eumetric-it
would in fact be the largest that could be obtained by economically
independent industry. While such procedure would result in a greater
supply of fish to the consumer, economic conditions in the fishing industry
would, in other respects, be indistinguishable from those in an unregulated
fishery. Conversely, it is well enough realised that the greatest catch per
unit effort-and, roughly, the greatest rate of profit-is obtained by one
ship alone exploiting the stocks, but of course, the total yield in such
circumstances is minimal.
Thus we reach the conclusion that with a rationally adjusted fishing
activity, i.e. with eumetric fishing, not only is it impossible to maximise
both yield and working efficiency together, but if one is maximised the
other is automatically minimised: it is difficult to visualise a situation
in which either extreme would be acceptable as an objective for regulation,
either to the industry or to society. We can find no peculiar virtue in
conservation for its own sake, and believe that as a general principle
it is misleading to regard conservation and economic management as two
separate and independent functions of regulation, especially as to do so
apparently leads, as we have shown, either to the former being regarded
as obligatory and the latter voluntary, or, at least, to the former being
assigned the greater weight on principle. Rather we would suggest that
fishery regulation should be conceived on a broad enough basis to embrace
biological, economic and social factors on, a priori, equal terms; it
should have as its general objective the adjustment of these factors so
that in each particular case the best balance is achieved between the
benefits on the one hand to the producer, in the form of profit to the fish-
72 Previous conceptions of overfishing are discussed in relation to that just mentioned in
the text, id. at 389-92.
73 Id. at 377.
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iug industry and a good living for fishermen, and on the other to the con-
sumer, as a large and steady supply of fish at a reasonable price. This
best balance we shall call a state of optimum fishing .... 74
While it is possible to construct a curve that will indicate, "for any
given cost of fishing, the mesh required to produce a yield of the greatest
total value"75 and to figure the optimum level of fishing for achieving
"the best balance between the benefits to the producer and consumer
components of the system to be regulated,"1 6 this is not necessarily the
level of effort which will give the best over-all results to a particular state
interested in the fishing. As Beverton and Holt indicate, the need for
food, or the necessities of the employment situation, or "the desire" to
provide a reserve of ships and seamen "may call for a fishing intensity
greater than that required for maximum profit."7 7
Certain limitations upon the eumetric fishing theory must be mentioned.
In the first place it is constructed upon the basis of observation of two
types of fish, the plaice and the haddock, caught with gear which can be
manipulated to alter the age at which fish can be caught, and the theory
is worked out on the basis of a single fleet fishing a single species using
gear of the same selective properties. In practice the fisheries are likely
to be very different but the eumetric theorists still believe it is possible
to base their regulation upon eumetric theory even though the results
may not be as great because additional factors require deviations from
the eumetric theory. It appears that if gear selectivity may not be
manipulated so as to control the age of fish at entry into the exploited
phase there is no basis at all for an application of the eumetric theory.78
The foregoing discussion would seem to indicate grounds for consider-
able doubt about the value of conservation programs which assume that
maximum sustainable yield, according to biological criteria, is a mean-
ingful goal. Nevertheless, it is commonly taken as a desirable conserva-
tion objective, and it is, therefore, relevant to consider opinions about
74 Id. at 377-78.
75 Id. at 383-84.
76 Id. at 385.
77 Id. at 386. If the fishery to be regulated is one in which "profit per vessel rather
than total profit is the critical factor" it is one which "presents the essentials of the
differences between biological conservation and economic management in their simplest
form. There are, in fact, only four primary factors involved in the regulation of such a
fishery, (a) the quantity of fish supplied to the consumer, (b) its price, (c) the number
of fishermen and vessels engaged, and (d) the profit to the individual owner-fisherman.
Apart from maintaining eumetric fishing, regulation in this case involves ultimately, adjust-
ment of the number of vessels so that the most acceptable compromise is obtained between
these four inter-related factors, and no general statement can be made about where the
optimum lies." Ibid.
78 The theory of eumetric fishing in terms of regulation is discussed in detail, id. at 370-
418, and given practical application to North Sea demersal fisheries, id. at 419-36. The
limitations mentioned in the text are fully acknowledged in this discussion.
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the kind and level of information required for a determination that a
fishery is being overfished. It has been asserted that the conclusion
that a population is being overfished may be reached "in many cases"
without reference to detailed information concerning recruitment, growth
and natural mortality. 9 Indeed, certain international regulations have
been instituted with favorable results, without actually having this
information. Schaefer notes that at the "first level of the investigation"
of a fishery one may, for a period of years, obtain information as to
"measurements of fishing intensity, size and composition of the catch,
and, on the basis of these, inferences as to the effects of fishing on the
stock and catch, and an estimate of the current status of the fishery in
comparison with the condition corresponding to maximum sustainable
yield"8 and that "the simple examination of such time series, is, in many
cases, adequate to indicate whether a stock is underfished or over-
fished.... ."I" The primary illustration given is that of the Pacific halibut
fishery, the regulation of which consisted of the reduction of effort
through a catch limit and which was followed by increases in total catch
and in catch per unit effort.8 Nevertheless, there has been considerable
controversy about whether this increase in catch results from reduction
in effort or from natural fluctuations in the halibut population.8 3 Beverton
and Holt apparently subscribe to the former opinion, but declare, none-
theless, that "the controversy is instructive in that it demonstrated that
nothing short of a detailed analytical study of the factors responsible for
the behavior of an exploited population can provide a sound basis for
regulation or a means of ascertaining conclusively its true effects."84
79 Schaefer, note 42, supra at 38.
80 Id. at 37.
81 Id. at 38.
82 Ibid.
83 Burkenroad, "Fluctuation in Abundance of Pacific Halibut" in A Symposium on Fish
Populations, 11 Bull. Bing. Ocean. Coll. 81 (1948) contends that natural fluctuations were
most important in accounting for the decline in catch per unit effort in the halibut fishery.
Since the Pacific halibut conservation program has been regarded as the pre-eminent
instance of a successful conservation program with respect to a high seas fishery, the
implications of this study have been accorded considerable import; see Graham, ed., op. cit.
supra note 34, at 264 and 412-13; Beverton and Holt, op. cit. supra note 36, at 24-26.
Burkenroad suggests that ". .. there is evidence that the abundance of various marine
animals is much more strongly influenced by natural events than by man, cf. Huntsman,
Prospects for More Fish, Canadian Fishermen (Feb. 1944). Therefore, too ready a resort
to analogy with the case of the Pacific halibut would be undesirable even if this classical
example of over-exploitation were unquestionable." 11 Bull. Bing. Ocean. Coll. 81, 83 (1948).
More recently another observer states that "[t]he conclusions to be drawn from the Pacific
halibut experiment remain quite uncertain and the validity of the theory of fishing to
account for the facts is still in doubt." Huntsman, "Fishery Management and Research,"
19 Journal du Conseil Permanent International Pour L'Exploration de la Mer 44, 51 (1953).
84 Graham, ed., op. cit. supra note 34, at 413. In a later publication these authors
stated: ". . . Burkenroad is concerned rather with longer-term fishery-independent (i.e.
'natural') trends or oscillations. If the possibility of the occurrence of these be admitted,
as we think it must be, it is equally true that great caution must be exercised in the
interpretation of events during the experimental management phase; but even so, the
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This latter point is of fundamental importance for it may be crucial
to a policy determination. Of the various factors which affect fluctuations
in fish population, man has control over only one, his own fishing effort.s5
If that effort has such an important influence on fluctuation that the total
yield decreases with increased effort, there may be some point in regulat-
ing effort in some way; but if it is the natural factors which are decisive,"6
then there may be a positive loss in regulating effort since a reduction of
effort could waste fish.8 7 Certainly, the effort put into restricting the catch
would be a great waste. In terms of biological problems, the scientific
disagreement appears to center not only on whether biological criteria
are meaningful but also, assuming fishing should be controlled for
biological reasons, on the scope of information which should be gathered
before the conclusion is reached that fishing has become that important.
Either choice, whether of the simpler level of investigation referred to
by Schaefer or the more complex one encompassing information on
recruitment, growth and natural mortality, might result in a waste of
fish. If fishing is excluded or restricted without adequate investigation
of the natural factors affecting population fluctuations, the regulation may
actually be premature and prevent a greater, but still rational, catch;
if controls are delayed until the more complete investigation is completed
it may be discovered that overfishing has in fact occurred and that
the same catch could have been obtained with lesser effort if controls
had been instituted.
A more general waste of resources is caused by measures which limit
the efficiency of fishing vessels and thereby increase the cost of landing
fish. Fishermen working in waters near a coast may, for effective fish-
ing, have to proceed shoreward,8s yet there may encounter the pro-
hibitions of the coastal state rigorously enforcing exclusion from an area
claimed as its territorial sea. 9 The result may be grossly inefficient
temporal coincidence of fishery limitation and a sudden change in the stocks in a favourable
direction-and one, furthermore, which could not have been in any way foreseen by
scrutiny of previous statistics-must be regarded, a priori, as unlikely. .. ." Beverton and
Holt, op. cit. supra note 36, at 25.
85 Herrington and Kask, "International Conservation Problems, and Solutions in Existing
Conventions," 1955 Rome Papers 145, 145-46, note 42, supra; Graham, "Over-fishing,"
7 USCCUR 20-24.
86 Schaefer, note 42, supra at 23: "Where the degree of predation by man [in relation
to magnitude of populations constituting the resource] is so low that the losses from
the stock of commercial sizes due to fishing are small in relation to the losses due to
natural causes, there is no need for conservation measures."
87 Poulsen, "Conservation Problems in the Northwestern Atlantic," 1955 Rome Papers
183, 183-84, note 42, supra; Kesteven and Holt, "Classification of International Conservation
Problems" 1955 Rome Papers 350, 356, note 42, supra.
88 For detailed analysis of fishing methods and units see Bottemanne, op. cit. supra
note 37, at 45-108.
89 For the fishermen the deprivation may be total, i.e., confiscation of vessel, gear and
catch-and this is a common penalty.
1960]
CORNELL LAW QUARTERLY [Vol. 45
since the fleet or fishing vessel must confine the search for fish or the
actual fishing activity to areas in which fish are not so heavily concen-
trated 0 This inefficiency may be increased if a fleet is unable to take
advantage of recent developments indicating the "particular distribution
the fleet must take up in order to obtain the greatest catch that is possible
in the circumstances." 91 The requirement here is that the vessels are
all located in a certain manner with respect to the density of the fish
in the area being fished. Inability to disperse a fleet in this fashion
could result in a much less productive use of available ships, gear and
men.
Serious economic study of fisheries has only begun during the past
few years; hence, it is not surprising that the knowledge needed to achieve
a rational allocation of resources to fishery activity is not highly devel-
oped.2 On the one hand, little or nothing is known regarding the capacity
of states to divert resources from fishing to other areas of endeavour,
although this is considered directly relevant to the appropriate allocation
of fishery resources to particular states, if this be a desirable goal. 3
On the other hand, there has been some preliminary work with respect
to the conditions required for securing the optimum economic yield from
a particular fishery or fishing ground.94 The desirable objective of
fishery regulation according to economists, whose conclusions are in
this respect quite similar to those of some biologists, is that of maximizing
the net economic yield from a fishery.95 The chief difficulty said to be
90 "... [Iln practice vessels spend an appreciable amount of their time in searching for
the highest concentrations of fish, especially in fisheries based on highly migratory species."
Graham, ed., op. cit. supra note 34, at 438. See also Bottemanne, op. cit. supra note 37,
at 73-108.
9' Id. at 439; Holt, "Exploratory and Experimental Fishing," 9 FAO Fisheries Bull. 1,
15 (1956).
92 8 FAO Fisheries Bull. 226-28 (1955) indicates the need for more intensive work. And
see Gordon, "The Economic Theory of a Common-Property Resource: The Fishery,"
62 J. Pol. Econ. 124-25 (1954).
93 It is ciear from these examples alone that in order to assess the effect on national
economies of most of the changes likely to occur in a fishery, one would need informa-
tion on what is technically known as the mobility of factors, i.e., the costs involved
in diverting capital, labour and other factors of production to other uses (and vice
versa) and on the elasticity of demand. Hardly any such information is available and
it is certain that much research would be needed to obtain it.
FAO Memorandum, "The Economic Importance of the Sea Fisheries in Different Countries"
(U.N. Doc. A/Conf. 13/16) (1957) 1 Official Records 245, 249 (1958).
94 The most ambitious effort with respect to an international fishery is that of Beverton
and Holt, On the Dynamics of Exploited Fish Population 419-36 (1957), in application of
the eumetric fishing theory. The authors note in such a fishery there are "matters of
policy and administration to be considered in formulating a detailed plan of regulations"
which are outside the scope of their discussion. Id. at 419.
95 From the perspective of the economist "the optimum degree of utilization of any
particular fishing ground . . . [is] that which maximizes the net economic yield, the
difference between total cost, on the one hand, and total receipts (or total value pro-
duction), on the other2 Gordon, note 92, supra at 129. Beverton and Holt recommend
as the "general objective" of fishing regulation" the best balance . . . between the
benefits on the one hand to the producer, in the form of profit to the fishing industry
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in the way of achieving this objective is that fishery resources are, for the
most part, common property. One commentator observes that "[t]he core
of the 'overfishing' problem inheres in the fact that the basic resource is
incapable of ownership in any meaningful sense.""6 It is said that
"most of the problems associated with the words 'conservation' or
'depletion' or 'over-exploitation' in the fishery are, in reality, manifesta-
tions of the fact that the natural resources of the sea yield no economic
rent.19 7 The solution suggested is that fisheries must be the object of
sole ownership if the optimum economic yield is to be obtained.98 Thus,
"[i]n the case of fisheries like the North Sea or the continental shelf
and the New England states, no other conclusion seems possible but that
the fishery resource must be considered as the property of a general
governmental authority. Such an authority must be able to regulate
its exploitation in such a manner as to achieve desired objectives." 99
It is perhaps inevitable that if some type of sole ownership of the
resource is desirable for achieving economic objectives, the economists
would look to the extension of the territorial sea as one way of simplifying
very complex problems. This possibility has, in fact, been mentioned
in a most tentative and exploratory fashion:
We will probably encounter these [economic] questions first in the
shape of the territorial waters issue. A great extension of territorial
waters recognized in international law would convert international fish-
eries into national ones and to that extent it would ease some of the
practical problems of fisheries management. Such a solution has many
difficulties, however, especially for a region such as the North Sea, and it
is by no means certain that in the long run it would be the best solution
of the problem.100
As we have seen, the extension of the territorial sea would have to be
"great" indeed if this were to convert entire fisheries from inclusive to
exclusive access.
As already mentioned, some marine biologists also emphasize the
relevance and decisiveness of economic and social factors in regard to
and a good living for fishermen, and on the other to the consumer, as a large and steady
supply of fish at a reasonable price." Beverton and Holt, op. cit. note 94, supra at 378.
06 Crtchfield, "Common Property Resources and Factor Allocation," 22 Can. J. of
Econ. and Pol. Science 292 (1956); Scott, Natural Resources: The Economics of Conserva-
tion 62-4 (1955).
97 Gordon, note 92, supra at 124. For a later expression of Professor Gordon's views
see Gordon, Obstacles to Agreement on Control in the Fishing Industry, in Turvey and
Wiseman, The Economics of Fisheries 65 (Proceedings of a Round Table organized by
the International Economic Association and held in Rome in September, 1956, sponsored
by the FAO.)
98 Gordon, note 92, supra at 135; Scott, op. cit. note 96, supra at 126; Scott, "The
Fishery: The Objectives of Sole Ownership," 63 J. Pol. Econ. 116, 124 (1955).
99 Gordon, note 97, supra at 66.100 Id. at 72.
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appropriate conservation criteria. Thus, Beverton has noted with respect
to eumetric fishing, in which intensity and mesh size are coordinated:
The point on the eumetric yield curve at which it is best for the fishery
to operate-the optimum fishing intensity-does not correspond to the
maximum yield nor is it determined by any particular biological criterion,
but must be decided purely with reference to economic factors and
administrative policy.1' 1
Nevertheless, it is evident that a majority of conservationists, and
apparently the representatives of states, are still preoccupied with
maximum sustained use as the appropriate goal of regulating a fishery."0 2
It deserves reemphasis that there is a seeming consensus among eco-
nomists that the goal of "maximum sustained yield" postulated by the
conservationists is not necessarily economically sound. Professor Ciriacy-
Wantrup focuses the problem sharply:
In the high seas fisheries, maximum sustained use is a meaningful
economic objective only under the following three assumptions: First,
there is a maximum harvest (use) which can be taken periodically without
affecting the natural flow. Second, it is not economical to increase or
stabilize... the natural flow and the corresponding harvest by inputs ...
Third, costs for harvesting and demand for products are such that it is
not economical to take less than the maximum harvest under natural
flow conditions.
It is conceivable, though not likely, that these assumptions may be
fulfilled in reality.'03
As we have seen in the foregoing analysis of the various and diver-
gent conceptions of overfishing, the first of Professor Ciriacy-Wantrup's
assumptions may be valid from a biological perspective. The third as-
sumption apparently has very little foundation. Professor Gordon, who
has "pioneered" in the subject of fishery economics, declares:
It is my belief that most conservation policies that are now in opera-
tion fail to achieve a rational economic objective and many of them are
detrimental to the progress of the fishing industry, the incomes of
fishermen, and the welfare of society.
The most important reasons, I think, why even carefully designed
conservation policies have often failed to achieve rational economic
objectives is due to the failure to appreciate the nature of economic
objectives and to see the significance of the common property nature
101 Beverton, "Some Observations on the Principles of Fishery Regulation," 19 J.
du Conseil Permanent International pour L'Exploration de la Mer 56, 67 (1953). One
economist refers to the following publications by biologists as "remarkable efforts" in
extending "thought into the economic sphere": Nesbit, Fishery Management, U.S. Fish
and Wildlife Service, Special Scientific Reports No. 18 (1943); Taylor, Survey of Marine
Fisheries of North Carolina (1951); Beverton, supra; Burkenroad, "Some Principles of
Marine Fishery Biology," 2 Publications of the Institute of Marine Science No. 1 (1951);
Gordon, note 92, supra at 124 and note 3.
102 See the criticism of Prof. Gordon quoted in note infra 104 and accompanying text.
103 Ciriacy-Wantrup, Resource Conservation-Economics and Policies 60-1 (1952).
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of fishery resources. No strong argument can be made for the point of
view, widely held by biologists, that the objective of fishery conservation
policy is the maintenance of the maximum sustained physical yield
from the resource. Such an objective neglects altogether the fact that
in order to catch fish we must use up other valuable goods and services. 0 4
When the costs of obtaining the maximum sustained yield are considered,
it is likely that all participants would be better off by taking a lesser yield.
B. The Territorial Sea and Security
The military implications of the territorial sea must be viewed in a
more impressionistic fashion than those regarding fisheries, since the sub-
ject has received less general inquiry. Perhaps the most important con-
siderations relate to the evolution of modern weapons of naval warfare
and to the degrees of intensity in the expectations of violence.
The most striking characteristics of modem naval weapons are the
scope and intensity of destruction attainable and the range from which
that destruction may be inflicted. The first of these stems from the
development of nuclear weapons; no other destructive device used in the
past even remotely compares to the comprehensivness of the damage
obtainable by fission and fusion devices. The contrast with traditional
naval power is spectacular:
Indeed, on a single modern carrier, in the space of a few steps, one
could walk about and pat the lethal warheads of weapons whose
destructive power exceeded all the ordnance the U.S. Navy had exploded
in its entire history.'0 5
This tremendous destruction may be inflicted at great distances from
the ships carrying the weapons. Modern jet aircraft, operating from
aircraft carriers, extend the threat of naval vessels for hundreds of
miles. Moreover, even aircraft of supersonic speed provide only a
rough measure of the speed and range of modern naval weapons since
aircraft are rapidly disappearing as a weapons system and will be
progressively replaced by missiles with ranges in the thousands of miles,
moving with fantastic speed. The deadliness of naval warfare is
104 Gordon, note 97, supra at 68. In giving substance to his strictures Prof. Gordon
continues:
Neglect of the cost side of the question has had the result that certain conservation
programmes are regarded as successful by biologists when from the economic point
of view they are palpable failures. The most conspicuous case in point is, I think,
the Pacific halibut programme. This programme has been hailed many times as
the outstanding case of successful fisheries conservation policy, yet I feel quite
certain that it must go down in the economic annals as one of the clearest cases of
failure.
Id. at 69. See Crutchfield, note 96, supra who also contends that the effect of conservation
measures in the Pacific halibut industry has been wasteful in a measurable degree.
105 Cagle, "A Philosophy for Naval Atomic Warfare," 83 U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings
No. 3, 249, 251 (1957).
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heightened even further by the use of missile-firing vessels which are
virtually undetectable. Submarines used for missile-firing may operate
wholly under water for substantial periods of time and can fire missiles
while submerged. The value of this combination of destructive device
and delivery systems is clearly seen in the emphasis on submarines
as a component of Soviet naval strength,"" and in the recent stress in the
United States Navy both upon improved measures of anti-submarine
warfare and upon missile-firing subs." 7
These revolutionary developments in weapons and delivery systems
are incredibly expensive and only a few states have the resources,
technological capacity and skills required to evolve naval power with such
speed, destructive capacity and range. For the vast majority of states the
conventional weapons of traditional naval power continue to comprise the
major components of national naval strength.
The level of intensity in the expectations of violence is often said
to be a relevant factor for considering the breadth of the territorial sea.
It appears to be widely assumed that agreement on a particular width
during times of "peace," when expectations of comprehensive violence
are relatively low, would be observed also in wartime when violence is
imminent or actually being employed.' If such an assumption is valid,
and it has been for the most part in the past, it means that belliger-
ents must abstain from hostile acts in the territorial sea of neutrals and
must not seek to use such waters in order to gain an advantage over an
opponent. The neutral's duty, on the other hand, is to attempt to
prohibit the participants from so using the territorial sea.1 9 It has been
thought that the wider the territorial sea the more easily an unscrupulous
participant can abuse the neutrality of the non-participant and the more
difficult the task of the non-participant to prevent such abuse. It is said,
further, that the scrupulous participant, who feels bound to observe
the amenities of neutrality, would be placed at a grave disadvantage by
106 Macintyre, The Soviet Submarine Threat, The Soviet Navy 168-86 (Saunders, ed.,
1958); Garthoff, Soviet Strategy in the Nuclear Age 202-05 (1958); N.Y. Times, March
15, 1959, p. 65, col. 1.
107 Brinkloe, "Missile Navy," 84 U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings No. 2, 23 (1958). See
also Brodie, A Guide to Naval Strategy 16-73 (4th ed. 1958) for review of the impact of
technological changes since World War II.
108 Concern about neutrality problems was evident in the deliberations of the 1930
Codification Conference and apparently played a part in the inability of the participants
to reach agreement on -the width problem. See Conference for the Codification of Interna-
tional Law, Report of the Second Commission (Territorial Waters) p. 123 (L.N. Pub. No.
C.230. M. 117. 1930. V).
109 The scope of neutral authority and obligations is examined in MacChesney, "The
Altmark Incident and Modern Warfare---Innocent Passage' in Wartime and the Right of
Belligerents to Use Force to Redress Neutrality Violations," 52 Nw. U.L. Rev. 320 (1957)
and Tucker, The Law of War and Neutrality at Sea 218-42, U.S. Naval War College,
International Law Studies, 1955) (1957).
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a self-imposed restriction on taking action against an opponent seeking
to secure an advantage in using the waters within the territorial sea of the
neutral.110
One further fact of importance consists of the general expectation that
a participant is authorized to take action against an enemy vessel, within
the neutral territorial sea and using that area for non-permissible pur-
poses, if the neutral is unwilling or is unable effectively to perform its
duty to prevent that use.'
C. Ocean Transportation and the Territorial Sea.
For purposes of considering the effects upon economy in communication
and transportation, it would finally be pertinent to know the location of
the major maritime routes of the world. The important point is, of
course, determining the distance from the coast at which ships move while
in transit between foreign points. Statements have been made that a ter-
ritorial sea of twelve miles would include many such routes at one point
or another.l"s So far as is known no detailed study of this matter, except
of a few areas, has been made and published, and it is probably possible to
say that certain routes, at least, do normally pass within such a distance
from shore.113 This is of importance both to ordinary merchant vessels
and to warships, but it has more significance in respect to the latter
since there is a considerable body of opinion that this type of vessel has
no right of passage through the territorial sea." 4 The effects of varying
breadths of the territorial sea in terms of air travel would similarly be
relevant, as it is universally conceded that, apart from agreement, planes
have no right of access to the air space over the territorial sea."15
110 Dean, "The Geneva Conference on the Law of the Sea: What Was Accomplished,"
52 Am. J. Int'l L. 607, 610-11 (1958); Dean, "Freedom of the Seas," 37 Foreign Affairs 83,
86 (1958).
Ill See sources cited note 109, supra.
112 One member of the International Law Commission estimated that an extension
of the territorial sea to twelve miles "would result in most of the maritime highways of
the world falling within territorial waters." Statement of Faris Bey el-Khouri, 1 Year-
book of the International Law Commission 213 (1956).
113 At the 1958 Conference the United Kingdom is reported to have distributed charts
indicating that a twelve-mile territorial sea in some parts of the world would include
a "great number of important sea lanes. . . ." Sorensen, The Law of the Sea 195, 245
(Int'l Conc. Pamphlet No. 520) (1958). The effect of an extension to twelve miles would
be especially felt in areas of complex water-land relationships, as in the Aegean and
Adriatic Seas. It is understood that in the Mediterranean a twelve-mile territorial
sea would reduce by over 50% the number of high seas passages between land masses.
114 It may be recalled that the International Law Commission had recommended a
right of innocent passage for all ships, but had also recommended, in Article 24, that
coastal states should have a right to require previous authorization or notification from
warships seeking to pass through the territorial sea not within straits. The First Committee
of the 1958 Conference adopted the Commission's recommendations but in Plenary Session
the words "authorization or" were deleted, with 45 voting in favor of deletion, 27 against,
and 6 abstentions. Subsequently, Article 24, as amended, failed to receive the two-thirds
majority required for adoption by the Conference. See 2 Official Records 66-68 (1958).
115 U.S. Dep't of State, Pub. No. 2282, International Civil Aviation Conference 59
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II. THE PATTERN OF CONTROVERSY: CLAIMS AND COUNTERCLAIMS
TO AUTHORITY
The major claims advanced by states with respect to the width of the
territorial sea, over which they demand comprehensive and exclusive
authority, concern both the competence by which a lawful width may be
determined"" and the particular widths claimed.17
Of the claims relating to competence, the most far-reaching assertion
is that each state is free, by its own exclusive decision, to fix the limit
of its territorial sea at whatever width it deems necessary for accom-
modating its local needs, as it conceives such needs. This view, promoted
most vigorously by the Soviet Union and the states in the Soviet bloc, 1
as well as by some South American states," 9 would, if generally accepted,
make international law largely irrelevant; the function of international
law would thus be exhausted by authorizing each state to determine its
own boundaries, and other states, as representatives of the general
community, would be required, in the modality of rubber stamps, simply
to accept such determination. In opposition, the great majority of states
insist that the width of the territorial sea, like other important problems
affecting the common interest, must ultimately be determined by general
community consensus and that, whatever width may ultimately be
accepted, particular states are not free to appropriate a hitherto common
resource without the consent of the other states to which this resource
belongs.'O.
The claims relating to a particular width for the territorial sea com-
monly assert either that some particular width is required or permitted
by customary international law, or that some such width ought now to
be accepted by all states in explicit, multilateral agreement.' 2 ' The
range of these claims, historically, has been quite limited in the width
(Articles 1 and 2 of the Convention on International Civil Aviation, 1944); 9 Hudson,
International Legislation 168, 169 (1950); Lissitzyn, International Air Transport and
National Policy 365 (1942); 3 Official Records 90-1, 104, 137 (1958).
116 See sources cited notes 133-139, infra for instances of these claims.
117 The most complete summary of these claims is that produced by the U.N. Secretariat
The basis document, apparently not reproduced in the Official Records, is U.N. Doc.
No. A/Conf. 13/C.1/L.11/Rev. 1 (1958) with later corrections. Sorensen, note 113, supra
at 244, contains a table derived from this document.
118 Specific illustration of this perspective is in International Law Commission, Sum-
mary Records (U.N. Doc. No. A/C.N.4/S.R.166/p.3) (1952); further illustration may be
found throughout the Commission deliberations in the statements of Mr. Krylov and Mr.
Zourek.
119 Pan American Union, Final Act of the Third Meeting of the Inter-American Council
of jurists 50-59 (1956).
120 For a concise statement see the remarks of Mr. Lauterpacht in I.L.C. Summary
Records (U.N. Doc. No. A/CN.4/SR.166/p.7) (1952).
121 The records of the 1930 Codification Conference, the International Law Commission,
the 1958 Conference and the notes from foreign office to foreign office are replete with
instances of this claim.
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demanded and the width most frequently insisted upon has been three
miles.'22 Wider limits such as four, six, and in a very few instances,
twelve miles, have, however, on occasion been claimed. 23 More recently,
the principal controversy has been between those states asserting that
international law permits no more than three miles and states contending
that three miles is not an authoritatively accepted maximum limit. The
latter have not, however, been able to agree upon a particular wider limit.
The various proposals they have made have centered most frequently
about six and twelve mile widths, but some have sought to establish
a prescription of merely a minimum and a maximum width, with each
state authorized to set a national limit within these figures.
In the efforts to achieve explicit agreement on a particular width for
the territorial sea, claims relating to a recommended width are frequently
accompanied by proposals which would make use of the historic safety
valve function of the contiguous zone to provide for certain limited
authority, primarily for fishing purposes, beyond the territorial sea. The
object of such proposals is, of course, to satisfy the most pressing demand
offered in justification of an enlarged territorial sea, by permitting ex-
tension of coastal authority for that particular purpose and, thus, pre-
serving a narrow width for the territorial sea over which all-embracing
coastal authority is exercised. Both states which propose the three mile
limit and those which suggest a six mile limit have recommended that
beyond these areas the coastal state should be authorized to extend
exclusive access to fishing. For purposes of access to fisheries, the
coastal state would be given a special exclusive authority beyond the
territorial sea, thus limiting the extension of such authority over the
passage of vessels but permitting greater control over fishing.
III. COMMUNITY PoLICiEs AT STAKE
The most general problem in community policy may be recapitulated as
that of achieving, through shared competence, an economic balance in
effective protection of the inclusive interests of all states and the exclusive
interests of particular states." In seeking this accommodation, the
322 Among the many historical surveys see Riesenfeld, Protection of Coastal Fisheries
under International Law 125-263 (1942); Jessup, The Law of Territorial Waters and
Maritime Jurisdiction 3-66 (1927); Meyer, The Extent of Jurisdiction in Coastal Waters,
passim (1937).
123 With particular reference to the relationship between the three and four-mile claims
see Walker, "Territorial Waters: The Cannon Shot Rule," 22 Brit. YB. Int'l L. 210 (1945)
and Kent, "The Historical Origins of the Three-Mile Limit," 48 Am. J. Int'l L. 537
(1954). For the historical development of United States claims to 1958 see Brief for
the United States, United States v. Louisiana, - U.S. - (- ) (No. 11, 1958 term; re-
numbered No. 10, 1959 term).
124 McDougal and Burke, "Crisis in the Law of the Sea: Community Perspectives
versus National Egoism," 67 Yale L.J. 539, 567-70 (1958).
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over-riding goal, as we have seen, is that of achieving the greatest
possible production and widest distribution of values from the use of
the oceans. The cumulative experience of several centuries clearly indi-
cates that an optimum balance for achieving this over-riding goal must
be heavily weighted in favor of inclusive competence and use and, accord-
ingly, that the area of comprehensive exclusive authority should be con-
fined within the narrowest possible limits. Realistic observation of
relevant factors in contemporary context serves equally to confirm the
probability that the greatest productivity is to be achieved by continuing
to maintain the broadest possible inclusive use and competence. In view
of current military technology and likely future developments in weap-
onry, it is clear that for security purposes the territorial sea is wholly
irrelevant to exclusive interest. For fisheries the greatest need, from
both inclusive and exclusive perspectives, is to increase productivity, but
the indispensable bases for such an increase, the acquisition and wide
distribution of scientific knowledge and skills, would be obstructed in a
serious degree if states successfully assert demands for enlargement
of the territorial sea. It seems beyond reasonable dispute, therefore,
that the most promising strategy for protecting and fulfilling both
inclusive and exclusive interests is by a narrow territorial sea. In support
of this recommendation, we turn now to a detailed consideration of the
factors relevant to a policy determination and the decisional trends
concerning the two specific claims by states with respect to the territorial
sea, dealing first with the claim to exclusive competence and then with
the claim to establish a specific width.
IV. THE CLAIM TO DIsCRETIoNARY AUTHORITY TO FIX THE WIDTH OF
T E TEmuToRiAL SEA
A. Relevant Policy Factors
The claim that each state is exclusively competent to determine for
itself what area of territorial sea it needs for protecting its own exclusively
determined interests would of course, if generally accepted, result in a
complete disintegration of community authority. A state could justify
its claimed width as lawful, irrespective of how exorbitant that width
might be in terms of its consequence for others, solely by reference to its
own egoistical views, realistic or unrealistic, of its exclusive interests.
The chief difficulty with this conception is, of course, that such exclusive
determination fixes not only the scope and content of local, exclusive
interests, but also both the inclusive and exclusive interests of other
states. Thus, for an illustration of the potential conflict of exclusive
interest with exclusive interest, if two or more states make claim to the
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same area of the ocean as within their territorial sea and if each state
claims to be competent to decide what will satisfy its own interests,
there is no possibility of ever achieving a resolution of the dispute short
of a trial of strength.125 Other conflicts, short of these most comprehen-
sively incompatible claims, may be imagined which would produce similar
difficulties in solution. If conflicts are not to be decided by relative
strength, states must seek an accommodation of such conflicting interests;
this, of course, is precisely what is sought by efforts to reach explicit
consensus on the limits of the territorial sea. Hence, when the proposal
for complete unilateral discretion is made in the context of just such
efforts, as it has been, its latent effect, if not manifest purpose, must
be that of completely destroying the question in issue. The end result
of its acceptance could only be complete exclusive monopolization
of the common resources of the ocean by states capable of the most
effective grab. There can be little difficulty, therefore, in concluding
that a desirable policy must reject the notion of an exclusive, unreview-
able competence to determine the width of the territorial sea.
B. Trend of Decision
One of the few certain statements one can make about perspectives of
authority relating to the width of the territorial sea is that there has never
been a consensus to the effect that each state is free to determine a
lawful width for itself, irrespective of the interests of other states.
Some writers, but relatively very few, have taken a position honoring such
exclusive competence. 26 States which have insisted upon complete
exclusive discretion are a distinct minority and, indeed, the fact that
two international conferences have considered this question within a thirty
year period indicates the degree of consensus on the existence of some
limit upon state discretion. The failure of these conferences to agree
upon an explicit limit hardly demonstrates that states are generally
believed to be completely free to adopt whatever width they please.
This is evident because the notion of complete freedom is commonly
put forward as a separate claim to authority on this problem and, just as
commonly, rejected even though no prescription as to specific width is
otherwise adopted. States replying to the questionnaire of the Prepara-
tory Committee for the 1930 Conference made no statements indicating
any belief in the desirability of unrestricted competence to determine
125 Id. at 565 n. 102 for a fuller statement.
126 Riesenfeld, op. cit. note 122, supra, surveys the views of writers back to 1800.
Excerpts of the writings of the most noted commentators of the 19th and early 20th
centuries are compiled in Crocker, The Extent of the Marginal Sea (1919).
1960]
CORNELL LAW QUARTERLY
the width of the terriorial sea.127 Such declarations as did suggest em-
phasis on local needs were in every case qualified by a standard of reason-
ableness or by a reference to respect for the rights of other states. At
the conference itself, only Spain spoke out for unrestricted freedom;
all other states accepted the notion of an internationally established
limit upon the breadth of the territorial sea. 2
One of the most authoritative rejections of the claim that a state has
exclusive competence to determine the width of the territorial sea is, of
course, that of the International Court of Justice in the Norwegian
Fisheries case. 9 It will be recalled that in their argument in this case
the British suggested a whole series of very precise rules as applicable
for determining the validity of the Norwegian system of straight
baselines from which its territorial sea was to be delimited.3 0  All
these the Court rejected as expressions of authoritative international
prescription; but the Court carefully and immediately added that this
did not mean that the validity of the Norwegian delimitation was "not
subject to certain principles."'' In a statement notable for its generality
of reference, the Court categorically stated:
The delimitation of sea areas has always an international aspect; it
cannot be dependent merely upon the will of the coastal state as expressed
in its municipal law. Although it is true that the act of delimitation is
necessarily a unilateral act, because only the coastal State is competent
to undertake it, the validity of the delimitation with regard to other
States depends upon international law.132
Nothing in the context remotely suggests that this declaration would
not be regarded as relevant also to a claimed determination of the
width of the territorial sea. The all-inclusive term "sea areas" would
seem comprehensive enough.
Despite this unequivocal and authoritative declaration from highest
authority, some states and certain members of the International Law
Commission have continued to urge the view that the individual state
is free to set whatever limit for the territorial sea it desires. At the
very first meeting of the International Law Commission during which
this issue was discussed several members declared that every state, in its
discretion, was competent to fix the breadth of the territorial sea at
whatever distance was felt to meet local needs.' 3 The member from the
127 Conference for the Codification of International Law, Bases of Discussion 22-33
(League of Nations Pub. No. C.74. M. 39. 1929. V)
128 Id., Minutes of the Second Committee 27 (League of Nations Pub. No. C.351 (b).
M. 145 (b). 1930. V)
129 Fisheries Case, Judgment of December 18th, 1951: [1951J I.C.J. Rep. 116.
130 Id. at 119-23.
131 Id. at 132.
132 Ibid.
133 I.L.C. Summary Records (U.N. Doc. No. A/CN.4/SR. 166/) (1952).
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Soviet Union took the position, maintained consistently in one form or
another throughout the Commission deliberations, and urged vigorously
by the Soviet Union at the 1958 Conference, that it was a "sovereign
right" of each state exclusively to determine the breadth of the territorial
sea and that both "international practice" and "national legislation"
recognized this.1M In general, all states politically associated with the
Soviet Union, with the possible exception of Poland, urged the same
notion in all subsequent consideration of the issue. In the Commission,
Professor Scelle appeared to be the only other member, at the fourth
session, subscribing to this conception, stating that the only cognizable
rule was that the territorial sea was the area which at any given time a
state felt that it needed and that it could effectively defend.135 All other
members either contended that some specific limit was established in
international law or that international law did not authorize exclusive
determination by the coastal state.
Events elsewhere apparently had some impact upon later Commission
discussion of this issue. The primary drive for an extensive enlargement
of the territorial sea came from Chile, Ecuador and Peru, 3 ' and this issue
became of very considerable interest and concern generally to American
states. The Organization of American States, therefore, recommended
the holding of a special conference of these states to consider the
"System of Territorial Waters and Related Questions" and, pursuant to
this goal, included this subject on the agenda of the Third Meeting of
the Inter-American Council of Jurists which was held in Mexico City
early in 1956.111 In Resolution XIII, adopted with but one dissenting
vote (the United States) and several abstentions, the Council "recognizes
as the expression of the juridical conscience of the Continent," that "[e] ach
State is competent to establish its territorial waters within reasonable
limits, taking into account geographical , geological, and biological factors,
as well as the economic needs of its population, and its security and
134 Id., S.R. 168, 11.
135 Id., SR. 166, 14.
136 For -the text of national prescriptions, see U.N. Legislative Series, Laws and
Regulations on the Regime of the Territorial Sea 4 (Chile), 13-14 (Ecuador), 38-9 (Peru).
For the text of agreements between Chile, Ecuador and Peru concerning the extension of
national sovereignty, see U.S. Naval War College, International Law Situation and
Documents 1956, 264-79 (1957). The history and extent of these, and other Latin American,
claims is given detailed treatment in Oda, "New Trends in the Regime of the Seas,"
18 Zeitschrift fuir Ausliindisches t3ffentlisches Recht und V6lkerrecht 61, 65-73 (1957). See
also Garaioca, "The Continental Shelf and the Extension of the Territorial Sea,"
10 U. Miami L.Q. 490 (1956). For a somewhat colorable account of legislation adopted
by various Latin American states, see Pan American Union, Department of International
Law, Background Material on the Activities in the Organization of American States
Relating to the Law of the Sea 39-47 (1957).
137 An account of the organized regional consideration of this issue is given, id. at 2-12.
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defense."1 38  This was generally interpreted to mean, despite the
reference to "reasonable limits," that the coastal state was exclusively
competent to set its own limits for the territorial sea. 39 The United
States made an express "declaration and reservation" to this resolution,
noting that there had been "virtually no study, analysis, or discussion
of the substantive aspects of the Resolution" and that "much of the
Resolution is contrary to international law." 40
The Inter-American Specialized Conference on "Conservation of
Natural Resources: The Continental Shelf and Marine Waters," for
which the Mexico City meeting was supposedly preparatory, was held
in March of 1956 at Ciudad Trujillo. Its final resolution differed con-
siderably from that adopted in Mexico City in the preceding month.'4 '
Among other issues about which disagreement was recorded, the Con-
ference Resolution expressly mentioned that "[t]here exists a diversity
of positions among the states represented at this Conference with respect
to the breadth of the territorial sea."' 42 The Resolution concluded with
the statement that the "[C]onference does not express an opinion
concerning the position of the various participating states on the matters
on which agreement has not been reached," and with the recommendation
"that the American States continue diligently with the consideration" of
the question of the breadth of the territorial sea. 43 The effect of this
Resolution is to emphasize that Resolution XIII of the Mexico City
meeting did not express a consensus among the American States;
the Resolution also prompted a number of interpretative statements
by various states. Mexico declared that the Principles of Mexico cor-
rectly stated the right of each state to determine the width of the ter-
ritorial sea, while Costa Rica, Chile, Ecuador, and Peru stated that their
affirmative votes on the Resolution were not understood to alter their
domestic prescriptions.'" In view of these statements the United States
and Cuba declared that, in their view, the coastal state was not exclu-
sively competent to determine the breadth of the territorial sea.145
At the 8th session of the International Law Commission the views of
the American states such as Mexico, Peru, Ecuador and Chile appeared
138 Pan American Union, Final Act of the Third Meeting of the Inter-American Council
of jurists 36 (1956).
139 Id. at 50-59 contains the texts of reservations to the above resolution, several
of which indicate the prevalence of this interpretation.
140 Id. at 58.
141 1955-57 Inter-American Juridical Yearbook 261.
142 Ibid.
143 Id. at 261-62.
144 Id. at 262-63.
145 Id. at 265-66. For a general assessment of these conferences see Oda, note 136, supra
at 87-91; Rieff, The United States and the Treaty Law of the Sea 309-15 (1959).
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to find representation in the proposal by Mr. Zourek, of Czechoslovakia,
that ".... each coastal state was free to fix the breadth of its territorial
sea according to its own needs. That was the principle he had formulated
in paragraph 1 of his proposal, which he hoped would be accepted as
a constructive solution to the problem." 4" Since this was the only
proposal for complete freedom in the coastal state, it is desirable to refer
to it in full:
1. Every coastal state, in the exercise of its sovereign powers, has
the right to fix the breadth of its territorial sea.
2. Since the power of the coastal state to fix the limits of the territorial
sea is limited by the principle of the freedom of the high seas, in order
to conform with international law, the breadth of the territorial sea
must not infringe that principle.
3. In all cases where its delimitation of the territorial sea is justified
by the real needs of the coastal state, the breadth of the territorial
sea is in conformity with international law. This applies, in particular,
to those states which have fixed the breadth of their territorial sea at
between three and twelve miles.147
Obviously, paragraphs 1 and 3 contained the crucial provisions and
both were defeated.148 The article in its entirety was rejected by 8
votes to 3, with 3 abstentions. 1 9 That the proposal as a whole was
intended, despite the mention of a limit in paragraph 2, to permit exercise
of exclusive coastal discretion by each state was made evident when its
sponsor, Mr. Zourek, declared that he had voted against the proposal
as a whole because the rejection of paragraph 1 meant that the "sense
of the proposal was completely destroyed."' 5" Mr. Padilla-Nervo, of
Mexico, explained his affirmative vote with the curious remark that
it "placed no limit on the territorial sea beyond what it was reasonable
to claim; ' 15 1 the proposal, of course, neither mentioned explicitly the
standard of reasonableness nor, in any case, did it furnish any criteria
for applying such a standard. It was certainly not intended that the
"real needs" which "justified" a particular claim would be subject to
review. In any event, the rejection of Mr. Zourek's article ended the effort
to obtain Commission approval of an exclusive competence in the
coastal state to fix the width of the territorial sea. The Commission's
final recommendation on this, whatever its other deficiencies, constituted
an unequivocal determination that coastal competence was definitely
limited by international law.'52
146 1 Yearbook of the International Law Commission 163 (1956).
147 Id. at 162.
148 Id. at 181.
149 Ibid.
150 Ibid.
151 Ibid.
152 International Law Commission, Report, Article 3 and Commentary, U.N. Gen. Ass.
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Two major proposals, only one of which was permitted to come to a
vote, were made at the 1958 Conference with the apparent objective of
permitting unlimited discretion in the coastal state. 53 The Peruvian
recommendation was largely adopted from the Principles of Mexico
and was represented as having the "support of an important regional
body,"':" a statement another delegate refuted by referring to the
Resolution later adopted at Ciudad Trujillo. 55 The proposal read:
Each State is competent to fix its territorial sea within reasonable limits,
taking into account geographical, geological and biological factors, as
well as the economic needs of its population, and its security and defence.
The States shall endeavour to fix the breadth of the territorial sea
preferably by regional agreements.
There was very little debate on this proposal, or even mention of it, and it
is not unlikely that the great majority at the Conference shared the
opinion of the United Arab Republic delegate who classified the Peruvian
article as "extreme." '56 The Peruvian delegate, while purporting to
discern a general agreement among the states upon exclusive coastal
competence, remarked that many proposals provided for specific limits
on the territorial sea, and added that if the coastal state was competent
to fix its own territorial sea it was "absurd" to require the concurrence of
other states.157 Since the really serious discussion at the Conference dealt
with attempts to reach agreement on relatively specific limits for the
territorial sea, quite clearly manifesting expectation of a requirement
for obtaining the concurrence of other states, the "absurd" position, if
the term is appropriate at all, was that of those who sought to establish
the lawfulness of a unilateral determination of the territorial sea.
Ultimately the trend of opinion became clear and Peru withdrew its
suggested article, offering as an explanation that the Conference "had
failed to study adequately the technical, biological and economic aspects
of the law of the sea."' 58 It is most doubtful that making good this
failure would have gained any greater support for the major policy
underlying the Peruvian article.
The Soviet Union recommendation had the benefit of more skillful
Off. Rec.,llth Sess., Supp. No. 9, at 12-13 (A/3159) (1956) (hereinafter cited as 1956
Report)
153 3 Official Records 247, 233 (1958).
154 3 Official Records 151 (1958).
155 3 Official Records 37, 66 (1958). The Colombian delegate also pointed out that, in
fact, only one-half the delegations at the Mexico City meeting had approved Resolution XIII
as it pertained to determination of the teritorial sea. 3 Official Records 110 (1958).
156 3 Official Records 137 (1958).
157 3 Official Records 166 (1958). Naturally, if this was an "absurd" requirement there
could be no operational meaning to the supposed condition relating to "reasonable limits."
158 3 Official Records 176 (1958).
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drafting than that of Peru but fared little better and at no time seemed to
be regarded as a serious alternative. The Soviet proposal read:
Each State shall determine the breadth of its territorial waters in accord-
ance with established practice within the limits, as a rule, of three to
twelve miles, having regard to historical and geographical conditions,
economic interests, the interests of the security of the coastal state and
the interests of international navigation.
The crucial phrase here, obviously, is "as a rule." The Soviet delegate,
when questioned, declared that it was "inserted... in order to allow for
the possibility of making exceptions in special circumstances."'6 9 It thus
became clear, despite the reference to three and twelve miles, that no
limit was being suggested; this was confirmed in the statement by the
Soviet Union, in answer to the inquiry as to who would be the judge
as to the "special circumstances," that "there was no compulsory juris-
diction under international law."'o In the Soviet view the appropriate
procedure was that of "peaceful settlement according to article 33 of the
United Nations Charter."'' In short, the Soviet proposal meant that each
state was to have exclusive competence to determine the breadth of the
territorial sea. In view of the general concern for agreeing upon a
relatively specific limit it is not surprising that this Soviet proposal was
decisively rejected by the First Committee (44 against, 29 for, 9
abstentions).2 Of the affirmative votes about one-third were from
members of the Soviet bloc.'6 3 The same article was even more over-
whelmingly defeated in the plenary session by a 47 to 21 vote, with 17
abstentions; about one-half of the favorable votes were from the Soviet
bloc.' 4
C. Appraisal and Recommendation
The outcome of the 1958 Conference constitutes a clear rejection of the
proposition that international law places no limit on state freedom to
determine the width of the territorial sea, and this result appears com-
pletely sound from a policy perspective. The consequence is to focus
159 3 Official Records 108 (1958).
160 3 Official Records 169 (1958).
161 3 Official Records 169 (1958).
162 3 Official Records 177-78 (1958).
163 The Soviet bloc is here considered to include nine states-Albania, Bulgaria,
Byelorussian S.S.R., Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Poland, Romania, Ukrainian S.S.R., and
the U.S.S.R.
Not a single European state outside Eastern Europe supported the Soviet proposal. All
of the remaining twenty affirmative votes came from five Latin American states,
thirteen Afro-Asian (including Arab) states, plus Yugoslavia and Iceland.
164 Of the Latin American states only Chile, Ecuador and Peru maintained their adamant
position upholding exclusive coastal competence. Only two Asian states (Burma and
Indonesia) and five Arab states (Morocco, Saudi Arabia, Tunisia, UA.R., and Iraq)
supported -the Soviet proposal. Yugoslavia and Iceland again voted for it. 2 Official
Records 40 (1958).
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attention even more intensely upon the extent of agreement upon variously
mentioned explicit limits for the territorial sea. As will be seen, the
Conference requirement for a two-thirds majority was not attained
with respect to any particular limit, but this, in view of the votes upon
the Soviet proposals, does not suggest the conclusion that states are there-
fore considered free to fix the limit of their exclusive authority. This
appears as the major significance of the heavy majorities against the
Soviet proposals.'l
V. THE CLAM TO A PARTICULAR WIDTH FOR THE TERRITORIAL SEA
A. Relevant Policy Factors
The most important policy question arising from contemporary con-
troversy is whether the rapidly growing need for food and for general
economic development in particular states is, or could be, served by any
specific, generally applicable width for the territorial sea.16 5 There is,
as has been seen, no question as to the necessity for remedying chronic
food shortages in populous parts of the world, nor is there much doubt
that fishing resources might be developed to aid in alleviating these
shortages. Similarly, the necessity for growth in the economies of a
great number of states is widely accepted. The question remains, how-
ever, whether some agreed-upon width for the territorial sea could be
made to contribute to achieving a greater production of food from the
sea or a more effective economic development. This question must be
faced, even though an area for exclusive fishing exploitation could be
created by honoring a new "contiguous zone" rather than by extension
of the territorial sea, because a considerable number of states have
164a The Soviet Union nevertheless continues to insist it is a "rule of international
law" that the coastal state is exclusively competent to determine its own limits. In
the discussion of the Sixth Committee of the General Assembly, concerning the convening
of another conference to attempt to agree upon the width issue, the Soviet delegate
declared:
The proposal for a six-mile limit, as also the proposal for a three-mile limit,
disregarded the basic and well-known principle of international law acording to which
each State determined the breadth of its territorial waters, having regard to historical,
and geographical conditions, economic interests, the interests of the security of the
coastal state and the interests of international navigation.
The fact that no decision had been reached at Geneva regarding the breadth
of territorial waters in no way signified, as some had tried to contend in the Com-
mittee, that a state of juridical vacuum had been created. The principle of inter-
national law to which he had referred, which had been supported at Geneva by
the Soviet Union and other States, already constituted a rule of international law,
whether some Powers liked it or not."
U.N. Gen. Ass. Off. Rec., 13th Sess., Sixth Committee (Legal Committee) 164 (U.N.
Doc. No. A/C.6/SR. 583/Rev. 1) (1958).
The Soviet delegate added that, in his government's view, certain Powers had attempted
to "impose" a six-mile territorial sea at Geneva.
165 Many arguments for a twelve-mile limit invoke these necessities as primary
justification. See notes 255-257, infra and accompanying text.
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demanded a wider territorial sea than was formerly claimed, for the
express purpose of securing greater exclusive access to offshore fishing.
Opposition to these claims has rested upon two primary bases: first,
that the establishment of larger exclusive fishing areas is not desirable,
and, second, that even if such establishment might be desirable, there
are more economic ways of accomplishing it than by an extension of the
territorial sea. We shall discuss these grounds in opposition seriatim.
For the most part all the limits suggested for the width of the territorial
sea have been in terms of specific distance in miles, ranging from three to
twelve. 16  The expansive limit of 200 miles claimed by Chile, Ecuador,
and Peru, has, as will be indicated later, failed to gain acceptance. The
difficulty with all the specific limits proposed from time to time is that
none of them bears any relationship, except in certain very limited in-
stances, to the range within which fish stocks move in adjacent waters.'67
The difficulties this poses will be examined in more detail below, but it
may be noted here that only one determinable limit appears to have such
a relationship, and even this limit does not hold for all species of fish.
The most important food fish are commonly found, as has been indicated,
in the relatively shallow waters above the continental shelf. Hence, if
the territorial sea were to be demarcated as the outer limit of the shelf,
it would encompass a substantial part of the presently exploited fish
populations of the world. 6' There have been unsuccessful efforts within
countries to secure adoption of legislation to this effect, as with respect
to certain waters off the Alaskan coast.169
The solution of employing the outer edge of the shelf as the boundary
of an exclusive fishing area or of the territorial sea would, however, appear
wholly inadvisable. Among the many reasons for this is the major one
that it would most likely result in a greatly reduced production of fish
166 Of all the proposals submitted to the 1958 Conference only two, those of Peru and
the Soviet Union, would have sanctioned greater distances. The method proposed, that of
recognizing an exclusive discretion in the coastal state, was rejected, as we have just
indicated.
167 This statement is true both in the sense that fish move laterally along a coast from
the waters adjacent to one state to waters adjacent to another state and in the sense
that the outer limit of the territorial sea does not mark the outer limit of the range within
which fish move. See sources in notes 37-38a, supra and accompanying text. See
also United States, Memorandum on Certain Aspects of United States Policy Regarding
the Conservation of the Resources of the Continental Shelf and Marine Waters 6 (Doc.
No. 31, Inter-American Specialized Conference on Conservation of Natural Resources:
Continental Shelf and Marine Waters) (19 Mar. 1956); Sette, Living Resources of the
Continental Shelf and Their Utilization and Conservation 3 (1956).
168 Of course, even this is relatively meaningless since fish also move laterally. Further-
more, every important pelagic species, such as tuna, roam over vast areas of the ocean.
See Schaefer, "The Scientific Basis for a Conservation Programme," 1955 Rome Papers 14,
23, note 42, supra.
169 Oda, note 136, supra at 62-5; Leonard, International Regulation of Fisheries 121
(1944).
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if it could be enforced.' ° It is not likely that very many coastal states
either have the capacity to exploit such an area effectively or could dis-
pose of the fish economically, if a full and rational catch could be made
by each state. There is also grave doubt that any single state, with very
few exceptions, ought to seek, in the economic allocation of its total
resources, to devote such resources to fishing on the scale that would be
required effectively to exploit the fish stocks of the continental shelves.
One of the arguments most frequently made for the various suggested
widths of the territorial sea is that exclusion of foreign fishing vessels,
operating with modern and efficient gear, will prevent "destruction,"
"extinction," "depletion," or "over-fishing" of adjacent fish stocks . 7
Apart from the fact that these allegations are very seldom accompanied
by any semblance of evidence supporting the conclusion of overexploita-
tion1 2 (other than a showing of a possible decline in catch per unit effort,
which scientists do not accept as decisive proof of overfishing), 173 the
claimed width for the territorial sea, whether six, nine, or twelve miles,
offers no solution to the problem which is alleged. The reason for this is
170 Another scarcely less important factor, which needs explicit mention, consists of the
requirements of investigation for scientific purposes. See FAO, Millions Still Go Hungry
65 (12th Report of the Director General, 1957).
171 Destruction is mentioned by numerous commentators. See, eg., Riesenfeld, Pro-
tection of Coastal Fisheries under International Law 282 (1942); Leonard, op. cit. note
169, supra at 1; Rieff, op. cit. note 145, supra at 30. The latter also refers to the pos-
sibilities of "irreparable damage" to "invaluable resources." Id. at 45.
There seems little doubt that biological opinion would not support these conclusions
except, perhaps, in regard to salmon, which is anadromous and not comparable to other
species. Schaefer states:
It may be agreed that for nearly all populations of organisms in the sea there need
not be concern with protecting them against being driven to such low levels that they
can never recover.
Schaefer, note 168, supra at 16.
The degree of realism in fears of "destruction" or "extinction" is perhaps more dearly
indicated by the FAO prediction: ". . . it seems unlikely that production from any of
the existing fisheries need fall substantially and permanently below their present level
of production," and where elements of overfishing are noted, ... even these could . .*
be held at present levels by appropriate adjustments of -the fishing effort." FAO Fisheries
Division, "Improving the Fisheries Contribution to World Food Supplies," 6 FAO Fisheries
Bull. 159, 170 (1953).
"Depletion" and "overfishing" are, on the other hand, accepted as biological possibilities,
and some fisheries are thought to display symptoms of overfishing. Graham, ed., Sea Fisheries
50 (1956); Beverton and Holt, On the Dynamics of Exploited Fish Populations 24-5 (1957).
1.72 With respect to the most vigorous complaints, i.e., those of some Latin American
states, the United States noted at the Ciudad Trujillo Conference in 1956 (the Inter-
American Specialized Conference) that:
It has been alleged that the activities of commercial fishing interests are bringing
about the destruction of fishery resources. But is there any substantiating evidence
to show that any of the major stocks of fish of international interest off the coasts
of the Americas have actually suffered depletion as a result of fishing activities by
vessels of countries not adjacent to those waters. If such evidence exists it should be
brought forward.
United States, Memorandum, note 167, supra at 6.
173 This is not considered a reliable indicator by itself. See Beverton and Holt, op. cit.
note 171, supra at 390; Graham, "Overfishing," 7 UNSCCUR 20, 21-22 (1951); Graham,
op. cit. note 171, supra at 262-63.
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that the area which would be included within the territorial sea so ex-
panded would still not include the whole area within which the exploited
stock or stocks range. It is probable that there are only a very few areas
in which fish are concentrated so close to shore and do not migrate beyond
such limits or beyond the lateral boundaries of the state. Insofar as has
been discovered, biological studies have all centered upon particular
species and upon the area inhabited by such species, and not upon a
given area which might coincide with the preferred limits for the ter-
ritorial sea. No scientific suggestions for the control of exploitation have
been formulated in terms of specific zones without regard to pertinent
biological facts pertaining to the species in question."7 It is abundantly
clear that no effort at control could succeed which asserted exclusive
exploitation over only a part of an area within which an exploited species
moves, leaving the remainder of the area in which the fish are found
open to intensive, unregulated use.175 A rational plan for controlled use
could hardly be constructed in such a piecemeal fashion. By itself, there-
fore, no width of the territorial sea, or exclusive fishing zone, in terms of
specific arbitrary distances in miles, can be said to serve a community
policy directed at prevention of a waste of resources due to overex-
ploitation.
This conclusion is not altered by the testimony of the few economists
who have studied the economics of fisheries and who have testified that
"sole ownership" or a "unified management" is the first step in dealing
with the problem of overfishing.176 It will be recalled that these econ-
omists have stated that the only possible way to achieve rational ex-
ploitation is to establish control over all of the fishery so that the benefits
of conserving use will accrue to those who practice it rather than being
dissipated by additional, uncontrolled fishing. But, again, this sole control
is not achieved, or achievable, by establishing an exclusive fishing area
174 Obviously, there have been suggestions which have purported to discover a
relationship between biological systems and a particular limit for the territorial sea or
exclusive fishing area. The best known of these, no doubt, is that of Chile, Ecuador and
Peru, urging the existence of an ecological system embracing both the adjacent ocean
area within 200 miles of shore and the bordering population and land masses. This was
the scientific basis for the CEP claims. The United States refused to recognize the
validity of such a concept. For the statement of opposing positions, see U.S. Department
of State, Santiago Negotiations on Fishery Conservation Problems, 30-33, 36-41 (1955).
Rieff, op. cit. note 145, supra at 307-09, summarizes these views.
The principle of abstention urged by the United States makes reference to exploitation
of a stock of fish and not to the boundaries determined irrespective of factors related to
the range of the particular species to which the principle would be applicable. See
van Cleve, "The Economic and Scientific Basis of the Principle of Abstention" (U.N. Doc.
A/Conf. 13/3) (1957) 1 Official Records 47 (1958).
175 "It must be understood that both the scientific investigations and the subsequent
management measures need to be extended over whatever area of the sea corresponds
to the range of the populations in question." Schaefer, note 168, supra at 22.
176 See notes 92-104, supra and accompanying text.
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which does not correspond with the area occupied by the exploited
species, and this is what would occur in most cases in fixing a three, six
or twelve mile limit for the territorial sea. Economists suggesting that
certain states have already taken this step by extending internal waters
or territorial sea are for this reason incorrect. 17
In any event the requirement that a fishery be subjected to a unified
management by no means necessarily supports an argument that such
management must be exercised by a single state for its own benefit;
economists have been careful to point out that exclusively local, or
coastal, control is not the only alternative.178 If it is determined that the
condition of a fishery required conservative use, it may be more econom-
ical to establish a management which, although unified, is nevertheless
shared by several states fishing in an area; other factors obviously rein-
force this desirability of shared competence and use. This seems sub-
stantially the purport of President Truman's proclamation in 1945179
and seems to be the most fruitful method, if conservation is otherwise
desirable. However this may be, it is nevertheless clear that any specified
limits for the territorial sea are not necessarily justified by the necessity
of single ownership or control in the sense urged by the fishery econ-
omists.
A final relevant point in this connection is that it may be undesirable
from an over-all community perspective to undertake the organization
of a unified management of a given fishery or to establish a conservatory
regime, even if it could be established through extensions of the limits
of the territorial sea. There have been strong suggestions that the con-
servation measures promulgated to maintain the yield of the Pacific
halibut fishery have resulted in a waste of resources, 8 ' and it has been
177 Scott, Natural Resources: The Economics of Conservation 126 (1955) suggests
that "appropriation of the fishery," which, as indicated in the text, is sometimes recom-
mended as the first step in dealing with the overfishing problem, was the objective of
certain "unilateral actions of Russia, Norway, Iceland and the United States, in declaring
that certain offshore waters, formerly believed to be accessible to all nations, are in fact
national property." Although the areas claimed are not specified it is very doubtful if
they encompassed the whole of a fishery. Insofar as is known the United States has not
claimed any waters beyond the territorial sea as "national property."
178 Id. at 126-27; Scott, "The Fishery: The Objectives of Sole Ownership," 63 J. Pol.
Econ. 116 (1955). Professor Gordon's proposal regarding extension of the territorial
sea as a method of easing the "practical problems of fisheries management" seems to
have been intended primarily to promote discussion of possible alternatives and not as
a considered solution. Gordon, Obstacles to Areement on Control in the Fishing Industry,
in Turvey and Wiseman, The Economics of Fisheries 65, 72 (1957).
179 As will be recalled, the United States there offered to cooperate with other states
in establishing conservation zones in areas contiguous to the United States where both
American and foreign fishermen jointly engaged in fishing on a substantial scale. 59
Stat. 885-86 (1945), 16 U.S.C. § 741 (1958).
180 The major detailed attack by economists is that of Crutchfield, "Common
Property Resources and Factor Allocation," 22 Canadian J. Econ. & Pol. Science 292
(1956) who enumerates what he regards as elements of waste in the halibut industry
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further suggested that there is no "clear-cut evidence that halibut fisher-
men were made relatively more prosperous by the control measures."' 8
Of more general significance is the assertion of Professor Scott that
[s]ome assets, such as oil fields, fisheries and watersheds, occur on an im-
mense scale, and it is a very real problem to know whether the efficiency
gained from unified management provides a social gain sufficient to offset
the possible dangers of the creation of some immense sole-ownership or-
ganization (such as a cooperative, a government board, a private corpora-
tion, or an international authority).182
The same general point was made by Burkenroad from a somewhat dif-
ferent perspective:
Reduction of a stock below the level for maximum equilibrium yield thus
has results which are clearly definable in terms of wasted effort. However,
the social benefits of saving this effort by management are not so easy to
demonstrate, ... 183
In other words, wholly unregulated exploitation may be more desirable
in certain circumstances, or less undesirable, than attempts at planned
use.
Perhaps the most important argument made for the extension of the
territorial sea to a particular distance is that the coastal state needs to
produce more food or employ more people or produce more savings
(either from the fishing activity itself or from the land freed from agri-
cultural production because of increased fish production), and that ex-
clusion of foreign exploitation is necessary for this end. The assumptions
underlying this argument, requiring examination, are several: that there
and concludes that another result has been "a high amount of over-capacity in the entire
Pacific Coast fishing industry." Id. at 295.
See also, for an appraisal of the Pacific halibut experience in terms of regulation for
optimum fishing, Beverton and Holt, op. cit. note 171, supra at 394-95.
181 Gordon, "The Economic Theory of a Common-Property Resource: The Fishery."
62 J. Pol. Econ. 124, 133 (1954). See especially note 104, supra. The general criticism
of conservation measures on economic grounds seems even more cogent if the biological
bases for conservation are subject to dispute and, as we have shown, there seem to be
grounds for such dispute.
182 Scott, note 178, supra at 116.
183 Burkenroad, "Theory and Practice of Marine Fishery Management," 18 J. du
Conseil Permanent International pour L'exploration de la Mer 300, 301 (1953). He sees
one of the more significant disadvantages of management in the removal of initiative to
develop fisheries in little-used stocks. Id. at 302.
Beverton and Holt disagree that management may not provide sufficient returns to
justify the effort. They observe:
There can be no reasonable doubt that management costs in the North Sea would
be negligible compared with the benefit to the industry and to the community. Whilst
agreeing that one important benefit would be an improvement in our knowledge of the
interaction between man and his environment, we cannot concur with Burkenroad's
belief that the net material gains would be small; on the contrary, though we do not
hold out much hope of a greatly increased demersal yield, the landings would certainly
be maintained with far less than the present effort. In this way not only would the
demersal catch be made at much reduced cost, but ships and men would be released to
intensify exploitation of the stocks of underfished species.
Beverton and Holt, op. cit. supra note 171, at 25-26. But see id. at 394-95.
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are not, in the particular instance, enough fish to provide for local needs
and the heavy demands of foreign fishermen, that exclusion of foreign
fishermen would increase local production or employment, that local food
production ought to be increased, or labor absorbed, through greater
fishery activity in preference to investment in other local projects, and
that foreign exploitation ought to be reduced to benefit local fishermen.
The first of these assumptions, that the supply of fish is not adequate,
is all too often no more than a bare assumption, for there is very little
indication that states claiming a widened territorial sea in order to obtain
more fish or employment opportunities have ever made the studies and
analyses necessary to establish either the identity of the exploitable fish
populations in adjacent waters, or their probable size, or that the current
or prospective level of fishing intensity is too great for the maintenance
of a maximum yield."s Yet without investigations of this type, sometimes
of a very complex character and extending over a considerable period of
years, it is not possible to conclude that the maximum sustainable yield
from the available resources is not great enough to satisfy present and
future local and foreign fishermen. The complexity of the research re-
quired, and the time necessary for observation, are such that it is most
improbable that even a sizeable minority of coastal states have made in-
vestigations of the character required. 85
The same assumption appears further questionable, as a general
proposition, because of the many difficulties previously mentioned con-
cerning the determination of the effect of fishing on a particular stock or
stocks. 86 Thus even if the required studies were made it might not be
possible to conclude that fishing intensity was too high.18 7 Apart from
the difficulties of assessing the factors determining fish population it may
be recalled that the possibility of cyclical variations in population size,
184 There is no compilation or collection of information about the world's fisheries
which would include an indication that, for particular fisheries, the available information
was or was not sufficient for instituting conservation measures. The FAO is apparently
engaged in such a compilation, but completion was reported in 1955 to be "several years"
away. Kesteven and Holt, "Classification of International Conservation Problems," 1955
Rome Papers 350, 359. The major basis for the declaration in -the text is that the intensive
study required to develop significant biological information relating to these problems seems
to have been pursued in only a few parts of the world.
It should be added that the economic data for determining the desirability of reducing
the fishing intensity of certain vessels is probably nonexistent.
185 For an indication of the possible time period involved and complexities in
fisheries research see Foerster, "Prospects for Managing Our Fisheries," 11 Bull Bing. Ocean.
Coll. 213, 216 (1948) and Merriman and Warfel, Studies on the Marine Resources of
Southern New England VII. Analysis of a Fish Population, Id. at 131, 132.
186 "The truth of the matter is that most of the major issues in fishing biology are
still highly controversial. For example, there is no unanimity of opinion as to demonstrable
instances of overfishing. We know only a modicum about the causes of fluctuations in
abundance." Id. See also notes 39-49, supra and accompanying text.
187 Some difficulties in drawing conclusions from data are summarized in Burkenroad,
note 183, supra at 304-09. And see Graham, "Overfishing," 7 UNSCCUR 20 (1951).
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over very long periods, have led some biologists to discount the effect of
fishing as an important determinant of available fish stocks. s8  Moreover,
it would seem to be of very considerable importance that, with respect
to some demersal species, it may no longer be valid to conclude that there
is a particular yield which is all the stock will bear. 89 If the eumetric
theory could be applied, it might be that with appropriate adjustments
in mesh size the fishery could produce even greater yields at current
fishing intensity or even bear the burden of greater intensity. In the
light of the eumetric theory, the argument that there is an inadequate
supply of fish would be extremely difficult to support, and the coastal
state would be required, instead, explicitly to face the problem of con-
sidering the economic, social and political factors which are relevant to
'the determination of how much effort should be exerted, and by whom,
in fishing.
The assumption that the exclusion of foreign fishermen from an ex-
panded territorial sea would increase local production or employment is
somewhat more difficult to assess, but appears to be equally devoid of
supporting evidence. The major point appears to be that preventing
intensive fishing activity within an area where fish may be found in
relatively dense concentrations results in a better catch by local fishermen
or in encouraging the entry into fishing by nationals of the coastal state.
Since exclusion does not by itself change the quantity and density of the
fish in the area, the argument appears to be that by reducing the oppor-
tunity for use of the foreign, more efficient, gear, the catch of local fisher-
men may be increased, while effort remains constant, and costs thereby
reduced. Exclusion of this kind perhaps does result in less intensive
fishing when the more efficient foreign vessels and gear are prevented
from operating in the most favorable fishing area which exists at a given
time. Thus, the fishing vessel searching for the densest concentration of
fish is hindered when this concentration appears to lie within an area
from which it is excluded. The result is that during such a time period
the vessel must continue to search beyond the territorial sea and to fish
under what then may be the less favorable conditions. Despite many
advances in method, finding fish in many areas is, to a considerable
degree, a matter of hunting or chance, and exclusion of foreign fishermen
lengthens the odds against a good find by relatively more efficient gear.
188 The complexity of all the interdependent factors involved may also include long-
term changes which might be of such magnitude as to invalidate any conclusions drawn
about changes in the short run. Burkenroad, "Fluctuation in Abundance of Pacific Halibut,"
11 Bull. Bing. Ocean Coll. 81 (1948), concluded that there was a "bare possibility . . .
that fluctuation in the population of halibut on the western banks might be of a regular
cyclical sort with a period of around thirty-four years." Id. at 120-21.
189 Beverton and Holt, op. cit. supra note 171, 389-92.
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Local fishermen, on the other hand, have the advantage of being able
to search for and find fish wherever they occur in the best concentration;
the chances of finding a good catch are increased when better gear is not
competing on equal terms. As a result of the less intensive fishing effort
it is possible that local fishermen might obtain a greater catch per unit
of effort, resulting in less time away from port and a reduction of the
cost of fishing. This may have several beneficial ramifications, such as
reducing prices and increasing demand and, because of increased profits,
encouraging more fishing by a greater number of fishermen.
If the handicap imposed upon foreign fishing does reduce fishing effort
and permit good catches by local fishermen in areas relatively close to
shore it may also have the important consequence of permitting use of
less powerful and smaller boats. This might allow the expansion of local
fishing since it reduces the investment required for equipment, including
the necessity for refrigeration or for other methods of preserving fish.
There may be some situations in which all or most of a fishery is
located within a territorial sea of twelve miles or less but these are
probably far from common. In such instances, it is clear that coastal
fishermen would have a relatively assured catch and foreign fishermen
would be cut off altogether from fishing the stocks in question. The po-
tential advantage to the coastal state is as obvious as is the deprivation
to foreign fishermen accustomed to exploiting the area. Nevertheless,
these instances are not numerous and they hardly constitute persuasive
argument for a general extension of the territorial sea.
The major difficulty with this analysis relating to the increased local
production or employment is that there is no assurance that any such
increase will take place or even that it ought to take place from either
local or general community perspectives. It is quite possible that no
reduction in cost may ensue because the gear used by local fishermen is
too inefficient to take advantage of the better opportunities, if indeed
there are any; or the reduction may not reach such a magnitude that it
has any effect in increasing local activity and production. Further, the
fact that increased supplies are available does not mean that the fish will
be caught-the market may not be such as to permit increased con-
sumption. 90 In any of these events the major effect of exclusion would
be to raise costs to foreign fishermen and, perhaps, reduce the total
190 Great significance is attached to the availability of a market. The FAO Fisheries
Division refers to the "over-riding" importance of -this factor as a deterrent to increased
fishing exploitation. FAO Fisheries Division, "Improving the Fisheries Contribution to
World Food Supplies," 6 FAO Fisheries Bull. 159, 182 (1953). See also Kirby and
Szczepanik, Special Problems of Fisheries in Poor Countries in The Economics of Fisheries
83, 88 (Turvey and Wiseman eds. 1957), for an estimate attributing lesser significance to
this factor.
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production of food. In fact, if gear and boat efficiencies are different, the
advantages given local fishermen may mean a waste of fish. 1 '
Perhaps the most significant defect in the assumption under question
is that, even if increased production or employment might be possible
from a given case of exclusion, it does not at all follow that the coastal
state ought to devote more resources to fishing or that these resources
ought to be allocated to the particular fishery in question. Determining
what type of productive activity a state should invest in is obviously a
most complicated decision; it is here necessary only to note that the
quantity of fish available is but one factor in such a determination.
Similarly, the decisions as to what type of fishery should be developed
and with what type of vessels and gear involve a series of complex
factors."9 2 It is significant, too, that in one study of factors relevant to
this type of decision it was concluded:
Political boundaries largely belong to the harmful institutional factors. By
analogy with geographical obstacles, they may hamper the development of
fisheries, because they cut markets and fishing grounds off from com-
munities of fishermen and also hamper the spread of technical information
and of entrepreneurial and organizational abilities. Fisheries in many
South American states experience these and similar handicaps, due to
the division of that continent into a large number of national units.193
Clearly, extensions of the territorial sea which provoke similar action by
neighboring states may produce a net disadvantage. The conclusions
from inquiries of this type would be expected to vary from state to state,
depending upon a variety of value judgments and upon conclusions re-
garding the weight to be given the many factors involved. In general,
however, in this as in many comparable situations, a policy of exclusive
appropriation serves one state only so long as other states do not engage
in a similar policy; the benefits to coastal states from increased produc-
tion of fish or from greater employment are not necessarily to be ex-
pected merely from an enlargement of the territorial sea which excludes
foreign fishermen from accustomed fishing grounds.
Even if it were desirable, from immediate coastal perspectives, that
191 In particular instances, it is true, reduced production may be the price of better
distribution and the latter may be a more appropriate community goal. Our point here
is that universally applicable, enlarged exclusive fishing areas may lead to significantly
less production for ultimate distribution. The possibility that in specific instances
decreased production is desirable to obtain better distribution does not invalidate the
major point. We would accommodate these specific situations where enlarged fishing
limits seemed urgently required by recognition of limited exclusive authority in zones
specially created for that purpose. See pp. 224-26, infra.
192 For a survey of factors, see Netherlands Economic Institute, The Development
of Offshore Fisheries and the Economics of Choice (1958). For a more comprehensive
treatment, see Bottemanne, Principles of Fisheries Development (1959).
193 Netherlands Economic Institute, The Development of Offshore Fisheries and the
Economics of Choice 25 (1958).
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local resources be invested in increased fishing activity, the result may
be a net loss to the community and, in the long run, to the particular
state. The question of the allocation of resources as between states, as
it is here presented, is crucial when the issue is whether the fishing effort
of one state ought to be displaced by that of another. If a decision of
this type is to be rational, from general community perspectives, it must
take into account the costs of diverting the resources of one state either
into another fishery or another kind of productive activity relative to the
gain anticipated by replacing such resources with those of another state.
The relevance, and need for, this type of information has been em-
phasized in a study by the Secretariat of the Food and Agriculture Or-
ganization:
It is clear from these examples alone that in order to assess the effect on
national economies of most of the changes likely to occur in a fishery, one
would need information on what is technically known as the mobility of
factors, i.e., the costs involved in diverting capital, labour and other factors
of production to other uses (and vice versa) and on the elasticity of de-
mand. Hardly any such information is available and it is certain that much
research would be needed to obtain it. If economic considerations were
to be taken into account objectively in determining legal questions con-
nected with the sea fisheries or in regulating these fisheries, there would be
need for much greater knowledge of the relevant economic factors and
consequently for a very great deal of economic investigations.'1
It thus seems impossible to demonstrate, under current conditions, that
local exploitation is more economic in either exclusive or inclusive inter-
est than foreign, and there seems to be little reason that a priori assump-
tions should be accepted as guides to community policy.
The policy implications of this discussion may, accordingly, be briefly
summarized. Because of the migratory nature of fish, it appears to be
fact that no width for the territorial sea can make any particular con-
tribution to the prevention of possible overexploitation of a particular
fishery. Arrangements which are not coextensive with the range of the
exploited stock or stocks cannot be expected to have predictable effects.
If, further, a regime of unified management should be considered de-
sirable, it is apparent that the region to be included cannot be effectively
defined in terms of an area within a particular distance from one coastal
state. These facts make it clear that no practicable, generally applied,
breadth for the territorial sea can be designed which will promote a
rationally planned exploitation-that is, an exploitation which secures a
194 FAO Memorandum, "The Economic Importance of Sea Fisheries in Different
Countries" (U.N. Doc. A/Conf. 13/16) (1957) 1 Official Records -245, 249; see also Van
-Cleve, "The Economic and Scientific Bases of the Principle of Abstention" (U.N. Doc.
A/Conf. 13/3) (1957) 1 Official Records 47, 55-56 (1958).
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regulated yield with a view to maintenance of future benefits-of fishery
resources of the oceans.
The question is, then, whether any generally applied width would
permit community desired benefits to particular coastal states, although
admittedly not as part of a planned, rational scheme, which would offset
the losses, similarly of concern to the general community, to other states
fishing in affected areas. Thus, the query is whether increased production
of fish or increased employment in certain states is a desirable, and suf-
ficiently likely, return in exchange for universally applicable restrictions
upon the fishing activities of other states, and the consequent deprivation
of inclusive and exclusive interests. With respect to desirability, it is
very much open to question whether coastal states in general have at-
tempted the kind of planning which would warrant the conclusion that
increased production of fish or increased employment in fisheries repre-
sent well-considered priorities for allocation of available resources. Finally,
concerning the possibility of rationally determining the efforts particular
states should put forth with respect to particular fisheries, the present
lack of information concerning the mobility of the factors of production
makes it impossible to conclude that a particular instance of allocation
is or is not economic. In this state of ignorance it is certainly permissible
to doubt that the alleged benefits to coastal states will actually accrue
in any substantial number of instances. Because of this lack of evidence
demonstrating that the deprivations of other states and the general com-
munity is to be outweighed by the alleged gains for the coastal states, it
seems reasonable to conclude that establishing a particular width, greater
than the minimum all agree upon, for the territorial sea as a means of
promoting increased fish production or greaterhse of labor in fisheries,
is not a desirable community policy. From the perspective of fisheries,
at least, maintenance of the oceans as accessible to the most open in-
clusive use, perhaps conditioned by agreed upon limitations on intensity
where appropriate criteria so indicate, would appear, in the vast majority
of instances, to promise more both in production of fish and employment
than would restricting such area in any great degree. It bears emphasis
again that division of the ocean into areas of exclusive use is a positive
handicap to rational present and future uses since it obstructs the basic
research work and experimental fishing which must be preliminary to
development and, hence, may inhibit desirable development of the fishery
when this stage is reached. It goes without saying, admitting the com-
plexities involved, that where scientific studies so indicate and economic
and social criteria approved by the community are in accord, appropriate
conservation measures ought to be agreed upon.
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While it is perhaps not a probable development, it might be wise
community policy to establish procedures through which the area of
exclusive access for fishing could be varied to take into account the needs
of those few states which can justifiably demand a larger area than
others. The problem here is in providing for a method of assessing the
factors, by now familiar, relevant for determining the desirability of
recognizing an enlarged exclusive area, including information as to the
identity and size of the exploitable fish populations in adjacent waters,
the effects of fishing, the likelihood of increases in production or em-
ployment, the elasticity of the primary market, the effects on foreign
fishing, alternative fishing grounds, and so forth.195 One way of estab-
lishing appropriate procedures might be to employ regional arrange-
ments, consisting of the states interested in fishing particular ocean areas
-a device already in use for promulgating conservation measures. Re-
gionally organized groups, which have already in some instances begun
to collect the relevant scientific and other information, and the possibility
of extending this type of cooperative activity would appear far more
likely to promote broad community goals than any universally ap-
plicable limit for the territorial sea which can have no rational relation-
ship and may do possible harm to general community interests. 196
It is not suggested that any selective extensions of authority for fishing
purposes must be, or should be, accomplished through expansion of the
territorial sea, for it is clear that other techniques, more conservative of
inclusive use, are available for this purpose. Many suggestions have been
made that justifiable demands for special treatment could be accom-
modated by recognition of a right of exclusive exploitation in a "con-
tiguous zone" beyond the narrow territorial sea. From a policy per-
spective this alternative would appear eminently preferable, since there
is no need for extending all aspects of exclusive authority further out to
sea merely in order to accomplish the protection of a single interest. If
195 The goal is to provide for those states for whom adjacent fish resources may be of
the most vital consequence, such as Iceland, Greenland, and the Faeroe Islands. Other
areas may also be entitled to this concern. The above factors would be among those
relevant to a determination of allocation of effort and catch in these areas. For a
reference to the complexities of the general problem see Gordon, note 178, supra.
196 It seems unlikely that more than a few coastal states need special protection of this
kind. For another survey of the possibilities of meeting this problem, see Leonard, Inter-
national Regulation of Fisheries 163-86 (1944).
Professor Katzenbach has suggested that he "would infinitely prefer a subsidy to
Iceland to help her fishermen than a resolution which excludes foreigners and encourages
inefficient use of bloc resources." Katzenbach, "Sharable and Strategic Resources; Outer
Space, Polar Areas and the Oceans," Proc. Am. Soc'y Int'l L. 206, 211 (1959). This of
course, assumes that in the specific situation exclusive fishing would be inefficient. As we
have indicated, the most difficult problem is that of identifying efficient use. From com-
munity perspectives it may be, for example, much more efficient to export Icelandic
"fishing unemployment to the United Kingdom." Whether or not this is so depends upon
calculations of a kind the economists are only beginning to make.
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needed variations in exclusive fishing areas could be taken care of by
contiguous zones, then the establishment of the narrowest possible terri-
torial sea would most clearly appear as the most rational solution.
It is unfortunate that the focussing of excessive attention upon the
politically explosive issue of the width of the territorial sea has diverted
concern from the measures immediately needed for the development of
fishery resources, both for production of food and increased employment.
What is required is undoubtedly a more intensive program of scientific
and practical investigation, at local, regional, and world levels, not only
of presently exploited resources but also of those which are potentially
exploitable. The latter are of special importance because individual
states, and their private groups, often have neither the necessary skills
nor capital for financing such exploratory work, and because the new
opportunities for fishermen which might be opened could perhaps ease
the way toward a more rational distribution of effort among all fisher-
men. At the same time biologic and economic studies could provide basic
information for planning programs of rational exploitation, including
both criteria for conserving use and identification of the factors relevant
for determining the best distribution of activity in, and rewards from,
such use. Important work along these lines is being done by the Food
and Agricultural Organization, its regional groups, and individuals in
states especially concerned with fisheries; but the effort could be ampli-
fied and greater benefits obtained even with moderate increases in ex-
penditures of time and money. 97
Finally, planners seeking to recommend and implement schemes for a
general economic improvement in the underdeveloped states should be
assured of the assistance required for the fullest, rational use of available
fish. It is clear that the development of marine resources cannot be con-
sidered apart from the general problem of economic development,"' and
if it is dealt with in this context, the result will be a more rational ex-
ploitation and greater attention to the economic allocation of local and
global resources than could be obtained through exclusive use, or non-use.
In summary-from a community perspective embracing both the in-
clusive and exclusive interests of states-the most desirable policy with
respect to fisheries must be to maintain the largest possible ocean areas
open to rational exploitation by all, and to leave the enlargement of
197 The possibilities, obstacles, and direction of future effort are outlined in FAO,
Fisheries Division, "Improving the Fisheries Contribution to World Food Supplies,"
6 FAQ Fisheries Bull. 159 (1953). Nothing whatsoever is said in this FAO appraisal of
any need for enlarged areas of exclusive exploitation-it seems clear that the establishment
of such area promises little or nothing in assistance for increasing productivity.
198 Kirby and Szczepanik, note 190, supra at 88. Some general considerations in this
respect are outlined in Netherlands Economic Institute, note 192, supra.
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exclusive fishing areas, by use of contiguous zones especially adopted for
this particular purpose, to negotiation between the states most particu-
larly interested in the adjacent fisheries. This possibility of accom-
modating claims by negotiation, as will be suggested later, is not without
promise of peaceful settlement of disputes.
The alleged requirements of military security, turning to the other
relevant factors, are perhaps second in importance only to claims about
fisheries among contemporary arguments for an expansive width of terri-
torial sea. In fact the two issues are sometimes joined in the claim that
the presence of fishing vessels may be a menace to adjacent states.199 In
this view, the asserted economic interests in a larger exclusive fishing
area, and the alleged needs to exclude foreign fishing and other vessels
on the grounds of security, are made to combine in a more general justi-
fication of an alleged necessity for a wider territorial sea.
It may easily be observed that any claimed width for the territorial
sea, with a chance of acceptance by the general community of states, has
very little relevance to security, especially in a time when even relatively
weak states may maintain weapons systems of very considerable range
and speed."ee When one considers the giant powers, the irrelevance of the
territorial sea for security purposes is further intensified, for the threat
these states pose for each other, or for lesser endowed states, reaches
literally about the globe. The transformation of naval weapons under-
lines this point clearly: the submarine is no longer merely a commerce-
destroyer or a weapon of great efficiency in naval engagements, but a
delivery system for land-directed destruction which may operate unde-
tected for long periods and range over vast portions of the earth, ready to
fire weapons of the greatest destructiveness at distances of hundreds of
miles from the intended target. For such weapons, as well as for aircraft
moving at speeds far above that of sound, a territorial sea of five hundred
miles is just as irrelevant as one of three.
Under some conditions, most especially when expectations of violence
are not high but sufficiently intense not entirely to be discounted, it is of
course conceivable that security considerations, such as the prevention
199 Korea justified its claim to "national sovereignty" over an extensive ocean area
partly in terms of national defense, and seemed to be particularly concerned about the
use of small vessels to infiltrate enemy agents into South Korea.
See Oda, note 136, supra at 74-7; see also I.L.C. Summary Records, (U.N. Doc. No.
A/CN.4/SR. 309/16) (1955) (Statement of Mr. Hsu).
Several states have expressed concern about the presence of foreign fishing vessels near
their coasts. See N.Y. Times, June 2, 1958, p. 1, col. 3; June 8, 1958, p. 15, col 1 and
p. 20, col 3.
200 This point was made forcefully in the I.L.C. discussions. See 1 Yearbook, International
Law Commission 169 (1956) (statement of Mr. Pal); 1 Verbatim Record of the Debate
in the 6th Committee of the General Assembly 238-39 (Statement of Sir Gerald Fitz-
maurice) (U.N. Doc. No. A/Conf. 13/19) (1957).
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of surveillance from ships at sea or preventing reconnaissance of water
approaches to landing sites, may reasonably warrant the exercise of
coastal authority over adjacent vessels. Precautionary measures against
smuggling and illegal immigration could also call for coastal intervention.
Occasions for assertions of authority such as these are, however, likely
to be infrequent, and, if experience is any guide, not of grave im-
portance. 20 1 It hardly seems necessary, therefore, that the most com-
prehensive authority permissible over the territorial sea must be, in
entirety, extended seaward merely to authorize coastal states to guard
against these rather occasional and exceptional possibilities. As was ob-
served with respect to fisheries, it would seem much more economical
and more consistent with the most productive use of the oceans for all
purposes, that the necessary authority for these specific purposes be
claimed and honored only through the recognition of contiguous zones.
Confining the most comprehensive coastal authority to narrow limits
definitely appears more likely to promote efficient transportation and
communication, while permission to extend limited authority for security
and wealth purposes appears to assure adequate authority for the pro-
tection of legitimate, but exclusive and particular, interests. It may be
admitted, of course, that a coastal state seeking to harass the shipping
of another state might do so through abuse of its limited authority in a
contiguous zone as through assertion of authority over the territorial sea,
but this does not seem to be a very likely possibility. Generally speaking,
the seas have been rather effectively used in the past, without such inter-
ference, and the mutual interest of states in continuing this state of
affairs makes it unlikely that such authority would be abused. There are,
in any event, a wide variety of sanctions available for responding to such
harassment, not depending necessarily upon retaliation in the assertion
of similar authority, insuring that the nuisance value of this kind of
interference is not likely to be high.
The argument is often made that the recognition of a variety of con-
tiguous zones for different purposes is no improvement over an extension
of the territorial sea to include all such zones since the same authority
is being recognized, so it is asserted, under different labels202 Limited
201 Certainly, there have been instances of considerable disagreement over the protection
of various interests other than fishing. It is equally certain that these differences have never
occurred with such frequency and seriousness that any disruption of the use of the ocean has
ever been threatened.
202 This seems to be the purport of Professor Baxter's declaration that "the contiguous
zone and sweeping claims regarding the width of the territorial sea are interchangeable
devices for achieving the same result." Baxter, The Territorial Sea, 1956 Proc. Am. Soe'y
Int'l L. 116, 122. This view has also been expressed in the International Law Commission.
See ILC, Summary Records, (U.N. Doc. No. A/CN.4/SR. 166/ p. 15) (1952) (Statement
of Mr. Scelle).
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authority for specific purposes is not, however, the same as compre-
hensive authority for all purposes. States do frequently have particular
objectives which they seek by extending limited authority seaward, such
as in the control over fisheries, smuggling of guns, customs surveillance,
and prevention of other undesirable activities, and both their concern for
limited objectives only and their reciprocal claims for limited authority
are very often completely genuine. Recognition by the general com-
munity of particular contiguous zones for particular purposes is not,
therefore, tantamount to an invitation to states to create comprehensive
zones for all purposes. Maximization of values is not necessarily pro-
moted by meaningless assertions of authority and, in fact, both com-
munity sanction and self-interest may be counted upon to preclude empty
gestures. 3 The expansion of the territorial sea would extend many more
incidences of authority and would array community sanction in support
of, rather than in opposition to, such incidences.
There are, therefore, strong grounds for believing that the traditional
narrow limit of the territorial sea best serves the common interests, both
inclusive and exclusive, of states under modern conditions. The "shock
absorber" of the contiguous zone device seems entirely adequate to
cushion the impact of developments in modem science and technology,
when these in fact demand the extension seaward of some particular
aspects of coastal authority.
It is not inconceivable, however-despite the fact that rational grounds
cannot be invoked to demonstrate that a territorial sea wider than the
traditional three and four miles is desirable community policy-that con-
tinued insistence upon such a limit may prove more costly than agree-
ment upon some modest extension in that width. A rather considerable
number of states have recently claimed and insisted upon a variety of
widths greater than these traditional ones °.2 However irrational the bases
for these claims might seem in the great majority of instances, the
strength with which they are presented indicates that it may be more
desirable for the general community to agree upon a somewhat broader
limit than to permit to continue the wrangling and disputes which, all too
frequently, erupt in violence and in any event involve cost in disputation
and continued controversy. If a substantial number of states could be
persuaded definitely to subscribe to a six-mile limit for the territorial sea,
203 In the past states have made unmistakable distinctions between a territorial sea
and a contiguous zone. Not a single state in the world is known to claim contiguous zones
for all components of authority honored within the territorial sea. See U.N. Conference on
the Law of the Sea, Draft Synoptical Table, (U.N. Doc. No. A/Conf. 13/C.l/L.11/ Rev.
1 and Corr. 1 and 2) (1958) (Mimeographed).
204 The Draft Synoptical Table, ibid., gives the dates for legislation establishing partic-
ular widths for the territorial sea, a great many of which are later than 1950.
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the gains from avoidance of costly disputes might well outweigh the
losses to the general community and to certain states whose nationals
might be precluded from fishing on part of their accustomed fishing
grounds. A limit wider than six miles would, on the other hand, have a
much more substantial impact on such fishing, with little promise of
general benefit to coastal states, and, additionally, might inflict grave
deprivation upon international transportation and communication. From
these various perspectives, which it is not pretended can be demonstrated
in anything approaching certainty, a six-mile territorial sea would appear
to preserve a very considerable productive use of the ocean and at the
same time offer some prospect of more harmonious use.
B. Trend of Decisions
It would be pointless here to repeat the detailed state by state surveys
which numerous writers have made of the practice of states since the
beginning of the 19th century,205 or to engage in new analyses of the
views of the early Romans or of the great classic writers of the 17th and
18th centuries.0 6 For our present purposes the important point to be
noted is that, though states, writers' and experts' associations, have held
very different opinions on the extent of the area that has been, will be,
and ought to be considered to be within the territorial sea, until very
recently, that is within the last three decades, the range of claims actually
made by states to comprehensive authority over ocean areas has been
remarkably limited. During the 19th century the predominant demand
by states was for a limit measured by cannon range or by a three-mile
limit, and the two formulae were very frequently considered to be equiv-
alents, even as there was very insistent clamoring for an extension of this
to six miles and sometimes even more. Some states claimed a four-mile
territorial sea while a very few states sought to claim a territorial sea of
six miles but were usually resisted by Great Britain with varying degrees
of success. A large number of commentators during this period were still
endorsing the cannon-shot limit, a substantial group supported the three-
mile limit while a comparative few thought that the limit should be
varied according to the interests at stake.07
Toward the end of the 19th century the various experts' groups began
to consider the breadth question particularly as it related to fishing, and
205 For some sources see note 122, supra. For a description of state claims immediately
prior to the Geneva Conference see Heinzen, "The Three-Mile Limit: Preserving the
Freedom of the Seas," 11 Stan. L. Rev. 597, 641-51 (1959).
206 See Fenn, The Origin of the Right of Fishery in Territorial Waters (1926);
Riesenfeld, op. cit. supra note 122, at 7-28.
207 Professor Riesenfeld has compiled the views of over two hundred writers and,
noting a necessity for caution at such a procedure, gives a statistical breakdown of their
positions. Id. at 279-80.
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in 1894 and 1895 both the Institut de Droit International208 and the In-
ternational Law Association" 9 adopted recommendations for a territorial
sea of six miles. The Institut noted explicitly that three miles was the
limit "most generally adopted" but thought that "it has been recognized
as insufficient for the protection of coastal fisheries." In 1926 the Asso-
ciation, after intervening debates, changed its position and proposed a
three-mile limit.210 Within the Institut there was considerable controversy
about the appropriate limit, primarily because of the fisheries question,
but it was not until 1928 that the Institut again formulated recommenda-
tions and endorsed, by a narrow vote, the three mile limit.211 This change
was, however, accompanied by a recommendation of a contiguous zone
beyond the territorial sea, but not to exceed 9 miles, in which "the coastal
state may take the measures necessary for its safety, in respect to its
neutrality, and in respect to its sanitary, customs, and fishing police. It
possessed jurisdiction to adjudicate violations of the laws and regulations
pertaining to these matters in this supplemental zone." '212
Among other groups, the Harvard Research 213 and the Japanese Branch
of the International Law Association214 expressed approval of a three-
mile territorial sea, while the American Institute of International Law
refrained from suggesting any limit.215
The Schucking Report, a part of the preparatory work for the 1930
Codification Conference produced for the Subcommittee of the Com-
mittee of Experts for the Progressive Development of International Law,
and the documents accompanying it, are of interest primarily for the
divergence of views and reasoning expressed within the Subcommittee. 16
The Report itself declared that "the theory most widely accepted accords
to the riparian State the right to extend the limit of its territorial sea to
the range of coastal guns by unilateral acts," but added that this "positive
rule of international law" would lead "to quite inadmissible results,
which would restrict the freedom of the sea to an intolerable extent."2' 1
This situation being undesirable, Dr. Schucking recommended a limit to
the territorial sea of six miles provided the rights of other states were
208 Scott, Resolutions of the Institute of International Law 113 (1916).
209 Transactions of the International Law Association 1873-1924, 223-25 (1925).
210 Harvard Research in International Law, Draft Convention on Territorial Waters,
Appendix No. 6, 373 (1929).
211 Id., Appendix No.2, at 368.
212 Id. at 369.
213 Id. at 250.
214 Id., Appendix No.7, at 376.
215 Id., Appendix No.3, at 370.
216 Committee of Experts for the Progressive Codification of International Law, Report
to the Council of the League of Nations, p. 29, League of Nations Pub. No. C. 196. M.70.
1927. V.
217 Id. at 36.
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still recognized even if they had been exercised in what would now be
regarded as part of the territorial sea.118 For the most part, the bases for
this recommendation were found in what were considered to be legal con-
siderations: that the three-mile limit was not generally accepted "ac-
cording to the doctrine and practice of international law," that a state
was entitled -to "extend its dominion to the range of the coastal guns,"
and that the codification projects adopted the six-mile limit (here citing
the 1894 and 1895 actions of the Institut and the International Law
Association, both of which were altered subsequent to this report to
provide for a three-mile limit).219
Another member of the Subcommittee, M. Magalhaes of Portugal, was
unable to read the Schucking Report before it was printed and appended
thereto "observations" of particular interest since they focus attention
upon the factual conditions which, he argued, justify a territorial sea of
12 miles rather than six. 220 These conditions were asserted to require
"exclusive utilization of vegetable or mineral products, and, more par-
ticularly, the maintenance of exclusive fishing rights."22' Noting that
most fish are found over the adjacent continental shelves and alleging
that the supply was no longer enough for both coastal and foreign fisher-
men, M. Magalhaes thought that a territorial sea which did not coincide
with the area in which fish are concentrated would not actually assure
fishermen of exclusive access nor would it foster protection of the fish
resources.2 2 Because the continental shelf off Portugal is relatively nar-
row, a twelve mile limit for the territorial sea was recommended as ex-
tensive enough for these purposes.223 While nothing was said about the
adequacy of such a limit for the numerous states in which the shelf was
much wider than 12 miles, M. Magalhaes argued that increasing the
extent of the territorial sea would have the "general advantage" of making
protection of species more effective because it could be done by each
state in its own territorial waters rather than by an international or-
ganization assigned the task by convention.224
While the conclusions drawn are highly debatable, the Magalhaes
observations do bear some relationship to environmental conditions
relevant to the territorial sea question,225 in contrast to both the Schuck-
218 Ibid.
219 Id. at 36-7.
220 Id. at 60.
221 Id. at 63.
222 Id. at 63-4.
223 Id. at 65.
224 Ibid.
225 The notion that edible fish do not stray beyond the continental shelf is erroneous,
as is the assumption that they do not move beyond state boundaries which extend from
land into the sea. These considerations lead to an entirely different conclusion from that
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ing Report and Mr. Wickersham's observations 26 upon M. Magalhaes'
comments. Dr. Schucking and Mr. Wickersham placed the greatest em-
phasis on certain legal considerations, including the contents of certain
treaties, and apparently with these factors most heavily weighted, the
Draft Convention ultimately recommended provided for a territorial sea
of three miles.227
If one views the replies of governments to the questionnaire circulated
by the Preparatory Committee for the 1930 Conference228 in terms of
the various perspectives made explicit in the questions, it is clear that in
describing their past practice the vast majority of states replying ad-
hered to a three or four-mile territorial sea and that a smaller number,
but still a majority, preferred explicit provision for a three-mile limit,
if a convention were adopted. Other suggested limits ranged from six to
eighteen miles. Some urging the three-mile limit as well as those sug-
gesting six miles also recommended recognition of limited authority
beyond that area. The widest territorial sea then claimed, and for only
part of its coastline, was that of twelve miles by the Soviet Union.
The Preparatory Committee, summarizing the replies, noted that the
three mile width appeared to have the support of a majority of states and
therefore suggested a basis of discussion providing for such a width.2 29
Apparently the time-honored Scandinavian claims of four miles, and
perhaps others, created some disquiet about so definite a provision.
Another basis of discussion was designed to put before the forthcoming
conference the possibility that particular states might be able to justify
a territorial sea wider than three miles28 A final basis of discussion con-
nected with the width issue provided for a contiguous zone of twelve
miles for security, customs and sanitary purposes.28 1
There is scarcely need to recall that the Committee on Territorial
Waters of the 1930 Conference was unable to agree upon any width for
the territorial sea. It was quite obvious that some states were unprepared
to accept a three-mile territorial sea even if accompanied by a contiguous
zone. On the other hand, sentiment at the Conference was strongest in
reached by M. Magalhaes. Of course, nothing in his observations establishes the usefulness
of a twelve-mile territorial sea for conservation purposes.
226 Note 216, supra at 68.
227 Id. at 72. Dr. Schucking's notes on the Amended Draft Convention, id. at 74,
inject a note of realism in terms of the conditions affecting claims to exclusive fishing.
228 Conference for the Codification of International Law, Bases of Discussion 22-23
(League of Nations Pub. No. C. 74. M. 39. 1929. V) ; Supplement to Volume II, Replies of
Canada 2 (League of Nations Pub. No. C. 74(a). M. 39(a). 1929. V); Supplement to
Volume II, Reply of the Soviet Union 2 (League of Nations Pub. No. C. 74(b). M. 39(b).
1929. V).
229 Conference for the Codification of International Law, note 228, supra at 33.
230 Id. at 34.
231 Ibid.
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favor of a three-mile width, if provision were made for honoring limited
authority beyond that. States seeking the wider territorial sea invoked
various reasons, including fisheries, security, and neutrality problems,
for extending authority, while those opposed to extensions placed greatest
explicit emphasis on freedom of navigation and the difficulties wartime
neutrals might face of policing a large territorial sea. 32 In view of the
very substantial interests involved, and the emotional attachment to the
various attitudes expressed, little would have been gained at the 1930
Conference in seeking to adopt a majority view in a formal convention.
It would have been difficult, in any case, to have agreed on the three-mile
limit since proponents of this width were also divided about the exercise
of special authority in contiguous zones, some insisting upon a three-
mile limit plus a contiguous zone and others rigidly demanding only a
three-mile territorial sea.233
Despite the variety of opinions expressed at the Conference, it is note-
worthy that the limits proposed, beyond three miles, were essentially
modest. The Portuguese proposal for a six-mile territorial sea, coupled
with a six-mile contiguous zone which would include exclusive fishing
rights, seems to have been the most extreme and, as the Italian delegate
remarked, solutions other than three, four or six miles had "very limited
support. 2 34
One result of the 1930 Conference was, however, to cast a degree of
doubt upon the notion that states could not lawfully claim a territorial
sea broader than three miles. While it is, or ought to be, clear that
unanimity is not necessarily an indispensable characteristic of the con-
sensus that is often termed a prerequisite of customary international
law, the potential seriousness of the differences about the width of the
territorial sea (including belligerent-neutral disputes during wartime)
magnified the importance of the minority views on this point and con-
tributed to a growing feeling that the degree of consensus on the three-
mile rule was not sufficiently marked to warrant its definitive categoriza-
tion as part of customary international law. In any event, the doubt
inspired by the 1930 Conference about the three-mile rule eventually
became converted, as later events were to show, into widespread allega-
tions that a wider limit was lawful.
An attitude of uncertainty was the predominant characteristic of the
International Law Commission discussions on the width of the territorial
232 The fullest statement of the various positions may be found in Conference for the
Codification of International Law, Minutes of the Second Committee 133-46 League of
Nations Pub. No. C. 3S1(b). M. 145(b). 1930. V.)
233 Acts of the Conference for the Codification of International Law, Plenary Meetings,
Annex 10, 123-24 League of Nations Pub. No. C. 351. M. 145. 1930. V).
234 Conference for the Codification of International Law, note 232, supra at 148.
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sea, but, in the final analysis, the Commission's performance was not
wholly devoid of elements of clarification. It was not without importance
that the Commission firmly declined to approve the notion that, because
no one limit could be specified to which a substantial majority of states
agreed, each state, in its discretion, was therefore free to set its own
limits.235 Furthermore, the Commission, equally firmly, rejected the ex-
treme claims recently advanced by South American states, and in its
final formulation, recorded the opinion that claims beyond twelve miles
were impermissible.2
31
Perhaps the major shortcoming of the work of the Commission arose
out of the emphasis upon disagreement about the doctrinal content of
international law, much time being spent in fruitless attempts to prove
that this or that proposition was the only one firmly enshrined as binding
upon all states,23 7 and the failure to take into account the factual vari-
ables, seemingly upon the ground that recourse to such facts was not
within its authority, relevant to a conclusion about what the width of
the territorial sea ought to be.238 When facts were on occasion mentioned,
the conclusions drawn were not infrequently irrelevant. Thus, although
the Commission had already in its third and subsequent sessions devoted
attention to the conservation problem with a view to recommendations
on that specific issue, the discussion on the territorial sea is replete with
allegations about a felt need, on the part of some states, for a wider ter-
ritorial sea in order to prevent depletion of fishery resources. 239 Yet, by
235 The rejection of the proposal of Mr. Zourek particularly signified this disapproval.
See pp. 208-09 supra. The importance of such a decision was suitably emphasized by
Sir Gerald Fitzmaurice during discussion at the 7th Session. ILC Summary Records, (U.N.
Doc. No. A/CN.4/S.R. 309/10) (1955).
236 1956 Report, Article 3(2), 12, note 152, supra.
237 Illustrative of these sterile debates are those during the 166th, 167th, 168th and
309th meetings.
238 One member expressed the opinion that the question of width was a "strictly legal
question" and that it would create "an extremely bad impression" to propose that a
diplomatic conference decide such a question. ILC Sumary Records, (U.N. Doc. No. A/CN.
4/SR. 168/13) (Yepes) (1952).
239 For example:
Before taking a final decision about the limit of the teritorial sea, it might be
wise for the Commission to obtain the views of governments on those draft articles
(on conservation of fisheries), in order to ascertain whether the recognition of certain
rights of coastal states would satisfy those governments which were claiming an exten-
sive territorial sea. At the present moment, when conservation measures became
necessary, coastal states had no other alternative but to extend their territorial sea, and
consequently their sovereign rights.
ILC Summary Records, (U.N. Doc. No. A/CN.4/SR. 308/18) (1955). The point here
is that an extension of the territorial sea could not accomplish conservation objectives,
except in a very few possible instances, and such an extension could not, in fact, constitute
an "alternative" to real conservation measures.
It would probably be more accurate to conclude that the more extensive claims to the
territorial sea stemmed from the possibility that conservation measures might be put
into effect. This would be one way to secure as great a share as possible of the total
catch permitted under such a program. But cf. Opsahl, "Towards The Rule of International
Law in High Seas Fisheries," 27 Nordisk Tidsskrift for International Ret 265, 269-70
(1957).
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the time the seventh session of the Commission convened in 1955 it had
the benefit of the Rome Conference (and of the papers submitted at that
Conference); there was then no realistic basis for believing that the
territorial sea had anything to do with conservation.24 Furthermore, if
some members were disabused of this idea, as they surely ought to have
been, one could reasonably have expected some clarification of the effect
of various widths in terms of the alleged benefits accruing to coastal
states. But this is conspicuously lacking. Again, while the need for food
for mankind and an alleged dependence of coastal states upon adjacent
fishery resources are mentioned frequently, there was no attempt to dis-
cover and explain what an extension of the territorial sea might do to
relieve the food situation. Nor was anything specific said to support the
conception of an alleged great dependence of many coastal states upon
marine resources that was inconsistent with exploitation by foreign
fishermen.
Similarly, while the problem of security was often deemed important
for determining the breadth of the territorial sea, no effort was made to
indicate what specific problems were involved and why they could not be
handled through recognition of less comprehensive authority than that
usually honored in the territorial sea. It does not, in short, appear unfair
to say that for the most part the Commission worked without regard
to relevant factual context and, to the extent facts were invoked, without
reference to the more important policy considerations.
Thus, from the perspective of meaningful clarification the situation
in the Commission was virtually hopeless, and the outcome, with the
above-mentioned important qualifications, reflects that fact. Although a
number of proposals were made in the various sessions with respect to
specific limits, none commanded majority support and the Commission
finally agreed upon the following article:
1. The Commision recognizes that international practice is not uniform
as regards the delimitation of the territorial sea.
2. The Commision considers that international law does not permit an
extension of the territorial sea beyond twelve miles.
3. The Commission, without taking any decision as to the breadth
of the territorial sea up to that limit, notes, on the one hand, that many
states have fixed a breadth greater than three miles and, on the other
hand, that many states do not recognize such a breadth when that of
of their own territorial sea is less.
4. The Commission considers that the breadth of the territorial sea
should be fixed by an international conference. 241
240 The conclusions of this Conference with respect to information required for a
conservation program are formulated in terms which practically preclude any possible
relevance in a specific width of the territorial sea. See Report of the International
Technical Conference on the Conservation of the Living Resources of the Sea 3 (U.N. Doc.
No. A/Conf. 10/6) (1955).
241 1956 Report, Article 3, 12, note 152, supra.
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The manner in which this article was formulated created considerable
confusion, with some states and commentators understanding it to mean
that an extension to twelve miles was in accord with international law,
and others regarding it as an invitation, at the least, for extensions to
that limit. The Commission, through its Rapporteur and some members,
insisted on subsequent occasions that the Commission did not intend to
confer its blessing upon the twelve-mile width.242
In a related action, significant here because of later events at the 1958
Conference, the Commission adopted an article providing for authority
in a zone contiguous to the territorial sea. Article 66 read as follows:
1. In a zone of the high seas contiguous to its territorial sea, the
coastal state may exercise the control necessary to
(a) Prevent infringement of its customs, fiscal or sanitary regulations
within its territory or territorial sea;
(b) Punish infringement of the above regulations committed within
its territory or territorial sea.
2. The contiguous zone may not extend beyond twelve miles from the
baseline from which the breadth of the territorial sea is measured. 243
The noteworthy element in this provision consists of paragraph two,
which would have been largely, but not completely, meaningless if the
Commission had intended to sanction a twelve-mile territorial sea, and
in the omission of both security measures and exclusive fishing as
components of state authority in the contiguous zone.2 "4
Certainly, the most significant development at the 1958 Conference was
the shift of the major supporters of the three-mile limit, the United
States and the United Kingdom, to sponsorship and support of a
territorial sea of six miles, coupled with the extension of certain limited
exclusive fishing rights to twelve miles, a shift whose permanence was
expressly declared to be contingent upon achieving agreement at the
Conference.245 It apparently became clear as the Conference progressed,
242 McDougal and Burke, "Crisis in the Law of the Sea: Community Perspectives versus
National Egoism," 67 Yale L.J. 539, 577 and n.129. On the eve of the 1958 Conference,
Saudi Arabia and Egypt announced the extension to twelve miles, and since the Con-
ference ended other states have done the same, e.g., Iraq and Panama. Iceland has claimed
a twelve-mile limit for fishing, about which a current dispute centers. For the bases of this
claim see Iceland Ministry for Foreign Affairs, The Icelandic Fishery Limits (April 1959).
In Iceland it is apparently thought that this limit will be formally accepted at the forth-
coming Geneva Confence. See N.Y. Times, Nov. 8, 1959, p. 12, col. 1.
243 1956 Report, note 152, supra at 39.
244 McDougal and Burke, note 242, supra at 581-85.
245 Both the United Kingdom and the United States argued strongly for the three-
mile limit in the opening general debate in the First Committee (3 Official Records
8, 25 [1958]) and when, as a compromise, the United Kingdom proposed a six-mile belt with
certain limitations in the outer three miles (3 Official Records 103 [1958]), the United States
expressed its "keenest regret" (3 Official Records 105 [1958]). But two weeks later the
United States proposed a territorial sea up to six miles coupled with limited exclusive
fishing rights to twelve miles (3 Official Records 153 [1958]), and the United Kingdom
[Vol. 45
TERRITORIAL SEA
that no article making provision for a three-mile territorial sea had any
real possibility of adoption, no matter what added authority was given
over fisheries beyond such an area, and all of the proposals stipulating
a three-mile limit, or having that effect, were withdrawn before the
final votes were taken.240 The major proposals which did reach a vote
were sponsored by Canada, the United States, and jointly by Mexico and
India. The Colombian and Swedish proposals, providing for unqualified
extensions to twelve and six miles, respectively, also were voted upon,
but major controversy appeared to center upon the former three. None
of these suggested articles was accepted, as a whole, in the First Com-
mittee and no proposal received the necessary two-thirds majority in the
plenary session of the Conference for inclusion in the final Convention.
The Canadian measure called for a territorial sea up to six miles in
width and in an area extending twelve miles from the baseline, the coastal
state was to have "the same rights in respect of fishing and the exploita-
tion of the living resources of the sea as it has in its territorial sea."2 47 In
justification of these proposals Canada referred to the general undesira-
bility of extending the territorial sea to twelve miles, when the main
goal of most states in urging such a width was to secure control over
exploitation of fishery resources in that area.248 On the more positive
side it was alleged that Canada, and other states, needed to protect
dependent coastal populations by excluding foreign competition, and that
the exclusive fishing area would also protect coastal fisheries from over-
exploitation. 4 9
The joint proposal of Mexico and India would have permitted extension
of the territorial sea up to twelve miles, and made no explicit reference
to additional authority beyond that limit.2 5° But in introducing that pro-
posal during the first Committee debate the Mexican representative stated
"reluctantly decided to support it." 3 Official Records 163 (1958). The United States noted
that its proposal "constituted an important departure from a historic principle. But it was
only a proposed departure. It contemplated that others would also yield to some extent
on the demands with which they had come to the Conference." 3 Official Records 167
(1958).
In plenary session the United States stated that its "attempted compromise had been
rejected, the United States delegation had reverted to its belief that the three-mile limit
was the correct one and that everything beyond that limit was part of the high seas."
2 Official Records 69 (1958). In a similar declaration the United Kingdom also announced
that it must "resume its original position as a supporter of the three-mile limit." 2 Official
Records 76 (1958).
240 Report of the First Committee, 2 Official Records 115-16 (1958). This includes the
United Kingdom proposal for a six-mile width which amounted, in practical effect, to a
three-mile territorial sea and a three-mile contiguous zone for fisheries.
247 The Canadian proposal finally voted upon was that in U.N. Doc. No. A/Conf.
13/C.1/L. 77/Rev. 3 (1958), 3 Official Records 232 (1958).
248 3 Official Records 167-68 (1958). Originally Canada had proposed a three mile terri-
torial sea plus exclusive fishing rights to twelve.
249 3 Official Records 167-68 (1958).
250 U.N. Doc. No. A/Conf. 13/C.1/L.79, 3 Official Records 233 (1958).
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that "sovereign," "exclusive," or "special" rights would have to be
recognized even further from the coast in "exceptional cases. 125 1  The
principal feature distinguishing the India-Mexico proposal from that of
Canada was that the latter sought to take into account the general
interest in transportation (both air and sea) by limiting the territorial
sea to six miles though exclusive fishing was permitted in another six
miles, while the former would have permitted extension to twelve miles
of the entire range of coastal authority over the territorial sea.
The final American proposal also sought to achieve the transportation
and communication objectives of the Canadian proposal, but it went
further and attempted to protect those states whose fishermen were
accustomed to fishing in "distant" waters, seemingly close to the shore
of coastal states.22 The main thrust of the American proposal would have
been to benefit the fishermen of England, the Netherlands, Germany,
Portugal, and others who fished in the various coastal waters of the
North Atlantic from Canada to Norway. Japan, too, would have received
protection from severe disruption of its far-flung activities.2 53 In concrete
terms the provision called for a territorial sea of six miles and, in a zone
twelve miles from the same baseline, for the same rights with respect
to fishing as in the territorial sea. These rights were subject, however,
"to the right of the vessels of any State whose vessels have fished regularly
in that portion of the zone having a continuous baseline and located in the
same major body of water for the period of five years immediately
preceding the signature of this convention, to fish in the outer six miles of
that portion of the zone, under obligation to observe therein such con-
servation regulations as are consistent with the rules of international
law," as well as to past or future treaty rights entered into by a coastal
state2
54
251 Apparently Mexico had in mind states already claiming a territorial sea of more than
twelve miles, so that this appears to be a suggestion that such states would be accom-
modated by recognition of a contiguous zone beyond twelve miles. 3 Official Records 91
(1958).
252 The major difference at the Conference on this point was between states whose
fishing fleets range widely and states regarding their coastal waters as under heavy
exploitation by such fleets. Canada and Iceland were prominent states in the latter
group, and the United Kingdom, the United States, Western Germany, the Netherlands,
Portugal and Japan were leading states in the former group. An interesting point here,
and perhaps instructive for some states making extensive claims, is that through time
the state's interest in fisheries may change completely. At the 1930 Codification Conference,
Portugal considered it necessary to seek a wider territorial sea to protect its adjacent
fisheries. In the 1958 Conference, Portugal argued vigorously against efforts to exclude
its fishermen from distant waters. 3 Official Records 150 (1958).
253 The effect on Japan of exclusion from a twelve-mile territorial sea might not be
as intense as commonly supposed. Apparently the greater part of Japanese fish produc-
tion comes from its coastal waters. FAO Fisheries Division, "Improving the Fisheries
Contribution to World Food Supplies." 6 FAD Fisheries Bull. 159, 167 (1953). See
Sorensen, Law of the Sea 195, 248 (Int'l Conc. Pamphlet 520) (1958).
254 U.N. Doc. No. A/Conf. 13/C.1/L.159/Rev. 2, 3 Official Records 253 (1958). Some
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There was, of course, the usual, excessive amount of doctrinal disputa-
tion, with almost every delegation defending some proposed limit as the
content of some explicit principle of customary international law or as
in accord with some general criterion of reasonableness, which allegedly
supported one limit and no other. Apart from these sterile exercises,
resurrecting all the minutiae of divergent state practices for the past
centuries, the principal themes of the discussion on these various proposals
centered about fisheries and security considerations. The major argument
with respect to the former, put forward by Canada in defense of its
contiguous zone for fisheries, and also by states urging a twelve-mile
territorial sea, was that an exclusive fishing area of this width was re-
quired both to protect coastal fishermen and to promote conservation of
the adjacent fisheries. 55 Variations on this theme were cast in terms
of the great desirability of protecting the "smaller" states and of giving
assistance to underdeveloped areas. Failure to establish a twelve-mile
exclusive fishing area, or territorial sea, would allegedly "deny" resources
to states in desperate need of them.2 " Supporters of the India-Mexico
proposal for the twelve-mile belt, in the words of the Mexican representa-
tive, rejected "the idea that the peoples of the smaller nations must
be disowned and prevented from enjoying the living resources of the seas
adjacent to their coasts for the benefit of private interests in foreign
countries thousands of miles away." '57 It was unfortunate that so many
speakers were content to unleash highly general, emotive arguments,
so carefully unsullied by reference to actual capacity to fish, or to
knowledge of available resources, or to known or likely effects of fishing
intensity.
The counter arguments put forward by supporters of the American
proposal to permit some foreign fishing within the exclusive fishing area
between six and twelve miles from the coast emphasized the disastrous
effect of complete exclusion of fishermen from this area. This theme
was given particular attention by the United Kingdom, Germany, the
Netherlands, Portugal, and by New Zealand and Pakistan s.25  It was
further stressed, with respect to the alleged relationship between a twelve-
mile exclusive fishing zone or territorial sea and conservation, that con-
servation measures were also being adopted by the Conference to deal
with the overfishing problem so that no state need extend exclusive ex-
of the language seems needlessly vague. The reference to a "continuous baseline and located
in the same major body of water" is hardly self-explanatory.
255 The major Canadian arguments are at 3 Official Records 89-91, 154-55, 167-68.
256 Illustrative of this kind of contention are the statements of India (3 Official Records
155 [19581), Mexico (165), Saudi Arabia (135), and Peru (166).257 3 Official Records 165 (1958).
258 3 Official Records 163, 169-72 (1958), includes illustrative passages.
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ploitation rights for such a purpose. In the words of the French repre-
sentative, " [t] he United States' proposal meant that, so long as there were
fish for everyone, those at present fishing could continue to do so in peace;
if any danger of depletion arose, regulation would be introduced by
negotiation or arbitration.12
59
Since the Canadian proposal would have met the demands of practically
all the coastal states alleging a need to protect local resources and fisher-
men, it is evident that the latent aim of the Indian-Mexican proposal was
elsewhere. And this fundamental objective was put forward in terms
of security needs. Thus, the representative of the United Arab Republic
noted that American and Canadian proposals (he referred to versions
calling for a territorial sea of three miles and exclusive fishing in an
additional nine) "rightly recognized economic needs of coastal states"260
but they failed to provide for "security requirements," and Lebanon
observed that under "prevailing international conditions" a twelve-mile
territorial sea "would afford surer guarantees to coastal states." 261
The Soviet concern for this interest is manifest in the fact that, alone
of all the states in the First Committee, the nine Soviet bloc members
voted against the twelve-mile exclusive fishing zone in the Canadian
proposal and for the twelve mile territorial sea of the Indian-Mexican
provision. All other states either voted for both or for the former and
against the latter. The Soviet Union obviously was not interested merely
in seeking exclusive fishing authority in an adjacent twelve-mile belt.
It should be remembered of course, that the Soviet Union had long
claimed a twelve-mile territorial sea for part of its coast, but none of the
eight states invariably voting with the Soviet Union enjoyed that historic
position.262
The opposition to the twelve-mile territorial sea invoked not only the
arguments about fisheries outlined above but also referred vigorously
to the general needs of international transportation and communication
and to some of the security implications of a twelve-mile belt. The
United States declared itself concerned with the effect of a twelve-mile
territorial sea during wartime and alleged that a territorial sea of this
width would greatly increase the burden of neutral states responsible
259 3 Official Records 171 (1958).
260 3 Official Records 137 (1958).
281 3 Official Records 139 (1958).
202 Sweden took care to point out that the Russian twelve-mile claim in the Baltic
was still disputed. 3 Offcial Records 169 (1958). See U.S. Naval War College, International
Law Situation and Documents 1956, 495-500 (1957); Schapiro, "The Limits of Russian
Territorial Waters in the Baltic," 27 Brit. Yb. Int'l L. 439 (1950). The Swedish protests
have apparently been unavailing and Swedish vessels are still penalized when found within
the twelve-mile limit claimed by the Soviet Union. N.Y. Times, May 22, 1959. p. 14, col. 7.
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for preventing use of their territory for belligerent advantage. 6 3 Since
the Soviet Union was known to have a very considerable number of
submarines, the United States was apparently specifically concerned over
the possibility that a twelve-mile territorial sea would more readily lend
itself to use by belligerent submarines for escaping detection than
would the shallower waters within a narrower limit." The United
Kingdom, as well as the United States, Canada and others, stressed the
potential effect upon transportation and declared that "the effect of a
twelve mile limit would be to make it impossible for ships or aircraft to
proceed from one place to another without constantly passing through,
and indeed having to use as a channel of communication the territorial
waters of other countries.12 65 This was considered undesirable, despite
the right of innocent passage, because coastal states still have a consider-
able measure of authority over vessels passing in that area. A final point,
made by Canada and others, was that in the modern world of warfare
and state coercion, security needs could not be protected in a territorial
sea, no matter how wide.26
Among other factors which may be said to have had a more or less
general influence and significance for determining the positions of the
various states, it seems to be clear that a general aversion to the three-
mile limit as an alleged reminder of colonial domination was important.
It is true that, traditionally, the strongest supporter of the three-mile
limit has been the United Kingdom, followed closely by the United
States, and that, generally speaking, all of the western European states
have been associated with the creation of this limit in the past. Opposition
to such a limit, and to the new positions adopted by these states, was
thus in part regarded as an expression of a rejection of the colonial past
of many of the newly established states present at the 1958 Conference
and as a forceful way of asserting recently won independence.2 6 7 It
was perhaps not undue exaggeration to remark, as did the Saudi Arabian
representative, that the "crucial change" since the 1930 Conference
was that the number of sovereign States had almost doubled and that
263 3 Official Records 26 (1958).
264 The summary records do not indicate that this consideration was made explicit
during Committee debate. However, contemporary news reports indicated United
States concern on this ground. N.Y. Times, April 2, 1958, p. 1, col. 1. Since the Conference
the comments of Mr. Arthur H. Dean, head of the United States delegation, have
given prominent attention to this point. See Dean, "Freedom of the Seas," 37 Foreign
Affairs 83, 90 (1958); Dean, "The Geneva Conference on the Law of the Sea: What
Was Accomplished," 52 Am. J. Int'l L. 607, 610-11 (1958); Dean, "Achievements at the
Law of the Sea Conference," 1959 Proc. Am. Soc'y Int'l L. 186, 192.
265 3 Official Records 104 (1958).
266 3 Official Records 52, 167 (1958).
267 Sorensen, note 253, supra at 245.
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"ancient peoples which had now acquired statehood had become masters
over their coasts and fisheries. '26 8
One of the more curious arguments urged in support of a twelve-mile
territorial sea was that "many" states had claimed a limit greater than
six miles and had exercised authority over a territorial sea of this width
for a "long time."2 69 It is a matter of record that in 1930 there was but
one state-the Soviet Union-making a claim to twelve miles. Practically
all of the remainder of the twelve-mile claims have been advanced since
World War II; a number of them were made just prior to the 1958
Conference." But the more paradoxical characteristic of this contention
is that it was made at the same time as its proponents were rejecting as
wholly irrelevant the fact that a twelve mile territorial sea would exclude
foreign fishermen from areas which had been fished by their national pre-
decessors for centuries. If history were to be made so decisive as the
former argument suggests, there could be little doubt of the comparative
persuasiveness of these contentions.
Various regional influences were clearly at work. The rivalry between
Israel and neighboring Arab states no doubt affected the latter's uniform
voting response and vigorous support for a twelve-mile territorial sea.
In Asia it is not unlikely that fears of competition, whatever this might
be thought to mean, from highly skilled and efficient Japanese fishermen,
was responsible for the considerable support of states from this area for
a twelve-mile excusive fishing area or territorial sea. Legacies of wartime
experience may also have had some effects in this instance. In Latin
and South America, on the other hand, it apparently was the concern for
United States fishing activities, among other conditions, which was
important. It is probable that many other local and topical factors were
at work and no doubt proved decisive in particular instances in determin-
ing voting.2 71
There was, further, an obvious tendency toward bloc voting, largely
determined on regional lines. With occasional deviations, the Latin
American, Afro-Asian (including the Arab) and Soviet states tended to
vote as a group.272 For example, Iraq, Jordan, Lebanon, the United
268 3 Official Records 134 (1958).
269 3 Official Records 165 (1958) [(India: "the twelve mile limit had been applied by cer-
tain powers for a considerable time") ; 167 (Canada: "several countries had long claimed a
territorial sea in excess of six miles"); 173 (Ceylon: "some had exercised that right un-
opposed for many years").]
270 Synoptical table, U.N. Doc. A/Conf. 13/C.1/L.l1/Rev. 1 and Corr. 1 and 2 (1958).
271 The heads of the United States and Danish delegations have since published com-
ments on the conference which furnish some insight into the influential factors. Dean,
note 264, supra; Sorensen, note 253, supra.
272 For purposes of this discussion these regional groups have been assigned the
following compositions: Soviet, see note 163, supra; Latin-America: Argentina, Bolivia,
Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Cuba, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador,
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Arab Republic, Saudi Arabia, Morocco, Tunisia, and Libya had practi-
cally identical voting records273 With a slight discrepancy in the
Polish response in plenary session, the votes of Albania, Bulgaria,
Byelorussian S.S.R., Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Poland, Romania, Ukran-
ian S.S.R. and the U.S.S.R. were identical. A substantial number of
Latin American states were generally united in their responses, while
there was a considerable identity in a bloc of Afro-Asian states. Finally,
a very large group of identical votes was recorded by a number of states,
widely separated geographically, but united in support of the American
proposal, including Australia, Belgium, Brazil, Cuba, Dominican Repub-
lic, France, Germany, Luxembourg, Monaco, the Netherlands, New
Zealand, the Union of South Africa, the United Kingdom, and the
United States. But for abstention on certain votes, another seventeen
states voted in substantial agreement with this group.
The fate of the various proposals before the First Committee may be
briefly noted, along with an indication of their major opponents and
proponents.
The Canadian proposal for a six-mile territorial sea and an additional
six-mile exclusive fishing area had been presented for consideration as a
single measure, but the two provisions were voted separately. The former
provision received a relatively unique vote since almost all factions joined
in emphatic rejection, 48 against, 11 for, and 23 abstentions. The
second aspect of this proposal, on the other hand, was the only provision
dealing with fishing adopted by the First Committee, receiving 37 favor-
able and 35 negative votes, with 9 abstentions. Practically all of the
support for this came from Afro-Asian (22) and the Latin American (10)
states, the other five votes coming from Iceland, Canada, Norway,
Yugoslavia and Ireland. The former three states are, of course, vitally
interested in marine fishing and the waters near their coasts are those
in which various other states prosecute "distant" water fishing. Opposi-
tion to this article came primarily from the Soviet bloc, interested in a
territorial sea of twelve miles for "security" purposes and for possible
embarrassment to its political opponents in the West, and the western
European states who would be most detrimentally affected by exclusion
from distant fishing areas.
Guatemala, Haiti, Honduras, Mexico, Nicaragua, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Uruguay,
Venezuela (Total: 20); Afro-Asia: Afghanistan, Burma, Cambodia, Ceylon, China, India,
Indonesia, Iran, Iraq, Japan, Jordan, Korea, Laos, Lebanon, Malaya, Nepal, Pakistan,
Philippines, Saudi Arabia, Thailand, United Arab Republic, Vietnam, Ghana, Liberia,
Morocco, Tunisia, Turkey (Total: 28). Yemen has been excluded because it did not vote at
all.
273 For purposes of comparison, votes on the following seven proposals were included:
First Committee: the proposals of Canada, Mexico-India, Colombia, and the United
States; Plenary Session: Article 3 adopted by the First Committee, the U.S. proposal,
and the Eight-Power proposal.
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The Mexican-Indian proposal for a territorial sea up to twelve miles
was rejected, but only by a tie vote, 35 to 35 with 12 abstentions. All
of the support came from the Soviet bloc (9), Yugoslavia, the Afro-Asian
states (18) and a surprisingly small number of Latin American states
(7). The opposition again came chiefly from the states associated with
the western bloc, including a handful of Asian (6) and Latin American
states (6).
The Colombian proposal differed from the one submitted by Mexico
and India by flatly prescribing a twelve-mile territorial sea. Again, all the
support, 33 with 42 opposing, came from Yugoslavia, the Soviet (9),
Latin American (8), and Afro-Asian (15) states.
The final proposal (American) considered in the First Committee
was rejected by a 38 to 36 vote, with 9 abstaining. The opposition came
almost wholly from the Soviet bloc (9), Yugoslavia, Latin America
(10), and Asia-Africa (16). Iceland and Canada, the two states per-
ceiving the greatest impact of the proviso for foreign fishing in the outer
six miles of otherwise exclusive fishing area, joined in voting against this
recommended article.
The provision adopted by the First Committee, which was reported to
the plenary session for final voting, read:
A State has a fishing zone contiguous to its territorial sea extending to a
limit twelve nautical miles from the baseline from which the breadth of its
territorial sea is measured in which it has the same rights in respect of
fishing and the exploitation of the living resources of the sea as it has in its
territorial sea.274
In the plenary session of the Conference three main proposals were
submitted to a vote: Article 3 above quoted, the American proposal,27 5
and a revision of the Mexican-Indian proposal sponsored by eight
states not including IndiaY.2 7  The latter now consisted of a provision for
a territorial sea up to twelve miles plus provision for an exclusive
fishing area of twelve miles measured from the same baseline.
Of the three suggested articles, that of the United States received much
the greatest support, attracting 45 votes, but still was far short of the
required two-thirds majority. Of the 33 negative votes, the Soviet bloc
accounted for nine, the Latin American states eleven and the Afro-Asian
states ten; Canada, Iceland and Yugoslavia also voted in the negative.
The eight-Power proposal also received a marginal approval-39 for, 38
against, and 8 abstaining. Twenty-nine of the approving states were
LatinAmerican (12) and Afro-Asian (17), with a Soviet bloc of eight
274 Article 3, 3 Official Records 258 (1958).
275 U.N. Doc. No. A/Conf. 13/L. 29, 2 Official Records 125 (1958).
276 U.N. Doc. No. A/Conf. 13/L. 34, 2 Official Records 128 (1958).
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(Poland abstained), Yugoslavia and Iceland accounting for the remain-
der. The 35 states voting for Article 3, adopted in the First Committee,
were composed of 31 states in the Asian-African (18) and Latin American
blocs (13), plus Yugoslavia, Canada, Iceland and Ireland.276
C. Appraisal and Recommendation
Because the general level of discussion at the 1958 Conference, at
least as revealed in summary records, tended to be hortatory rather
than clarifying, and indicative, on the part of many states seeking to
extend exclusive control, of a failure to understand the irrelevance
and actual disadvantages of such extended control for fishery purposes,
it is not surprising that none of the proposals actually voted upon, includ-
ing that of the United States, can be considered to be in accord with de-
sirable community policy The United States proposal certainly must be
considered to be the least undesirable since, in the face of a determined,
ill-informed opposition, it sought to maintain the area of free, but not
unregulated, use in a domain as large as possible. Perhaps the suggestion
for a six-mile territorial sea may be justified as a rational compromise
under contemporary conditions for reasons previously indicated, but a
general and universal provision for an additional six-mile exclusive fishing
area can scarcely be regarded as supported by any available evidence of
a scientific nature, either biological or economic. Even this limited type
of exclusive control will serve to hamper biological investigation where
it is most needed, i.e. in states which have fishing industries thus far
relatively undeveloped and a population which might be able to take
advantage of an untapped food supply. The proviso, permitting non-
national access under certain conditions, attached to the outer exclusive
area of six miles would be beneficial as avoiding an apportionment of
resources that had little relation to the capacity to exploit, promoting
continued high production of fish, and preventing, in some degree,
uneconomic disruption in the fishing effort of certain states without
ascertainable benefits to coastal states.
It is quite clear that, in a numerical sense, there was at the 1958
Conference a very considerable demand for a territorial sea of twelve
miles or, at least, for an area of exclusive fishing of twelve miles, if a
coastal state wished to claim less for the territorial sea. From the
276a Assuming knowledge of both the width of the territorial sea and the base points,
from which the territorial sea is to be projected, there is one final claim which we have
omitted from this discussion because of its relative unimportance, i.e., the claim to the
manner of drawing the outer limit of the territorial sea. The "arcs of circles" method
is generally regarded as the most desirable technique for laying down the outer limit
of the territorial sea; this is the method prescribed in Article 6 of the Convention on the
Territorial Sea and Contiguous Zone.
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standpoint of fisheries, most of these demands, whether for conservation
or for exploitation purposes, have little to commend them. In this respect
the most surprising development consisted of the arguments of Canada,
which included both allegations that an exclusive fishing area was
relevant to fishery conservation, and arguments, somehow intended to
persuade, that Canada needed to protect its fishermen from foreign
competition and that many other states faced a similar necessity. If
there were such a necessity, either for states generally or for Canada
in particular, it was never made evident in the Canadian presentation at
Geneva or in that of any other state. In terms of conservation, neither
the evidence available from biologists nor that of the economists,
including those from Canada, remotely suggests that a twelve-mile
exclusive fishing zone would be of any assistance at all. Indeed, even
the Canadian spokesman vacillated on the supposed requirement for
conservation, at times suggesting there was no present conservation need,
and in practically the same breath, contending for an exclusive fishing
area for conservation purposes. 77
If Canada, where fisheries research is particularly advanced, was
unable to make a case for a large exclusive fishing zone, it is not likely
that many other states could muster better arguments. For the most
part, the contribution of states arguing for a twelve-mile territorial sea
consisted of such unsupported exhortations as that of the representative
of Saudi Arabia when he declared that the United Kingdom "argument
that a twelve-mile limit would adversely affect the food supply available
for the population and his country's balance of payments was indeed
a weighty one which, in fact, supported the proposal for the twelve-mile
limit, since other coastal states emerging from a condition of poverty in
Asia, Africa and Latin America also had to feed many millions and to
balance their economies; they, surely, had prior rights to exclusive
fishing off their coasts.12 78 The implication that, without a twelve-mile
territorial sea, coastal states could not gain access to adjacent fishery
resources and make adequate catches is wholly without foundation. There
is no assurance, and probably no likelihood, that recognition of a twelve-
mile territorial sea would create the necessary capacity in many of the
states concerned for promoting the local exploitation of such resources.
Indeed, the creation of such exclusive zones might hamper these
possibilities by making it difficult, if not impossible, to conduct the
277 A major argument made by Canada against the United States proviso for permitting
certain foreign fishing between six and twelve miles off the coast was that use of efficient
vessels and gear would "bring about an ultimately dangerous diminution in the world's
fish supply." 3 Official Records 154 (1958). This is far from asserting a present need for
conservation but it does assume that an exclusive area is relevant for that purpose.
278 3 Official Records 135 (1958).
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investigation necessary to increased exploitation. Furthermore, and of
greatest importance, even if exploitation by local fishermen might be
increased, none of the states claiming a twelve-mile territorial sea, or
exclusive fishing zone, offered evidence that there were not enough fish
to support this increased activity along with foreign exploitation. Among
a considerable number of statements representing as high a degree of
exaggeration as -that of Saudi Arabia, reference may be made to those
of Mexico, India, Chile, Canada and Yugoslavia. 79
In this connection, an illustration of the gap between the allegations
made at the Conference and actual conditions, in one concrete instance,
is revealing, if not necessarily typical. Libya, which joined in the
insistence upon a twelve-mile territorial sea, declared during early debate
in the Committee that:
Libya had a long seacoast, its Fisheries were of great importance as a
source of food; fish and sponges constituted, in addition, valuable Libyan
exports. His country had therefore a great interest in the question.
Under the Federal law of Libya, the breadth of the territorial sea was
twelve miles. Libya was constantly faced with the problem of foreign
fishermen who were wrongfully exploiting the resources of its territorial
sea."
280
In sharp contrast with these statements are two reports on economic
conditions in Libya prepared through the United Nations Technical
Assistance program.28 ' With respect to the place of fish in the Libyan
food supply, alleged to be of "great importance," a team of experts
reported in 1953 that "[t]here is practically no inshore fishing in Libya,
despite the length of the coastline and abundance of fish. 282 They added:
One of the factors which hinder the development of the fishing industry
is the very low consumer demand. The per capita consumption of fish in
Tripoli is only 2 kilogrammes a year. Catches could easily be increased,
since fish are abundant, but any increase is systematically and forcibly
opposed by the local fishermen, because it would lead to lower prices. 283
Other enlightening observations include:
The Libyan sea constitutes an important source of revenue which is
insufficiently exploited.... To develop fishing in Libya, however, several
serious problems must be overcome: the lack of skilled manpower; limita-
tions of local demand; the shortage of boats, ship-building yards, and
technicians capable of carrying out ordinary repairs; lack of raw material
279 3 Official Records 165 (1958) [(Mexico), 155 (India and Chile), 184 (Yugoslavia),
184-85 (Canada).]
280 3 Official Records 53 (1958).
281 U.N. Technical Assistance Program, A General Economic Appraisal of Libya
(U.N. Doc. No. St/TAA/K/Libya/1) (1952); U.N. Technical Assistance Programme,
The Economic and Social Development of Libya (U.N. Doc. No. ST/TAA/K/Libya/3)
(1953).
282 Id. at 51.
283 Ibid.
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for ropes and nets and other fishing equipment; lack of sufficient harbors
and equipment; and the inadequate facilities for preserving fish."1
28
The reference to fish and sponges as valuable exports, and the
alleged wrongful exploitation by foreign fishermen appear similarly
unrealistic. It is true that fish exports are valuable to Libya-the United
Nations team estimated that "[i]n the years 1949-1950, the value of
tunny and sardine exports has ranged from seven per cent to thirteen per
cent of the total export trade.1285 What was ignored by the Libyan
speaker at the 1958 Conference, in referring to these valuable exports and
wrongful foreign exploitation, was the disclosure that, for the most
part, the fishing installations, including fishing equipment and factories
ashore, responsible for this export trade are owned by foreigners, mostly
Italian and Greek. Judging from the problems noted in the United
Nations report, it is highly unlikely that these exports would have been
made at all if foreign fishermen had not exploited the resources off the
Libyan coast. The evidence demonstrates, in short, that the contentions
made by Libya regarding its need for a twelve-mile territorial sea reflected
a factual disorientation sufficient to create a thriving but fictional local
fishing industry in Libya.
One other illustration of this lack of realistic orientation might be
cited. Among the Latin American states demanding a twelve-mile territo-
rial sea was Venezuela. It may be, though it is doubtful, that conditions
have changed in Venezuela since 1957, but that year the FAO reported
that a biologist had been assigned to Venezuela "to carry out an appraisal
of fisheries possibilities with a view to permitting the expansion of cer-
tain operations." ' 6 The biologist made the survey and submitted a "use-
ful" report,
[b]ut when it came to appraising the possibilities for development, he
was unable to advise the Government because the actual statistics of
existing production and of marketing possibilities, on which such an
appraisal would be based, were lacking. In fact, it became evident that
the survey was done too soon and attempted too high a scientific level
2 8 7
Chile, another state seeking a larger exclusive fishing area, sought FAO
aid. A biologist was assigned
• . to design a fisheries resources survey, and to establish a program
for its operation. He made a competent study but on a purely biological
basis; he recommended a program again for biological research. But there
the matter rests. The funds for the suggested survey were not available,
nor were there facilities or funds for implementing the program he had
laid down. 288
284 Id. at 49.
285 Id. at 52.
286 FAO, Millions Still Go Hungry 66 (12th Report of the Director General, 1957).
287 Ibid.
288 Ibid.
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The point of these illustrations is, clearly enough, that simple avail-
ability of fish does not determine exploitability, and that a great many
factors are influential in affecting the extent of coastal exploitation. The
presence of particular legal arrangements, according a monopolistic access
to local fishermen, is probably in most cases notably insignificant as a
factor for increased production and may, in fact, create many difficulties
for such fishermen. In this sense the insistence of Latin American states
for a twelve-mile territorial sea, primarily for fishery purposes, is
particularly to be regretted. Economists and biologists studying the
economics of fisheries have emphasized that political boundaries, cutting
off both fishing grounds and markets and obstructing "the spread of
technical information and of entrepreneurial and organizational abilities,"
are harmful from the perspective of fishery development.28 9
The situation of Iceland, almost wholly dependent upon fishing for a
viable economy and national existence, attracted considerable sympathy
at the Conference, partly because the Icelandic position is patently
unique, and perhaps also because its case was presented more moderately
than that of other states. In a resolution directed at the positions of
Iceland, Greenland, and the Faeroe Islands, the Conference recommended,
without a dissenting vote, that where a catch limit is instituted as a
conservation measure, "any other states fishing in that area should
collaborate with the coastal state to secure just treatment of such
situation, by establishing agreed measures which shall recognize any
preferential requirements of the coastal state resulting from its depend-
ence upon the fishery concerned while having regard to the interests of
the other states. .... ,"9 A more limited prescription, directed almost
solely at Iceland, for incorporation in the conservation convention did
not receive a sufficient majority vote and failed of adoption.nsl
289 Netherlands Economic Institute, The Development of Offshore Fisheries and the
Economics of Choice 25 (1958).
290 Resolution on Special Situations Relating to Coastal Fisheries, 2 Official Records
144 (1958). The Resolution was directed at two categories of states: Those "whose people
are overwhelmingly dependent upon coastal fisheries for their livelihood or economic
development" and those "whose coastal population depends primarily on coastal fisheries
for the animal protein of its diet and whose fishing methods are mainly limited to local
fishing from small boats." The Resolution declared that these situations were of
'imited scope and exceptional nature."
291 This was Article 60A, adopted by the Third Committee (High Seas: Fishing:
Conservation of Living Resources). It read:
Where a people is overwhelmingly dependent upon its coastal fisheries for its
livelihood or economic development and it becomes necessary to limit the total catch
of a stock or stocks of fish in areas adjacent to the coastal fisheries zone, the coastal
State shall have preferential rights under such limitations to the extent rendered neces-
sary by its dependence on the fishery.
In the case of disagreement any interested State may initiate the procedure provided
for in Article 57.
5 Official Records 161 (1958). For the discussion and vote in plenary session, see 2 Official
Records 43-46 (1958).
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It is not easy to appraise the prospects of further attempts to achieve
explicit agreement on the width of the territorial sea. The American
proposal received much heavier support at the Conference than any
other, and, although the most desirable alternative would be the adoption
of a three mile territorial sea coupled with procedures for establishing
contiguous zones for exclusive fishing where urgently needed, future
efforts are not likely to deviate from its fundamental provisions.292 In
surveying possible future alignments, attention must naturally focus
upon states which demanded a twelve mile territorial sea. Of the thirty-
nine states supporting the eight-Power proposal for a territorial sea up
to twelve miles, it may be noted that six of them would have been willing
to accept the American article, having voted for the eight-Power proposal
only after voting for the American recommendation which failed of
a two-thirds majority. The Soviet bloc accounted for 8 of the remaining
33 states and, though Poland abstained on the eight-Power proposal and
claims only a three-mile territorial sea, it is not likely to throw support
to an American initiative.
Perhaps a slight majority of the remainder of the states, including
eleven from Latin America and Iceland, were most specifically concerned
with fishery problems, while those in the Afro-Asian group, apart from
Nepal and Afghanistan both of which are landlocked, appear to have been
affected by alleged security needs. Persuasive efforts to seek a change of
position should therefore be directed at both these problems. The
general irrelevance of the territorial sea for security purposes and fishery
exploitation naturally needs clear emphasis; presentations should be
appropriately related to any unique conditions prevailing with respect
to each state.
The potentialities of agreement on the breadth of the territorial sea
may be seriously affected by the passage of time and the continued
emergence of new bodies politic. In the 1958 Conference it was quite clear
that the new states were prone to urge a wider territorial sea, and the
establishment of new states in greater numbers in the forseeable future
292 Sorensen, note 253, supra at 251, declares that "future negotiations are bound to
start where the deliberations of the Conference ended-that is, by accepting the maximum
breadth of six miles, combined with certain exclusive fishing rights beyond that limit."
The United States proposal seems to have been adopted by Great Britain and Denmark
in resolving their disagreement about fisheries off the Faeroe Islands. There, it was agreed
that the exclusive fishing area should extend to twelve miles but that British trawlers could
fish up to six miles because they had traditionally fished in these waters. It is reported that
the agreement is to remain in force pending emergence of a general solution to the problem
of fishing limits from the 1960 Conference on the Law of the Sea. See N.Y. Times, Feb. 25,
1959, p. 12, col. 3.
Apparently Great Britain has also suggested this formula to Iceland as, at least, a
temporary solution. It is reported that another solution suggested by Great Britain would
have made reference to the maximum sustainable yield of the demersal fisheries over the
Icelandic continental shelf. See Heinzen, "The Three-Mile Limit: Preserving the Freedom
of the Seas," 11 Stan. L. Rev. 597, 662 (1959).
[Vol. 45
TERRITORIAL SEA
may thus add another substantial barrier to the achievement of explicit
agreement.
The most beneficial long-term strategy-that offering the greatest
promise of eventual agreement on a narrow territorial sea and other
necessary measures for increasing the productive use of the oceans-
would appear to consist of a more intense assault on the scientific,
technological and economic problems connected with the exploitation of
sea resources. Certainly one of the most potent obstacles to a rational
consideration of these problems is a simple lack of information stemming
both from the faulty distribution of knowledge and from a relative lack
of concern for the development of ocean resources. The knowledge
required is not, of course, simple. Rather, it is most complex and
difficult to obtain without very considerable cooperative effort. Certainly,
increased oceanographic research on a national, regional and global
scale is a necessity if potential resources are to be made available in fullest
measure for optimum exploitation. Part of this research, and a sig-
nificant proportion, must be concerned with the practical problems
connected with fishery exploitation.
Not the least of the effort required is in increased and concentrated
study of the economics of fisheries. It is not too much to hope that ade-
quate study of this kind would alone contribute substantially to
correcting many of the emotional, ill-considered notions widely held
concerning fishery resources. Of equal importance, economic investiga-
tion, including the study of existing markets and market development, as
well as an inquiry into other factors important for investment decisions
from local and global perspectives, is required if a modicum of rational
planning is to be employed as a method of increasing the well-being
of peoples. Without increased cooperative activity along these lines,
aimed particularly at aiding impoverished states to plan and promote
appropriate exploitation of fishery resources, no agreement upon verbal
formulae for delimiting the scope of state authority over adjacent ocean
areas is likely to have any relevance, unless a most unfortunate relevance,
for meeting the food problems of the world.
VI. Tim COMMON INTEREST IN PRESERVING INCLUSIVE USE AND
COMPETENCE
The problem confronting the states of the world in agreeing upon an
authoritative determination of the width of the territorial sea, as we
have posed it, requires a choice between protecting the common interests,
including both inclusive interests and long-term exclusive interests, of
all states, and attempting to protect the short-term exclusive interests
of a few states. It has, however, been objected by distinguished authority
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that it is "an over-simplification" to state contemporary problems of the
law of the sea in terms of a "conflict between wider community interests
and narrow national self-interest."9 13 In support of this charge of over-
simplification, it is insisted that "a wide measure of freedom may very
well serve the interests of one group or category of states, whereas the
opposite tendency may serve the interests of others"; that particular
states, whether principal powers or "small states with meager resources,"
may "in some circumstances, but in some only, legitimately identify their
interests with those of the international community at large"; and that
the "very concept of community interests is ambiguous because the func-
tion of law is to strike an acceptable balance between divergent inter-
ests." 94 This blunt denial of community interest, in favor of exaggerated
emphasis upon exclusive national interest, is based, we suggest in conclu-
sion, upon profound and dangerous misconceptions. On the one hand, it
underestimates the interdependences of states and does not take into ade-
quate account the most comprehensive long-term interests of all states.
Conversely, it overemphasizes the divergences and conflicts between states
and does not recognize the potentialities of genuine integrative solutions
in which all gain and none lose.
The reality of the world arena today is that all states, great and small,
are irrevocably locked in processes of interdetermination with respect to
all values, and, hence, that the public order which any particular state
can achieve is inescapably a function of a global public order, however
rent with dissensions that order may be. It is this comprehensive, global
public order which determines and secures both the inclusive and exclusive
interests of particular states. The collective experience of several cen-
turies has established that it is by shared use and shared competence,
with a minimum of monopolization of either use or authority, that the
states of the world in their exploitation of the oceans can create the
greatest net gains both in the indivisible value of general security and
the divisible values of wealth, enlightenment, well-being, and so on. This
same experience has established, further, that the best hope for a fair
and just division among the peoples of the world of the net gains from
their cooperative exploitation of the oceans must be found, not in exclu-
sive dictation, however benevolent, but in shared competence. The
historic function of the international law of the sea has been not merely
that of balancing "divergent interests," but of clarifying and securing,
by shared reciprocity and mutual restraint, the common interests
of all states in this greatest possible production and widest possible dis-
tribution of values from the great sharable resource of the oceans. In
293 Sorensen, note 253, supra at 199.
294 Ibid.
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this endeavor, states of all sizes and strengths have not irrationally or
unreasonably identified their comprehensive and long-term national
interests with the interests of the "international community at large."
It must, of course, be recognized that a state may, on occasion, be able
to secure unique advantages from the oceans by a policy of exclusive
grab and arbitrary assertion of authority; but its continued enjoyment
of such advantages is entirely dependent upon other states not embarking
upon similar policies or other retaliations. Once the restraints of law
are abandoned for naked power, the greatest gains-if anybody gains-
can only go to the most ruthless and the most powerful.
The balance between the common interests of all states and the
putative, exclusive interests of particular states is, as has been indicated
at length above, most directly and immediately at stake in the contem-
porary demands by some states to expand the width of the territorial
sea. The issue is whether several million square miles of the oceans, long
regarded as the common patrimony of all mankind, will remain open and
free for shared use and competence or will be closed for monopolistic
exploitation and control. It has not in fact been demonstrated that
an expansion of the territorial sea will serve any realistic, exclusive
interest of particular states: the testimony of scientists and economists
is, rather, that the important objectives of increased fish production and
a more profitable fishing industry would be better served by increased
international cooperation. It certainly has not been established that an
expansion of the territorial sea will serve the inclusive interests of
states: general security, efficiency in transporation and communication,
and increased total production of food are not likely to be advanced by
enlargements of the domain of exclusive authority. The dangers to both
the realistic exclusive interests and the inclusive interests of states which
inhere in an expansion of the territorial sea, in contrast, seem both
evident and certain. The expansion of exclusive competence to interfere
with navigation, fishing, and scientific inquiry is but an unnecessary
invitation to the exercise of such competence. It is, for example, beyond
any doubt that the yield from fisheries cannot be advanced to the maxi-
mum sustainable level or an optimum level if the information which
is indispensable to such achievement is not acquired or is made very
difficult to acquire. Yet these latter consequences must most certainly
ensue from an extension of the territorial sea or an exclusive fishing
area. Considering all our contemporary ignorance and interdependence,
the most rational course for the general community, and for particular
states genuinely concerned for their long-term interests, would appear
to be to abide by the wisdom of Grotius, as confirmed by experience and
as promising the greatest common gains for all mankind.
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